Deconstruction

John Phillips

The term deconstruction was widely picked up, especially in the United States, as a name for the kind of method or procedure that Jacques Derrida and others influenced by him used in their work.  Early in Of Grammatology, Derrida talks cautiously of a kind of “rationality” that governs writing, in an enlarged and radicalized sense, which “inaugurates the destruction, not the demolition but the de-sedimentation, the de-construction, of all the significations that have their source in that of the logos” (10).  This notion of deconstruction is best understood in terms of certain effects that are inevitably produced by traditional philosophical texts that fail in their various attempts to isolate or identify a pure value (truth, origin, presence) against diverse conditions that would tarnish that purity.  Deconstruction names the powerful and transferable effects of this inevitable failure. 

 

Certain properties of repetition have inevitable effects on values traditionally identified with rationality: truth, justice, religion, ethics and science, in short, all significations that have their source in the idea of what has been called the logos.  Logos means word in Ancient Greek, but is used in different contexts for rational account or logical reasoning.  The idea of the logos thus privileges the rational content of a signification.  Derrida is not the first to observe that the logos is traditionally determined according to the value of presence, which either is dogmatically asserted by philosophical teaching or is set up as the absent goal of rational questioning.  Because experience is always in several ways marked by certain kinds of repeatable mediation, the value of a pure presence remains tantalizingly out of reach, lost in the mists of pre-personal history or always yet to come beyond the horizon of an unknowable future.  An absolute past and an absolutely undetermined future infect experience, making possible memories and desires, as well as fictions and theories.  Experience is mediated in several ways, as problems of language, in a privileged example, show.  Relationships to others and to objects seem irremediably contaminated by the mechanical means of communication.   Questions of interpretation, translation, imagination, perspective, and cultural difference demonstrate an irreducible quantum of play in any relation.   

 

The concept of time lies at the heart of all the problems of establishing and maintaining the quest for the value of presence.  So long as time is determined in terms of presence (including past presents as well as presents to come) then thought will not pass beyond the constraints of what Derrida calls logocentrism.  Those conditions and processes that erode or compromise the value of presence will again be subject to attempts at domestication, exclusion, or containment. 

 

Language, for instance, tends to be divided up in terms of its supposed immediately expressive component (thought, concept, signified, sense) and the mediational component (word, symbol, signifier, mark).  The latter would ideally be controlled and ordered according to the former, as its tele-technological slave.  But this is when deconstruction kicks in.  It would not be possible to distinguish mediation rigorously in terms of a signifier and signified unless the signified was of a quite different nature to the signifier.  The mythical transcendental signified has been given many names, like the medieval topos noetos, which represents the divine understanding as a space of pure thought present to itself and undamaged by time, and which serves to guarantee the difference between word and concept.  Deconstruction is a name for what in fact guarantees the maintenance of the logos: the repeatability of the mark.  So long as a mark (which can be mental) differs from itself in its repetition then signification is possible.  The predicates of writing (repeatable marks with no natural or necessary connection to the meanings they refer to or endlessly produce) guarantee the functioning of both spoken words (repeatable sound images) and thoughts.  These predicates ensure the possibilities of social interaction in the always potential absence, in the mark, of sense, reference, addresser and addressee.  Derrida coins the phrase archi-writing (or proto-writing) to designate the predicates that allow meaningful interaction to occur. 

 

The basic and most problematic predicate of experience lies in the irreducible relation to the other, which in its undetermined state precedes and makes possible all particular relations to actual others.  The undetermined relation to the other’s alterity conditions all possible relations and thus remains in the form of the trace, connecting yet keeping separate the actual members, as well as those as yet unheard of potential members, of a community.  Because this trace of the other is a structural condition emerging from the repeatability of the mark, it tends to give rise to the dream of a dimension free from repetition (i.e., free of time): eternity. 

 

Conversely, traditional attempts to topple philosophy’s idealism and religion’s divinity tend to overemphasize the material grounds of social relations, thus attempting to contain or domesticate the repeatability of the trace in empirical or materialist determinations.  Once more, the example of the linguistic sign is often the site of such transformations, when the signifier (as opposed to the signified) is said to be the determining factor in signification.  But this reversal of metaphysics always turns out to be a repetition of metaphysics, locating the value of presence in an alternative but no less unanalyzed space, an alternative topos noetos.  For this reason Derrida extends the phrase logocentrism to phallogocentrism, after the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and his doctrine of the materiality of the signifier (the phallus as the signifier of the signifier).

 

Procedures of deconstruction can thus operate according to the laws of iterability, a term that combines the possibilities of alterity and repetition.  The combination reflects the indubitable law of repetition: what repeats must be the same but can never be identical.  Thus repeatability can be seen to be the source of the metaphysical doctrine of identity, simultaneously both allowing it and yet marking its impossibility.  Iterability links logocentrism to deconstruction in so far as deconstruction would repeat the procedures of a logocentric teaching so that, in the repetition, the procedures would themselves undermine the disavowal of iterability.

 

References

Derrida, J. (1967) De La Grammatologie. Paris: Minuit.  Trans. Gayatri Spivac (1974) Of Grammatology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.

Derrida, J. (1988) Limited Inc. Trans. Samuel Weber. Evanston, Il.: Northwestern University Press.