Benjamin on Art and Reproducibility: The Case of Music

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Nothing more was needed than a piece of pliable cardboard bent to the shape of a funnel, on the narrower orifice of which was stuck a piece of impermeable paper of the kind used to bottle fruit. This provided a vibrating membrane, in the midst of which was stuck a bristle from a coarse clothes brush at right angles to its surface. With these few things one part of the mysterious machine was made, receiver and reproducer were complete. It now only remained to construct the receiving cylinder…. When someone spoke or sang into the funnel, the needle in the parchment transferred the sound waves to the receptive surface of the roll slowly turning beneath it, and then, when the moving needle was made to retrace its path … the sound which had been ours came back to us tremlingly, haltingly from the paper funnel, uncertain, infinitely soft and hesitating and fading out altogether in places.

(Rainer Maria Rilke, “Primal Sound”, 1919)

1 A PLEA FOR MUSIC

Rilke’s childhood experiment invokes the primal aura of sound through the paradox of its repeatability. It underscores the perpetuation of sound as inscription, while revealing technology in the guise of a mirror that reverses technique. Production and reproduction are grounded in separate realms of materiality that constitute the limit conditions in which specific forms of transmissibility produce signs as sound and language. Rilke anticipates Benjamin’s intimation that “now the mirror image has become detachable from the person mirrored, and is transportable”
The preoccupations that led Benjamin in the 1930s to his theses on the relation of technology to art also prepared the way for his description of the decline of storytelling after the advent of the book. The Artwork essay, through its several versions, aspires to a general application that is belied by its focus on cinema and the visual arts, though it fulfills in exemplary fashion Benjamin’s consistent ambition for criticism “to liberate the future from its deformations in the present” (SW 1:38).² Its references to music are confined to glances at the development of recording technology around 1900 (SW 3: 102), the separation of audience from music in the gramophone record (SW 3: 103, SW 4: 254), the Dadaist use of “an enchanting fabric of sound” as missile (SW 3: 267; SW 4: 119), the profusion of trash in the music industry (Nt. 29, SW 4: 278), and Leonardo da Vinci’s disparagement of music as less lasting than painting (Nt. 33, SW 4: 279). As in Heidegger’s essay on “The Origin of the Work of Art” of the same period, “the thing-character of the work” retains the sense of an object with a tangible body and a unique afterlife in space and time.³ The elision of music leaves the imprint of its absence as a trace which retains the kind of faith that led Adorno to the belief that “Benjamin’s concept of aura … may touch on the music-like quality of all art” (B: 7). The present essay explores the scope for a wider application of Benjamin’s ideas by examining the effect of reproducibility on music and extending the reference to include music beyond Europe.

His letters indicate the programmatic nature of the Artwork essay in their recognition that technological reproducibility created possibilities that had differing implications for socialist and fascist orientations to art.⁴ In October 1935, he wrote to his friend Werner Kraft,
I am busy pointing my telescope through the bloody mist at a mirage of the nineteenth century that I am attempting to reproduce based on the characteristics it will manifest in a future state of the world, liberated from magic. I must first build this telescope myself and, in making this effort, I am the first to have discovered some fundamental principles of materialistic art theory (C: 516).

It is a curious aspect of the contingency bracketing this aim that neither of the two friends who tugged from opposite sides over Benjamin’s unresolved elective affinities found satisfaction in his treatment of a materialist theory of art. Adorno niggled away at the worry that the desire to oppose Fascism in art led Benjamin to betray the dialectical nature of the antithesis between the auratic and the mass-produced artwork. He complained for over thirty years that Benjamin ignored the degree to which external developments in technology were not as germane to art as the need to develop internal techniques that would sustain distance and autonomy in the teeth of the culture industry. More laconically, Brecht underlined the tension between idealism and materialism that haunts Benjamin’s aura:

Benjamin is here. … he says: when you feel a gaze directed to you, even behind your back, you return it (!). the expectation that what you look at looks back at you, provides the aura, the latter is supposed to be in decay in recent times, together with the cultic …. It is mysticism mysticism in a posture opposed to mysticism. It is in such a form that the materialist concept of history is adopted! It is rather ghastly.

Brecht’s characteristic response, as noted by Benjamin, was to cut the Gordian cut: in the age of mass reproducibility, the artwork might be rescued in its function even if the concept might have to be eliminated, along with its past associations (Nt. 16, SW 4: 274).
2 BENJAMIN AND MUSIC

There is sufficient evidence to suggest that music was not close to Benjamin’s interests. When he is mindful of its contemporary plight, as in “The Author as Producer” (1934), it is subsumed in a general antithesis between external developments in technological means of reproduction and the internal failure of the arts to evolve new modes of production to resist or shape the power of the reproduction process. He quotes with approval the view of Hans Eisler that “an ever-increasing process of rationalization” is likely to render the phonograph record and the sound film into canned commodities, unless the artist as producer learns to resist the economic mobilization of technology for mass consumption by trying to renew from within “the world as it is” (SW 2: 775). Eisler was to collaborate a decade later with Adorno on Composing for Films (1947), a text which repeats with heavy sarcasm the fear that the criterion “of reaching the consumer as effectively as possible” might even give us the Moonlight sonata ‘sung by a choir and played by a supposedly mystical orchestra’.

Benjamin shared Adorno’s anxiety, but his hope for an artistic technique that might resist the rationalizing power of technology turned to photomontage, as subsidized by Brecht’s Epic Theatre. Benjamin believed that the ‘superimposed element’ of the gestus had the power to disrupt “the context in which it is inserted” (SW 2: 778), an enthusiasm that left Adorno unimpressed. In Aesthetic Theory (1970), he repeatedly expresses doubts about the adequacy of photomontage, reiterating the view that “Technical forces of production have no value in themselves” (AT: 247). In the 1930s, he preferred to develop from Benjamin the dialectical relation inherent to Technik as technique and industrial process.
The motif that most impressed Adorno came in the form of a relatively brief but suggestive allusion to music in the context of the relation between allegory and Trauerspiel in *The Origin of German Tragic Drama* (1924-5). In “the musical philosophy of the romantic writers, who have an elective affinity with the baroque”, music symbolizes a myth of origin for the relation between creativity and language. As invoked in the poetry of pastoral plays, and exemplified in recitative and opera, it represents the primeval condition of humanity with what Johann Wilhelm Ritter referred to as “unsurpassed purity, power and innocence”. The belief that word and script or speech and writing are at source one subsidizes the notions that all creativity is a form of language, such that “every image is only a form of writing … only a signature, only the monogram of essence, not the essence itself in a mask” (*O*: 213-4). Benjamin treats the claim that all the arts derive from the unity of thought and language as concluding the “virtual romantic theory of allegory” on a question whose answer would

have to bring oral and written language together, by whatever means possible, which can only mean identifying them dialectically as thesis and antithesis; to secure for music, the antithetical mediating link, and the last remaining universal language since the tower of Babel, its rightful central position as antithesis; and it would have to investigate how written language grows out of music and not directly from the sounds of the spoken word (*O*: 214).

A decade later, Adorno acknowledged the influence of this motif in a letter of 17 December 1934:

I would also like especially to count your remarks about music, and about the gramophone and photography, as further evidence of our agreement – in a
few weeks you should hopefully be receiving something which I wrote about a year ago concerning the nature phonographic records, a piece which takes a specific passage in your book on Baroque drama as its point of departure and simultaneously employs the category of ambiguous and alienated thinghood in almost exactly the sense in which I now see you are construing it in the piece on Kafka; and above all the same is true of your remarks on beauty and hopelessness (CC: 67).

Ironically, Benjamin’s self-effacing reply reiterated his sense of music as a “field otherwise remote” from his own (CC: 119; C: 517), though as late as 1940 he recapitulates the romantic thesis, citing Vico as a source (SW 4: 364). Reading Adorno on jazz in 1936, he was willing to recognize an analogy between syncopation in jazz and his own preoccupation with ‘shock effects” in film (CC: 144). However, two years later, he qualified this recognition:

The subject matter of your work touches upon my own in those parts which relate certain characteristics of the contemporary acoustic perception of jazz to the optical perception of film as I have described it …. [but] I do not mean to suggest that acoustic and optical perception are equally susceptible to revolutionary transformation (CC: 295; C: 619).

He is – perhaps intentionally – ambiguous about whether he was reluctant to extend the analogy between his approach to film and Adorno’s approach to jazz, or whether he perceived film to possess a greater potential for revolution than music, and therefore found music less germane to his art theory, a point Adorno was willing to concede (C: 590). He went on to promote another analogy between their views during this period, by claiming that Benjamin’s treatment of developments in Impressionist and Abstract painting as a reaction to the rise of photography was parallel to his account of the relation between twelve-tone music and the rise of the gramophone
record. Michael Chanan has remarked aptly of this claim, “In this equation, the abandonment of tonality equals the abandonment of representation and atonality equals abstraction. Historical justification for this reading is ambiguous”.9

The last years of the correspondence between Benjamin and Adorno bring up a handful of significant encounters that link Benjamin’s concept of aura to Adorno’s work on music. In a letter of 18 March 1936, Adorno expresses unease about Benjamin’s concept of aura, claiming that the idea of aesthetic autonomy is dialectical, and “compounds within itself the magical element with the sign of freedom” (C: 128). The issue at stake is the recognition that if “the auratic element of the work of art is in decline”, that is “not merely on account of its technical reproducibility”, but because “the autonomy of the work of art, and therefore its material form, is not identical with the magical element in it” (C: 129). A letter of 9 December 1938 avers that Benjamin’s “analysis of the psychological types engendered by industry” complements and strengthens the argument of his own essay on regression in listening (C: 590). A letter of 29 February 1940 returns to Benjamin’s treatment of aura in relation to Baudelaire, to ask, “Is not the aura invariably a trace of a forgotten human moment in the thing, and is it not directly connected, precisely by virtue of this forgetting, with what you call “experience”?” The issue centered round Adorno’s unease at the idealism he declared latent in Benjamin’s desire to “retain this trace”, “in those things which have now become alien” (C: 322). Adorno preferred to enlist the notion of aura to refract the hermetic element in art, which he believed would reinforce aesthetic autonomy in its resistance to ideology. Meanwhile, Benjamin in the Artwork essay had moved on from the nostalgia he attached ambivalently to his thesis of the decline of aura in the “Little History of Photography” (1931). Aura shimmers like a chameleon through Benjamin’s writings.10 Note 15 in
the third version \((SW\ 4: 273-4)\) rejects idealism because, he claims, it conceives beauty as always undivided. The revision expands Note 9 from the second version \((SW\ 3: 124)\) by quoting from Hegel’s *Lectures on Aesthetics* to the effect that artistic reception has moved, or oscillated, between the artwork as an object of veneration and reflection. The third version of the Artwork essay inflects aura to signify a category of ‘spatiotemporal perception’ \((\text{Nt. 11, SW 4: 272})\), a kind of hallucination or illusion of the “unapproachable” that persists regardless of its material proximity. We might describe its significance here in terms of a Bakhtinian chronotope of cult value that has its retrospective being in the realm of “beautiful semblance” \((SW\ 4: 261)\),\(^{11}\) which the second version had described as the affect associated with a first technology \((\text{Nt. 22, SW 3: 127})\). According to Benjamin, technological reproducibility marks the twentieth century as the age of a second technology, which, by definition, involves the ‘shriveling of the aura’ \((SW\ 4: 261)\).

Criticism was not always a one-way street between the two. In 1938, Adorno’s chapters on Wagner induced Benjamin to put aside some of his Mandarin courtesy and relish the irony of using music to make a telling point against Adorno’s attempt at a ‘salvation’ of Wagner, while remaining committed to the view that the progressive elements in his music were mixed with the regressive. Benjamin points out that the logic of the position requires a kind of writing that would “have to exhibit “a particular affinity with musical form itself”, since ‘salvation is a cyclical form, polemic a progressive one” \((CC: 259)\). He goes on to regret that Adorno has compromised those elements in his music theory which link opera with consolation, resistance, and happiness, while intent on reifying the motif of eternity as a form of phantasmagoria. Alban Berg, and “his indescribably proud modesty” \((SF: 75)\), was to provide a more congenial common ground between them.\(^{12}\) Benjamin particularly
liked the description penned by Adorno under the bizarre yet apt pseudonym Hektor Rottweiler, “He has undercut the negativity of the world with the hopelessness of his fantasy” (C: 523). Many years after Benjamin’s death, Adorno was to draw attention to a different resemblance, that between Webern and Benjamin.

Adorno continued to draw upon ideas from Benjamin in his later work on music, as when he treats Beethoven as a musician who does not invent, but instead, discovers his music. This “revokes the a priori untruth of music’s voice, of its being music at all, the immanent movement of the concept as an unfolding truth” (B: 7). The composer is thus “the stenographer of the objectified composition… in Benjamin’s phrase, “the clerk recording his own inner life”“ (B: 9). Adorno’s preference for finding over making, and for music before its sound, is not far from the abstract idea of a primal language as invoked in Benjamin’s early essay “On Language as Such and on the Language of Man” (1916), which implies that music could be treated as a kind of paradisiac language that performance and notation render, in their different terms, as translation.

Meanwhile, the Romantic myth of a unified origin for the arts, a history of the degeneration of that unity into the antithesis between speech and writing, and an association of music with writing rather than speech, have remained open questions for discourse on music after Benjamin. The idea of art as a form of primal language can be assimilated to the kind of view developed by Derrida, which treats writing “before it is linked to incision, engraving, drawing, or the letter” as referring to “the instituted trace, as the possibility common to all systems of signification”. Of Grammatology takes up Rousseau’s version of the antithesis between the voice of speech and the voice of song to address the question of origin and separation that preoccupied Rousseau, and concludes its deconstructive reading with the view that
“Degeneration as separation, severing of voice and song, has always already begun…
The history of music is parallel to the history of language, its evil is in essence graphic”.  
Derrida’s reading of Rousseau’s valorization of the primacy of speech over writing, melody over harmony, and the association of music with voice rather than sound, suggests that “there is no origin at which the supplementation Rousseau hopes to avoid is not already inscribed”. Traditions that prioritize the oral aspects of music over the graphic might be expected to endorse belief in the primacy of sound over sign, but, as the Indian musicologist Ashok Ranade remarks, “even the Vedic tradition essentially consisted of oral transmission of the written material”. This reinforces the view stressed by Alastair Williams, that “even improvisation contains the articulatory features characteristic of musical notation”.

3 EXTRAPOLATIONS FROM THE ARTWORK ESSAY

Benjamin’s Artwork essay devotes considerable attention to film, and the displacement of aura brought about by the disembodied dissemination of the actor among the masses. “Reflections on Radio” (c.1931) calls such displacement a form of “barbarism” (SW 2: 544). The situation of the actor in the film studio corresponds to that of the musician in the recording studio in terms of “the fundamental separation between practitioners and the public” (SW 2: 543). That makes it possible to extrapolate several of Benjamin’s ideas from film and radio to recorded music, using both the second and third versions of the Artwork essay as a kind of palimpsest.

The most vital difference stressed by Benjamin is that between the natural and the artificial mode of production: the latter involves a breaking up of the integrity and wholeness of the interaction in which the producer and recipient share the same space
and time. The process of production is determined by technological intervention. In the studio, the principle of ‘selection before an apparatus’ (Nt. 27, SW 4: 277) and the principle of the second-take prevail in the service of the illusion of infinite perfectibility, producing a situation in which, as Jean Baudrillard remarks, ‘social finality is lost in the series. The simulacra win out over history.’

Music-making is mediated through the apparatus of recording, turning the performer into someone who produces only or primarily for the sake of reproduction, whereas, in a natural environment, the performer “measures himself against tasks set by nature, not by equipment” (SW 3: 111). In the studio, the time of production is broken up: the coherence, sequence, and integrity of production as performance are subjugated to the need to produce a simulacrum that will resemble performance. The studio-edited performance is thus an illusion “of the second degree” (SW 4: 263). Natural performance-conditions are violated in order to produce their semblance. Ironically, when “live” performances are recorded, either with or without the knowledge of the producer, the end-product often fails to match the finish of the sound in a recording perfected under studio conditions. Artifice thus provides a better illusion of actualization than natural performance, especially with music whose production coincides with its reproductive mode, as in the case of rock music.

In such situations, as Baudrillard notes, “to rephrase Benjamin, there is an aura of simulacrum – just as for him there was an aura of the original.” The sense of an aura perverted, or renaturalized, are both outcomes of the curious situation in which audiences value their participation in the “mediatized” reproduction even more than their presence at the scene of production.

When sound in the studio is produced and modified under circumstances that make performance artificial (SW 3: 111), and production submits directly to the
reproductive process, “the human being is placed in a position where he must operate with his whole living person, while forgoing its aura”, and the studio makes “productive use of the human being’s self-alienation” (SW 3: 112-3; SW 4: 260). The producer may have no audience beyond the technicians present at the recording; alternatively, the producer may be supplied with a small studio audience. In the latter case, any member of this artificial audience functions as recipient not for her own sake, or in her own person, but as token for the type, in order to simulate the semblance of presence in the studio’s construction of an illusory context for production. Such an audience suffers from the additional disadvantage that Benjamin identifies in respect of the film audience: a tendency for individuals who constitute a mass to react in ways that end up regulating one another (SW 3: 116), thus compromising the freedom of individual response.

When the artifice of such production is made reproducible through recording, it is translated into the materiality of a medium (such as tape or computer data) and then retranslated into the commodities of reproduction, producing what Baudrillard describes as the industrial “MODEL/SERIES distinction”. As commodity, music becomes the means through which the consumer becomes the collector, who “takes up the struggle against dispersion” (A: 211), and the fetishist, “who, through possession of the artwork, shares in its cultic power” (Nt. 12, SW 4: 272). Sound perceived as music through human conventions is rendered in the very different terms of sound as perceived through the conventions of acoustical physics, in a disjunction that has a visual parallel: “it is another nature which speaks to the camera as compared to the eye” (SW 4: 266). The difference between the two is disguised when we consider that as technology advances, the sound as produced and the sound as reproduced become less and less distinguishable in humanly affective terms, making
it all the more important to recognize the radical difference between them, which Friedrich Kittler stresses in an instructive comparison:

Overtones are frequencies, that is, vibrations per second. And the grooves of Edison’s phonograph recorded nothing but vibrations. Intervals and chords, by contrast, were ratios, that is, fractions made up of integers. The length of a string (especially on a monochord) was subdivided, and the fractions, to which Pythagoras gave the proud name *logoi*, resulted in octaves, fifths, fourths, and so on. Such was the logic upon which was founded everything that, in Old Europe, went by the name of music…. In frequency curves, the simple proportions of Pythagorean music turn into irrational, that is, logarithmic, functions. Conversely, overtones series – which in frequency curves are simple integral multiples of vibrations and determining elements of each sound – soon explode the diatonic music system. This is the depth of the gulf separating Old European alphabetism from mathematical-physical notation.25

The separation of the performer from a natural audience denies her “the opportunity … to adjust to the audience during performance”, and “This permits the audience to take the position of a critic, without experiencing any personal contact” with the producer (*SW* 4: 259-60). In “the here and now” (*SW* 3: 103, *SW* 4: 253) of natural production, the time of the music has primacy. Producer and recipient are both bound to its continuity and integrity. The “cult of the audience” (*SW* 3: 113) controls the market forces that affect the economy of the studio and what it reproduces. This may be described as the external control over production by the masses: “Those who are not visible, not present while he executes his performance, are precisely the ones who will control it” (*SW* 3: 113). The technologically equipped audience exercises a corresponding internal power over the reproduction. In playback mode, the time of the performance becomes secondary. The recipient has mastery over the music, and can
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pause, rewind, skip, and generally play fast and loose with the music and its temporal continuity. The continuity of the artwork as recording is thus subject to the whim of the recipient. The listening condition for music is no longer time, but its simulation. Music as objectified in a commodity can recreate the illusion of any segment of primary time within its secondariness. As objectification, it functions as a prosthetic meant to compensate for, or deflect from the human lack of control over the relentless linearity of time. It can appear to cheat time by repeating it in a stylized form. This can be said to resolve the antitheses Benjamin sets up in the Artwork essay to the advantage of the first category: between distraction and contemplative immersion, between distraction and concentration (SW 3: 119; SW 4: 267), and between play and semblance (SW 3: 127). The archetype of “being alone with one’s God” (Nt. 40, SW 4: 281) is displaced by being alone with one’s commodity, “the Blue Flower in the land of technology” (SW 4: 263).

Finally, the economic rationalization enforced by technological reproducibility feeds the hunger-to-expand on the creation of commodities, which leads to an ever-increasing profusion of producers and consumers, in excess of their natural proportions in society. Benjamin makes the point through Aldous Huxley’s *Beyond the Mexique Bay* (1934):

artistic talent is very rare … the proportion of trash in the total artistic output is greater now than at any other period…. The gramophone and the radio have created an audience of hearers who consume an amount of hearing-matter that has increased out of all proportion to the increase of the population and the consequent natural increase of talented musicians. (Note 29, SW 4: 278)
Such are the implications that account for why, even if the reproduction “may leave the artwork’s other properties untouched”, Benjamin feels that they “devalue the here and now of the artwork” (SW 3: 103), and revise “Humanity’s need to expose itself to shock effects” through a revision of “the apparatus of apperception” (Nt. 42, SW 4: 281).

4 MUSIC, TECHNOLOGY, ADORNO

Benjamin offers few direct and sustained engagements with music. Therefore, a second way of eliciting a wider application from his ideas is to approach them obliquely through the effect and recoil they produce in Adorno, who was impressed and disquieted by them in almost equal measure, from the 1920s to thirty years after Benjamin’s death. Adorno’s engagement with the practice and theory of music is marked by a sustained commitment to aesthetic autonomy, a predilection towards an idea of Modernism based on an admiration for the Second Viennese School of composers, and a marked antipathy for Stravinsky and jazz. It is also marked by a caustic pessimism about the culture industry which can sometimes become self-stultifying. An early essay, “The Curves of the Needle” (1928), is marred by a conviction that the female voice on record, unaccompanied by the female body, sounds “needy and incomplete” (E: 274). This prejudice can be placed in an ironic light by transposing the testimony of the earliest recording-engineers who found, in India, that many male vocalists taught themselves to sing at a higher pitch, because that made a more cutting impact, literally and metaphorically, on the 78rpm record as a medium for music. The 1928 essay also makes a literal attempt to apply Benjamin’s idea of aura as the semblance of distance to the record as art object.
Distracted by the poor quality of early recordings, Adorno claims that in the music emanating from the *Schallplatte* (as from the bourgeois photographs that Benjamin would cite in 1931 in his “Little History of Photography”) “the subtlety of color and the authenticity of vocal sound decline as if the singer were being distanced more and more from the apparatus” (*E*: 271). In “The Form of the Phonograph Record” (1934), Adorno provides a more convincing application of Benjamin’s notion of art as inscription to the technology of the gramophone, in which “through the curves of the needle on the phonograph record, music approaches decisively its true character as writing” (*E*: 279-80). Benjamin had been preoccupied with an elective affinity between the Romantic and Baroque symbolization of music. Adorno gives the “priestly hieroglyph script” of the musical artwork the characteristic slant of a persuasion wary of the culture industry and its exploitative “message of capital” (*M*: 38).  

His 1938 essay “On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening” is energetically pessimist about the mutation of the listener-as-subject into the “acquiescent purchaser” of ‘standardized musical goods” mesmerized by a “collective compulsion”. A letter of 9 December 1938 declares affinities between his interest in acoustic phenomena and Benjamin’s interest in optical phenomena (*C*: 590), a claim partly endorsed by Benjamin, though he was unprepared to do the same with Adorno on jazz (*C*: 326, 629). He reported being struck by Adorno’s closing remarks on Mahler’s ability to integrate fragments of regressive materials into a music that ‘stood athwart the concept of musical progress”, representing a form of resistance to regressive listening that had been ‘seismographically recorded forty years before it permeated society” (*E*: 315). Adorno sets up a dialectic between the ascetic and the aesthetic impulses that valorizes dissonance as a metonymy for the subject’s freedom
from banality, and alienation as the proof of resistance to the reduction of music into a sign of the alienation brought about by consumerism. This has a parallel in Benjamin’s attachment to the shock effect of art as a means of inducing a “heightened consciousness” (SW 4: 267). The relation between technology and technique is treated negatively: Adorno will have none of the cult of beautiful voices and master violins. Music, he claims, has become the pretext for a commerce that reifies it into commodity in an economy of ersatz substitution that converts use-value into exchange-value. Music turns to fetish; the listener, manipulated by the machinery of distribution and advertising, regresses; the musical event turns into a social ritual; aura degenerates into illusion; and the performer gets reinstated in a falsely auratic light (E: 312). In subsequent discussions, aura is interpreted to represent that which “makes art-works a closed structure of meaning – the aura that seals them from the degradation of reality, their fastidious refinement … [which] carries the privilege of noli me tangere into its innermost sanctum” (M: 38). More recently, Eva Geulen has developed the implications of aura away from this idea of the hermetic, along the lines of something perceived in the aftermath of its evanescence. This is a nuance made explicit in Benjamin’s fourth note to the third version: “a medieval picture of the Madonna at the time it was created could not yet be said to be “authentic”. It became “authentic” only during the succeeding centuries…” (SW IV: 271).

Adorno distinguishes between the function of time in and outside music. Each may be irreversible, but the two differ in a crucial respect, even before technological reproducibility steps in to make musical time repeatable: “music can never wrest itself from the invariant of time”, but “once this invariant is an object of reflection it becomes an element of composition and no longer an a priori” (AT: 23). The key element is the ability of musical form to assimilate itself to time while assimilating
time into its structuring of sound. Far more poignantly and sublimely than the plastic arts, music lives and dies in time. Duration and its lapse are intrinsic to the significance we attach to its existence. Wallace Stevens wrote in ‘sunday Morning”, “Death is the mother of beauty”.30 Benjamin underlines the Baroque aspect of the same paradox in his reminder that in death “the body too comes properly into its own” (O: 217). Adorno concurs, adding the insight that for music to be free of the desire for duration, it must “internalize its own transience in sympathy with the ephemeral life”, lest technological reproducibility give music an intimation of “the emerging omnipotence of the permanence of art” (AT: 27-8).

Adorno’s usefulness reaches a limit when it comes to music that is performed without the primacy of a score. In a loose sense, all such traditions can be described as improvisational, although improvisation in jazz is closer to Indian than to Western classical music. In improvisational traditions, individual performance relates to, and stems from, a pattern or idea of music loosely governed by a set of techniques and assumptions about musical form that constitute a genre for that practice. Individual performance in such traditions bears an unusual relation to repetition. Each performance is unique, but bespeaks a tradition through the genre whose conventions it uses, in order to create an auditory experience that is at once both new and old. Each performance relates to other performances of the ‘same” music as non-identical iteration. The idea of performance thus engages with originality through repetition, but revises the conventional idea of repetition from the recurrence of the same to the idea of alternatives, versions, or collaterals that refer to contingent actualizations of form and genre but not to an original ur-version. Andrew Benjamin’s development of the implications of repetition, in the essays collected in Present Hope (1997), helps to
transpose the idea of “iterative reworking” from Walter Benjamin to improvisational music in general:

The process of reworking re-presents the given in such a way that other possibilities that are in some way already inscribed within, and thus which are brought with it, are able as a consequence of that work – and thus also as constitutive of that work – to be revealed.\(^{31}\)

Such a notion of repetition valorizes the present tense of music – its “dialectics at a standstill” (A: 911-2, 917) – as its true and only being, a predicate of – without being a prediction from – the abstract conception whose perpetual renewal and reproducibility it ensures by resisting closure, so that no performance is ever the last word. Performance thus celebrates its own incompleteness as a sign of hope “linked to a form of finitude rather than being a mere counter-measure to the complete”, opening again and again “the possibility of a repetition taking place again for the first time”.\(^ {32}\)

5 THE VIRTUAL AND THE ACTUAL

The difference music makes to any attempt to theorize art may be approached in the recognition enjoined by Adorno in 1938: “music represents at once the immediate manifestation of impulse and the locus of its taming” (E: 288); “The unique nature of music, to be not an image standing for reality, but a reality sui generis” (B: 163):

an art that, more than all the others, seems to have its esse in its percipi and to enjoy little existence of its own beyond the moment of hearing it

On the other hand, it is precisely the tenuousness of musical object-hood, this more thoroughgoing passage of the artistic object into the sense organ
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itself … that suddenly seems to put a different face on the old subject-object problem, without ‘solving” it by violence, abandoning it as false or metaphysical crux, or projecting a mirage of reconciliation or spurious atonement between the poles.  

Music requires the idea of the artwork to resist an ontology derived from the visual and plastic arts. Above all, as noted by Sam Weber, it requires a clarification of the relation between real and virtual. Deleuze recommends a pairing in which the virtual is antithetical to the actual, and the possible is antithetical to the real.

The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual. Exactly what Proust said of states of resonance must be said of the virtual: “Real without being actual, ideal without being abstract”; and symbolic without being fictional.

When music is added to the compound idea of the artwork, the notion of an aura that recedes or decays as the artwork recedes in time or gets duplicated begins to look less worrying. During the 1930s, Benjamin expresses an anxiety about the damage sustained by art through reproducibility that stems from the habit of treating the artwork as an object whose technological reproduction entails, in Pierre Lévy’s words,

a change of identity, a displacement of the center of ontological gravity of the object considered. Rather than being defined principally through its actuality (a solution), the entity now finds its essential consistency within a problematic field. The virtualization of a given entity consists in determining the general question to which it responds, in mutating the entity in the direction of this question and redefining the initial actuality as the response to a specific question.
Lévy’s notion of the artwork as the response to a question corresponds to the approach adopted by Benjamin’s early essay on Hölderlin (1914-15), in which the task or the *a priori* facing the poet is defined as a question (the poetized, *das Gedichtete*) to which the poem is the answer (*SW* 1: 20). According to Lacoue-Labarthe, the question functions like a prerequisite that ‘signals, in both Heidegger and Benjamin toward the essence (or the Idea) of poetry’. Benjamin’s orientation to poetry in 1915 is more suited than his preoccupation with photography in 1931 or his concern with cinema in 1935 to reconcile the virtual-as-real aspect of the artwork with its mode of existence as an entity with a unique history in space and time. The earlier essay permits the recognition that an artwork is a realization of the possible while also representing an interpenetration of the virtual and the actual. In the case of music, and especially in traditions based on improvisation that cannot be relegated to a first technology of the past, the fear that the reproduction devalues “the here and now” becomes little more than a fetish of origin.

The claim for an original event from which all copies derive applies in a literal way to the performance recorded in a studio for the purposes of mass dissemination. The notion applies to the score and its performance in a different way. As with Beethoven, so also in his discussion of Mahler, Adorno resists the conflation of conception and execution, claiming, “Mahler’s music is never disfigured by the knowing experience of the interpreter” (*M*: 68). Music is conceived as an idea whose production might be damaged by performance, which is already its re-production. His alternative: “To compose music in such a way that the performance cannot destroy it, and so virtually to abolish performance” (*M*: 108). Adorno’s concept of music as preceding, and almost indifferent or resistant to, performance is not very far from the kind of phenomenon illustrated by Roger Scruton with reference to Bach’s music:
“The Well-Tempered Clavier on a piano, or a harpsichord, by a quartet of brass or woodwind, or by the Swingler Singers are all performances of The Well-Tempered Clavier”.

Adorno remarked, “Each work, insofar as it is intended for many, is already its own reproduction” (AT: 33). Applied to the case of a composer who performs his own music, we could say that the first performance does not diminish the “here and now” of later performances. Neither the score nor the first performance can claim greater authenticity than any of the composer’s other performances. Later, when the score or a recording of the composer as performer serves as the model for later performers, perhaps on instruments dissimilar to the ones used by the composer, their music-making might lack the authenticity of the composer’s performances, but lack of authenticity would not prevent recognition of the possibility that their execution or interpretation might sound more “authoritative” than the composer’s. The second version of the Artwork essay claims, “The authenticity of a thing is the quintessence of all that is transmissible in it from its origin on, ranging from its physical duration to the historical testimony relating to it” (SW 3: 103), and the fourth note to the third version qualifies, “Precisely because authenticity is not reproducible, the intensive penetration of certain (technological) processes of reproduction was instrumental in differentiating and gradating authenticity” (SW 4: 271). If Benjamin’s theses are to apply to a notion of art that includes music, his recognition that authenticity occupies a gradient in relation to the reproductive technology has to be made to correspond with the possibility that music’s peculiar mode of multiple existence – as virtuality, performance, and score – permits a separation of authority from authenticity. Authenticity in a narrow sense might be attached to “the here and now”, but music permits this to be actualized on a gradient, in repetitions that do not aspire to, or need
to aspire to, a first idea of an origin or an original. Indeed, to be present in a church where Bach might be improvising on the organ, or sit in the front row as Beethoven plunges into the keyboard, might possess a magical sense of an aura that abides, however momentarily, instead of the romanticism of one that is perceived in the moment of its going. However, if the music is to be parted from its composer, and granted its autonomy, then the magic of attending a first performance cannot entirely clear itself of the stigma of reifying music as its performance and fetishizing the chronotope of composer in performance.

Music as the virtually actual and the renewably repetitive enables a mitigation of the alternately tragic and revolutionary sentiments with which Benjamin endows aura in “Little History of Photography” (1931). If we think of the artwork in terms of a painting or a building, the technologically reproduced copy refers back to the original as to the actual. If we think of the artwork in terms of music, then the performance actualizes what is virtual, with the Deleuzean proviso that “the virtual must be defined as strictly a part of the real object – as though the object had one part of itself in the virtual into which it plunged as though into an objective dimension”. 39 Music that begins its life in a medium other than sound, as in a score, can be said to have a possible existence that awaits realization. When performed, the realization of the score as an acoustic entity can be said to actualize what we then infer as its virtual existence. The music in intentional terms, when written as the score, has its being as potentiality; in its affective condition, when contemplated as a whole, it has its being as virtuality; in renditional terms, when performed, it has its being as interpretation or version. In improvisational music, the realization of the possible is also at the same time an actualization of the virtual. 40
Benjamin’s notion of origin places the artwork in the context of ritual and magic. The history of artworks points to an origin prior to its aestheticization, as when music forms part of the communal life or religion of a people, which Benjamin calls first technology. The crucial difference between first and second technology is that the older modes are participative and communal, whereas music as an aesthetic entity splits the musical event more thoroughly between performance and reception. In Benjamin’s terms, it splits semblance from play (SW 3: 127). We might add that the former finds a function for music outside the music-making, while the latter finds an end in the contemplation that constitutes aesthetic pleasure. The activity of the latter is rendered passive to all other performative aspects of the music-making beyond its reception (and valorization). One might well say that this constitutes, already, a separation from or displacement of origin, in which music as art is already its own reproduction. This is no mere transposition of cult value into exhibition value, since in being received as art, participative commonality is transposed into a culture of reproduction and reception that splits performer from the audience.

The decline of aura begins at the origin, with performance becoming art. In the reproduction, the performer and the listener are both alienated from the chronotope of performance. 41 Such distance obtains equally in the reproduction of music and the plastic arts. However, what happens between copy and original in the plastic arts differs from what happens with music and its reproduction. In the visual or plastic arts, the copy cannot bespeak or embody the unique material history of the original, nor its rootedness in tradition, which contributes to its authority and aura. In the case of music, the notion of a unique history cannot really apply to the score or script as material object. Since music comes into being in time as performance, to treat authority or authenticity as attached to its physical objectification would mean little
more than making a fetish of the score. Even the event of recording (especially if it is in the studio), would not have the authority of an original painting or piece of sculpture, since the production takes place for the sake of reproduction. Ironically, the artifice of a studio recording more fully approximates to the ideal for the reception of music, as exemplified in the recording career of a musician such as Glenn Gould.

In summary terms, music is not a thing; its origin is virtual; its authenticity does not depend on objectification; the historical testimony relating to it does not expire with its cessation in time, it hibernates as potentiality; and its transmissibility is not diminished by copies; on the contrary, it requires iterability. In the case of Western music, these copies generally take the form of scores; in improvisational traditions, the copies resided in the chain of memories that transmit such music down through the generations, and since the twentieth century, this option has been open to supplementation and correction by recordings.

6 MUSIC, INDIA, TECHNOLOGY

India provides fertile ground for an analysis of the interaction between technology and music. There are several reasons for this. Recording technology came to India almost immediately after its industrialization in the West. Its influence on the relation of music to society was immediate and massive. India has a long oral tradition of art music based on narrow systems of patronage and transmission. The radical changes brought to the production, transmission, and reception of music by the recording industry reinforced other changes under way during the early decades of the twentieth century. These had the collective effect of moving India towards a modern practice of music that many musicians still regard with mixed feelings. These changes
offer confirmation for some of Benjamin’s views on the damage sustained by art through reproducibility. However, they also provide evidence for a resilience and resourcefulness to the interaction between tradition and technology that could not have been anticipated from Benjamin’s perspective in the 1930s. The third version of the Artwork essays invokes “Humanity’s need to expose itself to shock effects” as representing “an adaptation to the dangers threatening it” (Nt. 42, SW 4: 281). The Indian context provides a detailed demonstration of what is entailed in a culture adapting to a second technology that acts as “a system in which the mastering of elementary social forces is a precondition for playing with natural forces” (SW 3: 124). Daniel Neuman, one of the earliest social historians of music to apply Benjamin to the Indian context (1980), identifies a concern with authenticity and tradition as the chief “problem for Hindustani music today”.42 Gerry Farrell devotes a whole chapter of Indian Music and the West (1997) to developing the implications of the fact that India was “the Asian vanguard of a massive commercial enterprise which was already well established in America and Europe, a business concerned with cornering lucrative, untapped markets”.43

The classical or art music of North India needs be distinguished from participative and communal forms such as folk and devotional music.44 The latter can be described, in terms of the second version of the Artwork essay, as part of the cultural practice of a first technology, of the sort that makes “the maximum possible use of human beings” (SW 3: 107). From Benjamin’s perspective, the productions of a first technology belonged to the European past. In India, this technology coexists in the here and now, cheek by jowl with art music. The latter may be differentiated from the Western musical tradition in terms of five features: (1) The Indian musical tradition foregrounds melody and rhythm, at the expense of harmony. (2) It is
primarily an oral tradition, in which transmission has functioned largely without a system of notation comparable to the Western score. The perspective adopted by Benjamin in “The Storyteller” toward the role of memory in the traditional story applies exactly to the role of musical structure and its transmission through memory in Indian music. Like the traditional story, music “does not expend itself. It preserves and concentrates its energy and is capable of releasing it even after a long time” (SW 3: 148), and memory “creates the chain of tradition which transmits an event from generation to generation” (SW 3: 154). In this tradition, reproducibility is internalized as virtuality, and in that form, it remains indispensable to the transmissibility of music, even if individual musicians have been known to develop their own personal shorthand as guides to performance or as archives of lyrics, while pedagogic practice began to modernize itself under the impact of musicologists like V.N. Bhatkhande (1860-1936) and the evangelical pedagogy of V.D. Paluskar (1872-1931).

(3) Indian art music does not provide an equivalent to the Western institution of individual authorship: a musical structure is generally not composed by any single individual or group, instead, it is inherited as part of a continuous oral tradition (although individuals might set lyrics of their choice to specific melodies, and the occasional performer might compose a “new” melodic hybrid). (4) It collapses or dissolves the Western distinction between composition and performance, between composer and performer, and hence between music as idea and performance as interpretation. It constitutes a form of citation that alludes to a pattern, and then proceeds to actualize that pattern, in a way that refers back to the pattern and can be compared with, but not superceded by, other actualizations. The performer is, in one part, also the composer, although the performance owes its form to a convention, and draws upon a received repertoire of musical elements, techniques, and effects that are
part of a tradition peopled by a large, loose, and nameless assemblage of previous performances and performers, transmitted and assimilated through ear and mouth. (5)

The notion of pitch in Indian music is relational rather than absolute, “there is no absolute or fixed pitch for the tones” of India music. (6) A tentative sixth distinction can be suggested briefly here in terms of the thoroughly syncretic nature of Indian art music, in which the classical element derives and differentiates itself from, while constantly returning to, its partial ancestry in folk traditions. It shows a similar complicity between the sacred and the profane, and a full sense of the play of erotic pleasure compounded with the act of performance, in which music, as vibration (nāda), echoes and repeats the primal act of creation as reproducibility. (48)

The voice and instrument rely for transmission on auditory memory, and accept all the lapses and distortions to which such transmission is prone. The given or a priori element for the classical system is a set of melodic paradigms called rāgas. Each rāga constitutes a pattern of melodic ascent and decent, along with distinctive musical phrases. When performed, it is set to a rhythmic pattern which adopts one or more of three tempi. The rāga is a structure of melodic and rhythmic potentialities, which leaves the realization of the music to improvisation within a framework in which, as Bonnie Wade points out, “flexibility and latitude for creative imagination are prime elements”. (49) The exact structure, the proportion between constituent parts, and the duration of each musical event remain an open-ended interaction between freedom and determinacy. Such music can be said to exist, when not performed, as an incipience latent between the abstract notion of an oral tradition and in the musician’s potential for music making. Transposing Benjamin, one could say, a rāga is “an idea that could be called an ideal, because it refers not to the immanent form of the problem but to the transcendent content of its solution” (SW 1: 218); and transposing
Adorno, one might call rāga “the yet to be in works, their utopic trace” (AT: 172). In a literal sense, such music does not exist when not performed; whereas a symphony, an opera, or a play exists, even when not being performed, in the materiality of score and libretto, so that “the primacy of the text over its performance” renders the score as “indeed the thing itself” (AT: 100). Contrariwise, the mode of existence of the Indian artwork has a natural affinity with the startling but apt comparison between music and fireworks made by Benjamin’s (and Dora’s) friend, Ernest Schoen, who was a student of Debussy: “the unsurpassable noblesse of fireworks … [is] the only art that aspires not to duration but only to glow for an instant and fade away” (AT: 28).

Next, a condensed account of the salient features of the recording industry in India will indicate the appropriateness of using it as a test case for the extension of Benjamin’s ideas. The Gramophone Company was founded in London in 1898, under license from Emile Berliner, the inventor of the gramophone. The machine parts were manufactured in the USA, assembled in London, the material recorded globally in situ, and the discs manufactured first in Hanover and later from other locations. The first Indians were recorded in London the following year, in 1899, and the first recordings in India took place in 1902. The motive was not ethnomusicology, but the intention of creating a market close to where the material resources were available: seventy-five percent of the shellac from which the physical substance of gramophone records was manufactured came from India. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Gramophone Company sent three major recording expeditions to India. By 1910, the Indian market boasted seventy-five different recording companies, with European and local labels in competition with the Gramophone Company for a share of the market. The discographer Michael Kinnear reports, “by mid 1908, it is estimated that there was upwards of 10,000 different recordings of the various styles
of Indian music on the market”. The Gramophone Company’s earnings for 1910-1913 show an average sale of almost half a million records and over six thousand machines per year, with a revenue that doubled in six years from the initial take of more than 700,000 Rupees in 1905. The first Indian pressings were issued from Calcutta in 1908, and in 2000, commemorating one hundred years of recording technology, Suresh Chandvankar (the secretary of The Society of Indian Record Collectors) estimated that the total number of gramophone records issued in India would amount to about half a million, each with 500 to a few hundred thousand copies. This massive industry saw the implementation of a whole range of developments in recording technology through the century, from the acoustic/mechanical (1877-1925), the electrical (c.1926-), the magnetic (c.1940-), to the optical (c.1960s-).

Technik as recording technology forced Technik as structured sound to reconfigure its textural and structural elements. Music could no longer repose in the brevity of performance and the porosity of human memory: musicians became self-conscious. The record gave music a new form of citability, it transformed music-making into a form of evidence, like Atget’s photographs of deserted Paris streets, which Benjamin describes as a crime scene (SW 2: 527; SW 3: 108; SW 4: 258). In the record, the peopled landscape of musicians performing before an audience was cleared for a reproductive process conducted before a mechanical apparatus (SW 3: 108). The record as physical object of value reduced the spontaneity of performance even as it invited the consumer to succumb to “the putrid magic of its own commodity character” (SW 3: 113). Increasing sophistication of the reproductive process seduced musicians to the cosmetic treatment of sound for its own sake, distracting them with what Adorno, in a phrase of Eduard Steuermann, calls “the barbarism of perfection”
The cult of beautiful sound also produced in consumers a musical equivalent to the phenomenon described by Benjamin with reference to film audiences: “psychic immunization” (SW 3: 118). Reproducibility also led Indian musicians to selectivity: the temptation to record a small selection of their repertoire for the masses, and to reserve the more abstruse or cherished part for smaller, more discerning, or more paying audiences. Recordings split music not only from the chronotope of natural music-making, but from the traditional associations of rāgas with specific times of day, seasons, and to traditional archetypes of experience, mood, and sentiment. The exigencies of the recording studio put aside such orthodoxies. Performances recorded regardless of their traditional correspondences encouraged listeners to do the same, providing a specific example of the potential damage sustained by tradition.

The technology of reproduction forced a series of fixed time limits on the duration of musical recordings: around 3-4 minutes for the 10-inch/12-inch 78rpm disc, increasing with the EP and LP record formats to over 5 and 45 minutes respectively, and then to over 72 minutes with the audio compact disc. Each increase in the limit of the recording format made it possible for the musician to develop a more ambitious musical structure, although, to begin with, the improvisatory nature of Indian music had to fit its tendency toward indefinite expansion and repetition within a Procrustean limit. This led to an ongoing dialectic between freedom and control, and between the limit as challenge and opportunity. Not every musician was able to profit from the expansion. Ironically, as the duration of the recording medium increased, Indian music was given back its traditional liberty with time, although the intervening experience with briefer durations no longer permitted a safe return to the dilatory modes of the pre-technological era. Music-making submitted to the most severe form
of miniaturization in the 78rpm format: performers responded by condensing and re-proportioning the constituents of the rāga structure. Technological limitation was converted by the more resourceful musicians into an aesthetic opportunity, illustrating the kind of dialectic Adorno invokes for the West in the 1930s. For example, the female vocalist Zohrabai Agrewali (c.1868-1913) became a model for later musicians in the selection and presentation of three-minute performances, often creating a “beautiful semblance” of sustained duration and relaxed pace.⁶¹ One might apply to the best vocalism in the 78rpm format what Adorno said, in an oddly ambivalent compliment, of Webern and Benjamin, that they were “like letters received from a kingdom of dwarfs, in miniature format, which always looked as if they had been reduced from something of vast dimensions” (SF: 94).

The miniaturization of music in its 78rpm format neatly underlines the ironic and dialectical relation between technology and tradition. In “Music and Technique”, Adorno notes a specific consequence to the ongoing historical dialectic between changes in techniques of performance and changes in the technology underlying the manufacture of musical instruments:

…advances in mechanical reproduction that make it possible to fix music, like the plastic arts, independently of ephemeral performances with their arbitrary features, bring reproduction decisively closer to production… If works become their own reproductions, the time when reproductions will become the works cannot be all that far away.⁶²

He argued that when the tension in such a relation slackened, technological reproducibility led to a desiccation of forms. In the context of Indian music, Gerry Farrell claims, with a mixture of plausibility and overstatement, that “the music on early recordings is as much a creation of Western technology as a representation of
The vocalists fared better than the instrumentalists under the duress of extreme compression, and what Adorno would have called “the memorability of disconnected parts” (E: 298). Farrell claims that it also encouraged artists “to give greater weight to the composed, or fixed, parts of the performance, at the expense of the more developmental forms of improvisation”. Neuman concedes much less to the damaging effect of technology, and notes the widely shared belief that “the old masters squeezed the essence of a rāga into three minutes, and what we hear are perfect miniatures of rāgas”.

In sociological terms, the musicians’ access to a wide and faceless public loosened the hold of the widespread prejudice that had associated music and dance in India with the decadent culture of the courtesan and her patrons. The musician’s capacity to shape audiences was availed by the most successful of early Indian vocalists, Gauhar Jan of Calcutta (1873-1930) and Jankibai of Allahabad (1880-1934). The scale of the public recognition and monetary remuneration they accomplished was rarely matched by even the most successful male vocalists. In Benjiminian terms, music broke free from cult value, enabling the artist to reach the masses in a widened transmission of exhibition value. This did not generally lead to an uncritical cult of the performer, as Benjamin had feared in the context of Fascism. In India, it offered some relief to female musicians from the traditional stigmatization of their profession. However, the delinking of performer from reproduction also abetted the delinking of music-teacher from pupil. This has had a double-edged result. The record gives access to repeated listening, which can be put to pedagogical use in learning techniques independent of teachers, notation, or the strict control of tutelage characteristic of the orthodox tradition, in which the transmission of techniques and styles was confined within a patriarchal gharānā (household) system. A musician as
father-teacher might transmit different elements of the tradition he had imbibed, and only to his progeny and disciples, fitting the teaching to the potential he discerned in each pupil. “They are extremely possessive of their traditions”, notes the musicologist Bonnie Wade. Records enabled a break from this system and its power to nominate and regulate authenticity. Contrariwise, the democratization of access to musical materials brought about by technological reproducibility was bought at the price of subverting the cohesion built over generations by the exclusivity principle operative in the gharānā tradition, which was responsible for the highly individuated styles of each musical genealogy. The response to this development has been divided among musicians: traditionalists lament the dilution of individuated styles by the eclecticism that radio and records facilitate, while modernists celebrate freedom from the stranglehold of the gharānā system, enjoining younger musicians to celebrate hybridity and the death of hermeticism.

The power of the gramophone record was aided after the middle of the twentieth century by radio. The economic status of the average professional musician came to depend more on this humble but reliable source of patronage than on the uncertain earnings of record sales. In India, the sale of recorded music, and its broadcast by radio, did not have the effect Michael Chanan reports for the West in the 1920s and 1930s: “a general reduction in public musical performance”. In his essay on “Theatre and Radio” (1932), Benjamin, who had considerable experience with radio broadcasting, describes the two institutions locked in competition, with radio the likely victor because of its capacity to use a more advanced technology to reach wider masses (SW 2: 583-6). The Indian evidence suggests that this supposed conflict between “live” performance and radio or records can resolve itself in a symbiotic relation: the reproducibility of music through radio, record, and cassette made Indian
audiences more – not less – receptive to “live” performance, although it has not transcended Huxley’s skepticism (Nt. 29, SW 4: 278): good musicians remain as rare as before, and listeners do not often match enthusiasm or purchasing power with discrimination or discernment in their approach to music. However, on balance, it is possible to claim that music has prospered; not just economically, but in terms of transmissibility, awareness, and a more democratic system of patronage.  

From the perspective of the consumer, the gramophone record was affordable only for the section of the population Benjamin called the “compact mass” (SW 3: 129). The “proletarian” mass has had to wait upon the advent of the relatively low-cost cassette before becoming capable of making a commodity out of music from the 1960s. In terms of the culture industry, the fate and fortune of art music in India has depended on, and been marginalized by, the vastly greater economic success and mass appeal of film music.

The impact of technology on tradition has produced mixed results rather than a simple confirmation of Benjamin’s predictions and apprehensions. The materiality of the recording (tape, CD, DVD) both captures and distorts the value attributed to tradition. Music survives the brief duration of its making through an archive of frozen and repeatedly revivable sound whose mode of existence as an impress on inert matter remains separated from the human origins it replicates. However, the recording medium does more to music than ensure its mere repeatability: it also enables an awareness of tradition to be preserved and exemplified. In a tradition whose transmissibility is fraught by memorial decay and a general tendency to imprecision, hyperbole and falsification, recordings provide precise materials with which to educate the ear of performers and audiences. The access to musical evidence cuts both ways: if models of interpretative excellence are objectified, such performances get
raised to the pedestal of what Neuman calls “archetypal” status, exercising a normative and constraining effect on the scope for future improvisation. It also facilitates the kind of withdrawal from the “live” audience to the second-take option emblematized for the twentieth century in the studio career of Glenn Gould.

Both features can be illustrated by adding the latest medium – the Internet – to the medley of technologies that have interacted with music, and with one another, through the course of the twentieth century. As a single example of what has a vast and yet-to-be-fully-tapped potential, one can examine the radio lectures on Indian music made accessible by Patrick Moutal, Professor of Indian Music at the Conservatoire National Superieur de Musique in Paris, on his web site. If we consider his two-part lecture on the rāga Darbāri Kānāda (“the rāga for kings, and the king of rāgas”), it can be noted that he provides free access to a survey of all the major vocal and instrumental expositions that have survived through the twentieth century in the medium of recorded sound. Such an archive accomplishes several functions: it provides the bases for an informed reception, and a more cultured performance practice; although, as previously noted, such access bypasses the need for admission into any specific gharānā. Thus, technological reproducibility abets human reproducibility while it transforms performance practices: tradition is not only preserved, but the conditions for its survival and continuance are modified and shaped towards a set of canonical directions. The changes enforced and enabled by technology mix gain with loss as functions of change. In this context, if authenticity is to be retained as a notion of value divested of the cultic and the occult, it has to be treated as in continual metamorphosis. Neuman probably overstates his case in claiming that “it is equally admissible to say the aura can be transferred from presence
in a live performance to preservation in a recorded one”. Nevertheless, the case of Indian music clearly intimates that there is no future for aura in nostalgia.

Abbreviations


Notes


5 Adorno to Benjamin, 18 March 1936: “It neglects a fundamental experience which daily becomes increasingly evident to me in my musical work, that precisely the uttermost consistency in the pursuit of the technical laws of autonomous art actually transforms this art itself, and instead of turning it into a fetish or taboo, brings it that much closer to a state of freedom, to something that can be consciously produced and made…. You underestimate the technical character of autonomous art and overestimate that of dependent art; put simply, this would be my principal objection’ (CC: 129, 131; cf. *AT*: 33, 45, 56, 66, 311, 320).


7 At one extreme, it evoked the oddest associations, as when he wrote to Ernst Schoen on September 10, 1917, that he was affected by the sight of a hump that had developed on the back of a friend he had not met for several years: “This hump suddenly seemed to me to be a characteristic of most modern people who devote themselves to music… This
“hump” and everything connected to it is a particular form of the Socratism I despise, a form of the modern, of “beauty in ugliness” (C: 95). Adorno confirms this prejudice in *Alban Berg: Master of the Smallest Link* [1968], trans. Juliane Brand and Christopher Hailey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 25-6: “Benjamin … was rather indifferent to music and … in his youth had nursed a certain animosity towards musicians…” (Cf. E: 625).


12 In “The Opera Wozzeck’ (1929), Adorno remarks, “Walter Benjamin correctly remarked on the analogy between Berg’s method and Karl Kraus’s treatment of the lyrics of Matthias Claudius’ (E: 620). In “Berg’s Discoveries in Compositional technique’ (1961), he writes, “freedom is intimately connected with the quality which … originally attracted me to Berg, as well as to Benjamin’s philosophy. This was the quality of inexhaustibility, of a profusion of ideas which constantly regenerates itself and flows in superabundance’, *Quasi una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music* [1962], trans. Rodney Livingstone (London and New York: Verso, 1992), pp.194-5.

13 The affinity between Benjamin and the temperament ascribed to Berg is evident, as remarked by Bernstein, *Five Portraits*, p.93.

14 “Webern shared with Walter Benjamin a penchant for the micrological and the confidence that the concrete concentration of a fulfilled moment is worth more than any amount of development that is merely ordained abstractly from outside’ (SF: 94).

Ibid. p.199.


Ashok D. Ranade, *Essays in Ethnomusicology* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1998), p.245. From a contrary perspective, Roger Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Music* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), inverts the Derridean emphasis: “Written signs owe their life to the thing which is written down” (p.439). Despite his rejection of Adorno’s view of the bourgeoisie in the decline of culture, Scruton’s idea of music as “the thing” prior to its transcription and performance is not very different from that developed by Adorno.

Williams, *New Music and the Claims of Modernity*, pp.74-5.


Ibid. p.35.


Kittler, *Gramophone, Film, Typewriter*, pp.24-5.


Cf. Eva Geulen, “Under Construction: Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’” [1992], reprinted in Benjamin’s Ghosts: Interventions in Contemporary Literary and Cultural Theory, ed. Gerhard Richter (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p.135: “The aura, as the distinguishing feature of traditional art, becomes visible only to the extent that art has lost this character. The manifestation of the aura arises out of its loss…. Authenticity is a belated effect. In the beginning was not the original, but rather the reproduction, which makes the concept of authenticity possible in the first place…. The decline does not happen to, but rather constitutes the aura’.


Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition [1968], trans. Paul Patton (London: The Athlone Press, 1994), p.208. Weber, “Virtuality of Media’, links the notion of virtuality to Heidegger’s discussion of “possibility’ and “being towards death’ in §53 of Being and Time (1927), and stresses the importance of mediation to the concept of a medium of reproducibility: “the Hegelian notion of mediation as an infinite process of becoming other in order to become the same, presents a strategy of safeguarding finitude from an alterity, and a future, that would not come full-circle and not simply be a return of the same’ (p.316).


39 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p.209.

40 Cf. Weber, “Virtuality of Media”, p.311: “all actualization of the medial, whether linguistic or other, tends to mediate the linguistic aspect of the medial, its impartability, by institutionalizing and codifying it. Such codification is exemplified in the work, and in particular, in the artwork”.

41 The practice of concluding a 78rpm record by announcing the vocalist’s name can be treated as a token of resistance to this separation, a literal inscription of identity into the grooves of a record, as in “My name is Gauhar Jan!” Farrell, Indian Music and the West, p.140, accounts for the practice on the more mundane grounds of novelty and advertising, but Suresh Chandvankar’s explanation in “Presenting First dancing girl, Calcutta’, The Indian Express (November 15, 2002), is even more mundane and plausible: “Gaisberg requested her to sing for three minutes and to announce her name at the end of the recording. She announced: “My name is Gauhar Jan”. This was necessary, since the wax masters were sent to Hanover in Germany for pressing the records, and the technicians would make proper labels and confirm the name by listening to these announcements at the end of the performance”. Source: <http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=13037> Accessed May 24, 2003.


43 Farrell, Indian Music and the West, p.113.

44 Ranade, Essays in Ethnomusicology, p.21.

45 Bonnie Wade, Music in India: The Classical Traditions (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pp.24-5: “in India, written transmission has been seen as unnecessarily restrictive: since improvisation is the heart of the tradition”.

46 William Gaisberg writes from his experience of recording music in India in 1906: “one never finds written music for these songs; they are handed down from father to son, and this has been going on for hundreds of generations” (p.40i). For the role of the

47 *The Raga Guide: A Survey of 74 Hindustani Ragas*, ed. Joep Bor (London: Zenith Media for Nimbus Records with the Rotterdam Conservatory of Music, 1999), p.vii. Cf. Ashok Ranade, *Essays in Ethnomusicology*, “Indian music does not accept concepts of absolute time and pitch. As a corollary, the three basic tempi, namely slow, medium and fast are defined with reference to one another’ (p.203). He also stresses the Heraclitan and aleatory persuasion of Indian music: “Indian music lays special emphasis on improvisation. Consequently, there is an ever-present theoretical possibility that no music can be performed twice’ (p.157).

48 *Nāda* connotes the primordial manifestation of energy in vibration. It embodies recognition of several orders of duality within its unitariness: breath (*prāna*) against non-being; the audible (*ahat*) against the inaudible (*anahat*); and its metaphorical equivalent, the expressible against the ineffable, the former finding its realization in music, the latter in the yogic discipline of the *kundalini*, in which energy spirals back to its origins. In *nāda*, therefore, music as sound is closely allied to silence.

49 Bonnie C. Wade, *Khyal: Creativity within North India’s classical music tradition* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984, reprinted New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Pvt. Ltd., 1997), p. 2. Her earlier work, *Music in India: The Classical Traditions* (1979), comments on the concept of the rāga, “The idea of ‘scale’ is alien to many Hindustāni rāgas, because melodic shape, rather than an abstract scale, accounts for the difference between one rāga and another…. It may involve … other characteristic turns of melody (*pakad*) that make a rāga immediately recognizable to a listener’ (pp. 59, 63).

50 Cf. Michael Kinnear, *The Gramophone Company’s First Indian Recordings, 1899-1908* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1994), p.28: “many great vocalists and musicians in India … were left unrecorded, either because they were not approached to do so or had declined to have their talents recorded, as was often the case’ (28). Farrell, *Indian Music and the West*, notes: “in the early days many performers of Indian music refused to be recorded’ (p.137), citing the example of the singer Chandra Prabhu as recounted by A.H. Fox-Strangways in *The Music of Hindostan* (1914). Even if the following anecdote were to prove apocryphal, one would like to believe it. The great vocalist Alladiya Khan (1855-1946) is reported to have turned his back on Bhatkhande’s request that the vocalist allow the scholar to transcribe his singing. As he walked away from the crestfallen scholar on Chowpatti Beach in Bombay, Alladiya Khan is supposed to have hummed the beginning
of rāga Tilak Kāmod, whose lyric (‘sur sangat rāga vidya…’) commemorates music as alive only in the moment of its singing.


53 Ibid. p.92.


57 Ibid. pp.85, 95.

58 Neuman, The Life of Music in North India, p.224.

59 The Indian scene provides confirmation for the more general claim made by Chanan, Musica Practica, that reproducibility had “marked effects on both performance and listening. The former began to lose its spontaneity and became the art of the repeated take. The latter turned attention away from the excitement and risk of the act of performance, towards the reproduction and its surface sheen’ (pp.250-1).

60 William Gaisberg writes in 1918, ‘In recording we experienced great difficulty in getting the singers to sing their songs out of proper time of day’ (p.43i).

61 V.V. Navelkar and Suresh Chandvankar, “Zohrabai Agrewali, a literature survey’, The Record News (The Journal of the Society of Indian Record Collectors, Bombay, TRN Annual 2001), pp.23-31, brings together many published acknowledgments by noted musicians of their debt to her recordings.

62 Adorno, Sound Figures, p.201.

63 Farrell, Indian Music and the West, p.112.

64 Ibid. pp.140-1.

65 Neuman, The Life of Music in North India, p.224.

66 Cf. Farrell, Indian Music and the West, p.124: “Music and musicians stigmatized as immoral and degenerate by large sections of the population … came to gain status as carriers of classical musical culture. The gramophone industry played an important role in this process’.

67 Ibid. p.119: “Gauhar Jan charged 1,000 rupees for a recording session, and Jankibai 3,000”.

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Neuman, *The Life of Music in North India*, explains: “A musician’s identity is always defined in part by the identity of his teacher who, in turn, is identified by the identity of his teacher back through the line. This taken as a whole comprises a given ‘school,’ called a *gharānā* (lit., ‘of the house’), distinguished from other *gharānās* on the basis of its unique history, pedigree, and style of performance” (p.31).


Cf. Auslander, *Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture*, p.159: “I have described the relationship between the live and the mediatized as competitive, conflictual and agonistic…however …It is not an opposition rooted in essential differences between the live and the mediatized’.


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**NOTE ON THE AUTHOR**