Petrarca
John Phillips
30/10/06
Montaigne’s text sometimes reads like an echo of
Petrarca but in a new idiom. More
than two centuries earlier, in one of the founding texts of the humanities,
“Of his own Ignorance and that of Many Others” (1368), Petrarca
writes: “What is the use—I beseech you—of knowing the nature
of quadrupeds, fowls fishes and serpents and not knowing or even neglecting
man’s nature, the purpose for which we are born, and whence and whereto
we travel?” (Petrarca 58-59).
Petrarca is perhaps only the most outspoken of those who mock the
encyclopaedic absurdities of the knowledge of his time. In “On his own Ignorance,”
he compiles a list of the facts that a “great man” of knowledge
might tell us:
[H]ow many hairs there are
in a lion’s mane; how many feathers in a hawk’s tail; with how many
arms a cuttlefish clasps a shipwrecked man; that elephants couple from behind
and are pregnant for two years; that this docile and vigorous animal, the
nearest to man by its intelligence, lives until the end of the second or third
century of its life; that the phoenix is consumed by aromatic fire and revives
after it has been burned; that the sea urchin stops a ship, however fast she is
driving along, while it is unable to do anything once it is dragged out of the
waves; how the hunter fools a tiger with a mirror; how the arimasp attacks the
griffin with his sword; how whales turn over on their backs and thus deceive
the sailors; that the newborn of the bear has as yet no shape; that the mule
rarely gives birth, the viper only once and then to its own disaster; that
moles are blind and bees deaf; that alone among all living things the crocodile
moves its upper jaw. (57)
Petrarca’s sources (which he clearly knew both
from the earlier contexts as well as from their later encyclopaedic
restatements) might seem to resemble an archaic version of the present
situation: the expanding encyclopaedias of global internet knowledge. Vincent of Beauvais, for instance, had
produced in the preceding century an encyclopaedic volume named Speculum naturale, which collects and
conveniently organises (with no aspiration to any critical assessment)
knowledge and opinions from a very wide range of sources. These include, amongst the wisdom of the
Aristotlelian tradition, not only the relatively few blunders and later
distortions of Aristotle’s biological works (usually from History of Animals and Generation of Animals) but also the lies
and inventions of pseudo-scientific scholarship passed down often with the aid
of spurious etymologies (the word “viper” was for instance said to
mean “giving birth in violence”). Other similar sources include
Alexander Neckam, De rerum naturis (see Wright, 1863) and Bartholomaeus
Angelus, De propriatatibus rerum
(some of which is translated in Steele, R., 1924). The reference to the bee has its source
in the opening sentences of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the chief work of the scholastic tradition. He had written: “those [animals]
that are not able to hear sounds are intelligent without being able to learn
(e.g., the bee)” (980b 23), thus also revealing an interesting assumption
about the functions of the different senses (sight and hearing) for memory and
learning respectively.