

**SECTION I****QUESTIONS 1-20; MULTIPLE CHOICE**

1 point for each right answer, for a total of 20 points. (No penalty for wrong answers.)

**Instructions:**

A separate 1-page answer sheet accompanies this question paper. Record your answers in the blank spaces on the answer sheet. Answer by writing one letter (A-E) per question. Illegible or ambiguous answers will receive no credit.

Remember to write your matriculation number on the answer sheet; do not write your name on the answer sheet.

Passage 1, from Plato's "Euthyphro" (pdf, p. 3):

S: Is it a case, then, of your father killing another relative? But I suppose that much is obvious. It wouldn't make sense to prosecute your father for killing a stranger.

E: What makes no sense, Socrates, is for you to think it makes a difference whether the victim is a stranger or a relative. One should only consider whether the killer acted justly or not; if he acted justly, let him go; if not, prosecute even a killer who shares your hearth and home. You are just as polluted, remaining under the same roof with such a one, when you should be helping yourself and him by leading the way to divine cleanliness and justice. The victim was a dependent of mine, and when we were farming in Naxos he acted as our servant. In a drunken rage, he killed one of our household slaves, so my father bound him hand and foot, threw him in a ditch, then sent a man here to inquire of the priest what should be done. While awaiting an answer, he gave not a thought nor care to the prisoner – who, being a killer, might as well be dead, which he soon enough was. Hunger, exposure and his bonds did for the man before the messenger came back from the seer. Now my father and other relatives are angry that I am prosecuting him for murder on behalf of a murderer when my father didn't even murder him, so they say; and even if he did, the dead man doesn't deserve a second thought, being a murderer. They say it is impious for a son to prosecute a father for murder. But their notions of how the gods view holiness and unholiness are wrong, Socrates.

**QUESTION 1**

Which of the following is inconsistent with Euthyphro's stated views in passage 1? (That is, which of the following can Euthyphro not believe without contradicting something he says in passage 1?)

- A) Wrongful death due to negligence can constitute murder.
- B) A son should treat his father the same way he would treat any stranger.
- C) Prosecuting murderous family members is not merely right but prudent, since associating with murderers may cause one to become morally polluted.
- D) Taking the life of a human being is always wrong.
- E) Murder is always wrong.

**QUESTION 2**

Suppose Euthyphro grants that parricide – the crime of murdering one's father – is especially horrible and should be punished even more severely than other forms of murder. And suppose Euthyphro's relatives make the argument that to prosecute one's father for murder is attempted parricide, since the punishment for murder is death. Ergo, what Euthyphro is doing is horrible. Which of the following responses would clearly be unsuitable for purposes of coherently defending Euthyphro's position against this argument.

- A) The law should be enforced impersonally. Agents of the law cannot show favoritism to family members. This does not mean the law itself cannot be written to reflect the importance of family ties.
- B) The law is impersonal and should never reflect the importance of family ties. But agents of the law cannot be expected to set aside family feeling in enforcing the law.
- C) Prosecuting murderers is not attempted murder; therefore, prosecuting one's father for murder cannot be attempted parricide.
- D) Prosecuting murderers is attempted murder; therefore murder is not necessarily wrong; therefore parricide is not necessarily wrong
- E) B) and D).

Passage 2, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (pdf, p. 7):

S: The same things, then, are loved by the gods and hated by the gods, and will be both god-loved and god-hated.

E: It seems likely.

S: And the same things will be both holy and unholy, according to the terms of this argument ['holy' means 'that which is loved by the gods']?

E: I'm afraid so.

S: So you didn't answer my question, you man of mystery. I did not ask you what one thing is both holy and unholy, but it appears what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. So it won't be too surprising if the thing you now undertake – namely, punishing your father – is pleasing Zeus but displeasing to Kronos and Ouranos; is pleasing to Hephaestus but displeasing to Hera; and the same goes for any other gods who may care to take up the matter.

E: I think, Socrates, that here we have something no god would dispute: whoever kills anyone unjustly must pay the penalty.

### QUESTION 3

Which of the following is the best statement of Euthyphro's response to Socrates' argument? (The response is given in the underlined portion of passage 2.)

- A) Euthyphro's definition of 'holiness' must be right because no god could dispute it.
- B) Even if there is a puzzle concerning holiness in some cases, there is no problem in the present case.
- C) Euthyphro is not guilty of being a man of mystery, who refuses to answer. He answers that those who are guilty must be punished.
- D) Perhaps some things are, indeed, both holy and unholy.
- E) Whoever kills anyone unjustly must pay the price.

Passage 3, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (continues from where passage 2 ends):

S: Well now, Euthyphro, have you ever heard any man arguing that one who has murdered or otherwise acted unjustly should not pay the penalty?

E: There are endless disputes about this sort of thing, both in and out of the courts, because wrongdoers will say and do anything to avoid getting punished.

S: Do they admit they have done wrong, Euthyphro, but maintain that, even so, they should not be punished?

E: No, they don't admit it.

S: So then they don't say or do just anything. For they don't go so far as to admit this, nor do they go so far as to deny they should pay the penalty if they did wrong. But I think they do deny wrong-doing, don't they?

E: That's how it is.

S: Then they don't dispute that wrongdoers must be punished, only who did wrong, what they did, and when.

E: You are right.

S: Don't the gods have the same experience – if indeed they are at odds about justice and injustice, as your argument maintains? Some say that they wrong one another, while others deny it; but none among gods or men goes so far as to say a wrongdoer should not be punished

E: Yes, that is basically true, Socrates.

#### QUESTION 4

Which of the following is the best statement of Socrates' main point in passage 2?

- A) The gods are at odds about justice and injustice.
- B) The gods are at odds about justice and injustice; even so, they agree wrongdoers should be punished.
- C) The gods have the same sorts of disputes about justice and injustice as men.
- D) The gods have the same sorts of disputes about justice and injustice as men; so men should not look to the gods to resolve these disputes.
- E) Agreement that wrongdoers should be punished does not entail agreement about what constitutes wrongdoing.

Passage 4, from Plato's *Meno* (pdf, p. 2):

M: It's really not that hard to say, Socrates. First, if you want the virtue of a man, it is easy to say that a man's virtue consists in being able to manage public affairs and thereby help his friends and harm his enemies – all the while being careful to come to no harm himself. If you want the virtue of a woman, it's not difficult to describe: she must manage the home well, keep the household together, and be submissive to her husband; the virtue of a child, whether boy or girl, is another thing altogether, and so is that of an elderly man – if you want that – or if you want that of a free man or a slave. There are lots of different virtues, as a result of which it is not at all hard to say what virtue is. There is virtue for every action and every stage in life, for every person and every capacity, Socrates. And the same goes for wickedness.

S: It must be my lucky day, Meno! Here I was, looking for just one virtue, and you happen by with a whole swarm! But, Meno, following up on this figurative swarm of mine, if I were to ask you what sort of being a bee is, and you said, 'there are all sorts of different sorts of bees,' what would you say if I went on to ask: 'Do you mean that there are all sorts of different sorts of bees insofar as they are bees? Or are they no different, insofar as they are bees, but they differ in other respects – in how beautiful they are, for example, or how big, and so on and so forth?' Tell me, what would you answer if I asked you this?

M: I would say that they do not differ from one another insofar as they are all bees.

#### QUESTION 5

Which of the following is the best statement of Socrates' point, in passage 4, concerning Meno's attempt to answer 'what is virtue?'

- A) Meno wrongly implies that virtuous people will differ in many respects. In fact if they are all virtuous they must be, and behave, alike.
- B) Whatever makes virtuous people virtuous cannot be any of the things that make them differ from one another.
- C) Meno is wrong to think it is virtuous for a man to want to help his friends and harm his enemies.
- D) Meno is wrong to think there can be different sorts of virtuous people. There can only be one sort of virtuous person.
- E) Since virtue can only be one thing, and Meno suggests that virtue is many different things, at least some of the people Meno identifies as virtuous must not be virtuous.

Passage 5, from Plato's *Meno* (pdf, p. 8):

M: I think, Socrates, that virtue is, as the poet says, "to find joy in beautiful things and have power." Therefore I say that virtue is to want all the best things in life, and to have the power to get them.

S: Do you mean that the man who desires the best things in life desires good things?

M: That's certainly right.

S: Do you take it for granted that there are people who desire bad things, and others who desire good things? Don't you think, my good man, that all men desire good things?

M: I certainly don't.

S: You think some want bad things, then?

M: Yes.

S: Do you mean that they believe the bad things to be good, or that they know they are bad and want them anyway?

M: I think there are both kinds.

S: Do you think, Meno, that anyone, knowing that bad things are bad, still wants them?

M: I certainly do.

S: Wants in what way? To have for himself?

M: What else?

S: Does he think the bad things benefit he who has them, or does he perfectly well know they will harm him?

M: There are some who believe bad things benefit them, others who know that they harm them.

S: And do you think that those who believe that bad things benefit them know they are bad?

M: No, that's something I can't quite believe.

S: It's clear, then, that those who do not know things to be bad do not want what is bad. What they want are things they think are good, that are in fact bad. It follows that those who have no knowledge about these things and believe them to be good clearly want good things. Isn't that right?

M: It is likely.

S: Well then, those who you say want bad things, believing bad things harm those who have them, know they will be harmed by them?

M: Necessarily.

S: And don't they think those who are harmed are miserable to the extent that they are harmed?

M: That seems unavoidable.

S: And don't they think those who are miserable are unhappy?

M: I think so.

S: Does anyone want to be miserable and unhappy?

M: I do not think so, Socrates.

S: Then no one wants what is bad, Meno – unless he wants to be in such a state. For what else is misery if not wishing for bad things, and having one's wish come true?

M: You are probably right, Socrates. No one really wants what is bad.

### QUESTION 6

In passage 5, Meno advances a definition of virtue and Socrates makes an argument concerning desire. What is the relevance of Socrates' argument to Meno's proposed definition?

- A) Socrates seeks to show that everyone is virtuous, on Meno's account.
- B) Socrates seeks to show that everyone is virtuous, on Meno's definition, which is absurd; therefore, Meno's account is wrong.
- C) Socrates seeks to show that one half of Meno's definition of virtue is trivial, since all human beings satisfy it.
- D) Socrates is trying to arrive at a definition of 'desire', which Meno uses to define virtue.
- E) Socrates seeks to prove that virtue, since it is the power to acquire good things, may be regarded simply as the power to get what one truly wants.

**QUESTION 7**

If accepted, all of the following, except one, would constitute objections to Socrates' argument and conclusion

- A) When I say, 'X is good', that just means 'X is what I really want'. When I say, 'X is bad' that just means 'X is what I really don't want'. In this way, good and bad are relative.
- B) It is possible to want X without wanting to have X for oneself. Therefore, even if the possession of bad things is always harmful, it does not follow that wanting bad things is always harmful.
- C) Suppose I drink a glass of clear liquid, thinking it is water. It turns out to be poison. There may be a sense in which I did not really want what was in the glass. But there is certainly a sense in which I really did want it. Yet it really was bad.
- D) Some bad things harm only those who do not possess them.
- E) Some things bring harm without bringing misery.

Passage 6, From Plato's *Meno*, (pdf, p. 25):

A: May no member of my household – may none of my friends, be they citizens or strangers – be crazy enough to ruin themselves by running after these people [sophists], who patently plague and corrupt those who follow them.

S: How do you mean, Anytus? Of all the people who set themselves up as professional practitioners of beneficial knowledge, are only this lot so different from the rest that they not only fail to improve the things they are given to work on, but they actually corrupt them – and they plainly think they'll make money in the process? I can't believe it is true, because I know that one man, Protagoras [a sophist], made more money off his wisdom than Pheidias [a sculptor], who crafted such remarkably fine works, or any other ten sculptors put together. Surely what you say is bizarre, given that anyone who set up to repair old shoes, or old clothes, and returned all items in a more tattered state than when received, would be out of business in a month. Anyone who did business like that would starve to death, and yet you would have me believe all of Greece has neglected to notice – for lo these forty years – that Protagoras corrupts those who follow him, and sends them back out into the world in a worse moral condition than when he took them into his care. I think the man was seventy when he died, and he had plied his craft for forty years. During all that time, down to this very day, his reputation has stood very high. And it isn't just Protagoras; there are lots of others, some born before him, some still alive today. Are we to say that you say they deceive and harm the young knowingly, or that they themselves are not aware of it? Are we to consider those whom some people consider the wisest of men to be so crazy as that?

A: They are far from being crazy, Socrates. It is more a question of crazy young people being willing to pay their fees, and – even more so – parents entrusting children to such company; most of all it is a matter of cities not driving out any citizen or stranger who tries to conduct himself in this manner.

S: Some sophist has done you wrong, Anytus. Otherwise, why would you be so hard on them?

A: No, by Zeus, I have never met a single one of them, nor would I allow any member of my household to do so.

S: So then you are wholly unacquainted with these people?

A: And may I remain so.

S: How then, my good sir, can you know whether there is any good in what they teach or not, if you are altogether without experience of it?

A: Easily, for I know who they are, whether I have made their acquaintance or not.

**QUESTION 8**

Socrates (or, if you like, Plato) can be read as making any or all of the following points in passage 6. But one of the following is clearly made only ironically.

- A) Anytus is not clear enough about what he means when he says the sophists 'patently plague and corrupt those who follow them'.
- B) It cannot be the case that the sophists really corrupt their students. If they did it would be obvious they did, and no one would pay to be corrupted.
- C) Anyone who says the sophists plague and corrupt their followers owes an explanation of how it is that they keep attracting students and making money.
- D) Anytus does not have enough knowledge of the sophists to judge whether they are good teachers or not.
- E) Even if Anytus is right that the sophists corrupt their students, he might be wrong the next time he condemns some teacher – Socrates, for example. Anytus obviously condemns people for teaching anything he finds unorthodox or foreign.

Passage 7, from Plato's *Republic*, Book I (pdf, p. 26):

Socrates: Does the just man try to gain any advantage over the just?

Thrasymachus: Far from it; if he did that he would not be the simple, unassuming creature he is.

And would he try to do better than to do justice?

He would not.

How would he regard any attempt to gain an advantage over the unjust; would that be considered by him to be just or would it be unjust?

He would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage; but he would not be able to do so.

Whether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. My question is whether the just man, while refusing to have more than another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust has?

Yes, he would.

And what of the unjust – does he claim to have more than the just man, and to do more than what is just?

Of course, he said; he seeks to have more than all men.

And so the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the unjust man, in order that he may have more than everyone?

True.

We may put the matter this way, I said. The just man does not desire more than those like him have, but does desire more than those unlike him have; whereas the unjust desires more than both his like and his unlike?

You've got it.

And the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither of these?

Right again, he said.

And isn't the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them?

Of course, he said. He who is of a certain nature is like others who are also of that nature; he who is not, not.

Each of them, I said, is like his like?

Certainly, he replied.

Very good, Thrasymachus, I said. Now you would admit that one man is a musician and another not?

Yes.

And who is skillful and who foolish, when it comes to music?

Clearly the musician is skillful; he who is not is foolish.

And he is good insofar as he is skillful, and bad insofar as he is foolish?

Yes.

And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?

Yes.

And do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician tuning his lyre would want or claim to exceed or go beyond a fellow musician, when it comes to tightening and loosening the strings just so?

I do not think that he would.

But he would claim to exceed the non-musician?

Of course.

And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing food and drink would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the practice of medicine?

He would not.

But he would wish to go beyond the non-physician?

Yes.

And about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think any man who has knowledge would even wish to have the choice of saying or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or do the same as his like in the same case?

That, I suppose, cannot be denied.

And what of the ignorant man? Would he not desire to have more than both he who knows and he who does not?

I dare say he would.

And he who knows is wise?

Yes.

And he who is wise is good?

True.

Then the wise and good man will not desire to get the better of his like, but of his unlike and opposite?

I suppose so.

Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to get the better of both?

Yes.

But we said, didn't we, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his like and unlike? Weren't these your words?

They were.

And you also said that the just man will not go beyond his like but only beyond his unlike?

Yes.

Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and ignorant?

That seems to follow

And each of them is like his like?

That was admitted.

Then the just has turned out to be wise and good and the unjust evil and ignorant.

**QUESTION 9**

In passage 7, Socrates attempts to refute which of the following claims?

- A) The just man is wise and good; the unjust man is neither wise nor good.
- B) The unjust man is wise and good; the just man is neither wise nor good.
- C) The just man will not try to gain an advantage over another just men.
- D) The unjust man will try to gain an advantage over just men.
- E) Both B) and C)

**QUESTION 10**

Which of the following plausible statements might provide a basis for defending Thrasymachus' position against Socrates' arguments in passage 7?

- A) What makes musicians good is not knowledge of how to tune their instruments. What makes musicians good is determination to outdo other musicians by giving better performances than anyone else.
- B) What makes doctors wise is that they constantly strive to learn new things, and freely share discoveries with other doctors so that collective medical knowledge constantly advances.
- C) A man with knowledge may want to be able to say more than another man with the same knowledge. He hopes to do so by acquiring new knowledge the other man does not have, thus exceeding him in skill and wisdom.
- D) Both A) and C).
- E) All of A), B) and C).

**QUESTION 11**

Which of the following statements about passage 7 is false?

- A) Thrasymachus claims that the just will not try to gain any advantage over the just.
- B) Thrasymachus claims that the just will not try to gain any advantage over anyone.
- C) Thrasymachus claims that the unjust man is wise and good.
- D) Thrasymachus grants that the unjust man will be like other wise and good men.
- E) Thrasymachus grants that ignorant men wish to know more than wise men.

Passage 8, from Descartes' "First Meditation" (pdf, p. 1):

Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true and assured I have gotten either from the senses or through the senses. But from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once.

Yet although the senses sometimes deceive us with respect to barely perceivable and distant objects, one finds that concerning many other matters no reasonable doubt is possible, even though these things are known through the senses: for example, that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in my hand, and other things of a similar nature. And how could it be denied that these are my hands, or that this is my body? Unless, perhaps, I were to compare myself to madmen, whose brains are so disordered and clouded by chronic vapors of bile that they staunchly maintain they are kings when they are paupers; that they are dressed in purple and gold when they are naked; or that they have jugs for heads, or bodies made of glass. But these are the insane, and I would think myself just as far gone if I took them as my model, and conducted my life accordingly.

What a brilliant argument! As if I were not a man in the habit of sleeping at night and, while asleep, having the same sorts of experiences madmen do while awake – indeed, sometimes even less probable ones. And how often, asleep at night, have I become convinced of quite ordinary things - that I am here in my dressing-gown, seated by the fire - when in fact I am lying undressed in bed! Yet at the moment I surely see this paper with open eyes; I shake my head and it is not asleep; I deliberately and intentionally stretch out my hand and feel what I feel. None of this would happen with such distinctness to one asleep. As if I did not remember all the times I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep! The more carefully I reflect on all this, the more clearly I see that there are never any sure signs by means of which one can distinguish wakefulness from sleep. As a result, I begin to feel stupified, and this feeling only reinforces the notion that I may be asleep.

## QUESTION 12

Which of the following is true about the first sentence of passage 8 [the underlined one]?

- A) It states a premise Descartes accepts at the start of the passage but rejects by the end.
- B) It states a premise Descartes accepts at the start of the passage and does not question even by the end.
- C) It states a conclusion Descartes thinks he has established by the end of the passage.
- D) It states a conclusion Descartes wants to establish at the beginning of the passage, but realizes cannot be proven because it is actually false.
- E) It states a conclusion Descartes wants to establish at the beginning of the passage, but finds he cannot prove because he is 'stupified' by all the skeptical arguments against it.

Passage 9, from Descartes' "First Meditation" [continues passage 8]:

Therefore, let us now suppose we dream: that these things - that my eyes are open, that I shake my head and stretch out my hands - are not true. Perhaps, indeed, I do not even have such things as hands or a body at all. On the other hand, at least this much has to be admitted: the visions which come in sleep are like paintings, insofar as they are things that can only be fashioned in the likeness of real things. Therefore at least these general kinds of things - eyes, head, hands and bodies as such - are not figments of imagination but are real and exist. For even when painters try to invent satyrs and sirens with the most peculiar shapes, they cannot give them natures which are new in every way; they simply mix and match the limbs of different animals. Or if somehow they manage to make up something so new that nothing remotely similar has ever been seen before - something that is, therefore, completely fictitious and unreal - at least the colors used to make it up must be real. By similar reasoning, although these general kinds of things - eyes, head, hands, so forth - could be imaginary, this much must be granted: that certain other still simpler and more universal things are real. These are, as it were, the true colors from which we form all our mental images of things, whether true or false.

### QUESTION 13

Which of the following is the best statement of the conclusion of the argument – call it 'the painting analogy' – that Descartes makes in passage 9?

- A) Even if it is true that I am dreaming, it is not possible that everything I am dreaming is fundamentally untrue.
- B) It is not reasonable to suppose that I am dreaming.
- C) Painters are not capable of inventing subjects for their paintings that are 'completely fictitious and unreal'.
- D) Dreams are like paintings.
- E) Even if painters could invent subjects for their paintings that are 'completely fictitious and unreal', they would still have to use colors. Those would have to be real.

Passage 10, from Descartes' "Second Meditation" (pdf, p. 3):

*Having concluded that he is 'a thing that thinks' - more specifically, 'a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions' - Descartes proceeds to write the following:*

As a result of all this I am arriving at a rather better understanding of what I am. But it still appears – and I cannot stop thinking so – that the corporeal things of which images are formed in my thought, and which the senses investigate, are known with much more distinctness than this puzzling 'I' which cannot be pictured in the imagination. And yet it is surely surprising that I should have a more distinct grasp of things I realize are doubtful, unknown and foreign to me, than of that which is true and known - my own self. But I see how it is: my mind likes to wander and will not yet submit to confinement within the bounds of truth.

#### QUESTION 14

Which of the following is the best summary of Descartes' argument in passage 10:

- A) It is surprising that I should have a more distinct grasp of things doubtful and unknown than things true and known. If this is indeed so, it follows that I may know the nature of corporeal things better than I know the nature of 'this puzzling 'I' which cannot be pictured in the imagination.'
- B) I cannot stop thinking corporeal things are known with much more distinctness than this puzzling 'I'. What I cannot stop thinking cannot be doubted and must be true. Therefore, corporeal things must be known with more distinctness than this puzzling 'I'.
- C) It is absurd to suppose I could grasp something doubtful and unknown better than something known and true. I keep thinking I grasp something doubtful and unknown better than something known and true. It follows that my mind is prone to think something absurd.
- D) Since I am finally forcing my mind not to wander, it follows that I am arriving at a better understanding of my corporeal nature. I know it with much more distinctness than 'this puzzling 'I' which cannot be pictured in the imagination.'
- E) From the fact that I now know the existence of 'this puzzling 'I' which cannot be picture in the imagination' better than I know corporeal bodies, it follows that I am finally forcing my mind not to wander from the path of truth.

Passage 11, from J. S. Mill, *On Liberty*, chapter 1 (pdf, p. 7):

In England, from the peculiar circumstances of our political history, though the yoke of opinion is perhaps heavier, that of law is lighter, than in most other countries of Europe; and there is considerable jealousy of direct interference, by the legislative or the executive power with private conduct; not so much from any just regard for the independence of the individual, as from the still subsisting habit of looking on the government as representing an opposite interest to the public. The majority have not yet learnt to feel the power of the government their power, or its opinions their opinions. When they do so, individual liberty will probably be as much exposed to invasion from the government, as it already is from public opinion. But, as yet, there is a considerable amount of feeling ready to be called forth against any attempt of the law to control individuals in things in which they have not hitherto been accustomed to be controlled by it; and this with very little discrimination as to whether the matter is, or is not, within the legitimate sphere of legal control; insomuch that the feeling, highly salutary on the whole, is perhaps quite as often misplaced as well grounded in the particular instances of its application.

#### QUESTION 15

Which of the following does Mill not claim, in passage 11?

- A) In England individual liberty tends to be protected from legal interference by a general sense that the interests of the government are opposed to those of the people.
- B) In England certain irrational attitudes about government often have beneficial effects.
- C) In England individual liberty tends to be illegitimately constrained by 'the yoke of opinion'.
- D) In countries where the populace has learned 'to feel the power of the government their power, or its opinions their opinion', there will be less individual freedom than in England.
- E) If the English populace ceased to mistrust their government, the government would probably place more restrictions on individual liberty.

Passage 12, from Mill's *On Liberty*, chapter 1 (pdf, p. 11):

There is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself, or, if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation. When I say only himself, I mean directly, and in the first instance: for whatever affects himself, may affect others through himself; and the objection which may be grounded on this contingency will receive consideration in the sequel. This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.

#### QUESTION 16

It is not entirely clear what argument, or arguments, Mill wants to advance on behalf of an individual's right to free expression and free publication of opinions. But one (or more) of the following arguments is obviously not Mill's in passage 12. Which is it?

- A) An individual's opinions are part of a 'sphere of action' that does not affect society, hence does not concern it. Society may regulate public conduct, not private thought.
- B) Society is incapable of interfering with anything that does not affect society. Therefore society cannot interfere with the expression and publication of individual opinions.
- C) It is not possible to interfere with the expression and publication of opinions without interfering with 'the inward domain of consciousness . . . absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment', so forth. It is not permissible to interfere with 'the inward domain of consciousness'. Therefore, it is not permissible to interfere with the expression and publication of opinions.
- D) Whatever is necessary for securing freedom of thought cannot legitimately be forbidden.
- E) Both A) and B).

Passage 13, from J.S. Mill, *On Liberty*, chapter 2 (excerpts pdf, p. 2):

Unfortunately for the good sense of mankind, the fact of their fallibility is far from carrying the weight in their practical judgment, which is always allowed to it in theory; for while every one well knows himself to be fallible, few think it necessary to take any precautions against their own fallibility, or admit the supposition that any opinion of which they feel very certain, may be one of the examples of the error to which they acknowledge themselves to be liable. Absolute princes, or others who are accustomed to unlimited deference, usually feel this complete confidence in their own opinions on nearly all subjects. People more happily situated, who sometimes hear their opinions disputed, and are not wholly unused to be set right when they are wrong, place the same unbounded reliance only on such of their opinions as are shared by all who surround them, or to whom they habitually defer: for in proportion to a man's want of confidence in his own solitary judgment, does he usually repose, with implicit trust, on the infallibility of "the world" in general. And the world, to each individual, means the part of it with which he comes in contact; his party, his sect, his church, his class of society: the man may be called, by comparison, almost liberal and largeminded to whom it means anything so comprehensive as his own country or his own age.

#### **QUESTION 17**

Which of the following is the best statement of Mill's main point in passage 13:

- A) Absolute princes are more confident in their opinions about nearly everything, and are therefore more 'happily situated'.
- B) Most people do not admit that they are fallible.
- C) Most people admit they are fallible, but don't admit that the people around them are fallible as well.
- D) Most people admit they are fallible. Yet they do not treat their firmly held beliefs as if they might be mistaken.
- E) Ordinary people do not seriously consider that something believed by everyone around them might nevertheless be mistaken.

Passage 14, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", p. 176:

Liberty [in Mill's sense] is not incompatible with some kinds of autocracy, or at any rate with the absence of self-government. Liberty in this sense is principally concerned with the area of control, not with its source. Just as democracy may, in fact, deprive the individual citizen of a great many liberties which he might have in some other form of society, so it is perfectly conceivable that a liberal-minded despot would allow his subjects a large measure of personal freedom. The despot who leaves his subjects a wide area of liberty may be unjust, or encourage the wildest inequalities, care little for order, or virtue, or knowledge; but provided he does not curb their liberty, or at least curbs it less than many other regimes, he meets with Mill's specification.

Freedom in this sense is not, at any rate logically, connected with democracy or self-government.

### QUESTION 18

Which of the following is the best statement of the critical point Berlin wishes to make about Mill's conception of liberty, in passage 14?

- A) Mill was too tolerant of political despotism.
- B) Liberty, in Mill's sense, may encourage despotism.
- C) Freedom ought to be defined in such a way that one cannot have it without having democracy or self-government.
- D) Mill may be assuming that if society is free, in his sense, it will be democratic; but this is not necessarily the case.
- E) Liberty should not be defined in terms of an area of control, rather than in terms of a source of control.

Passage 15, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", p. 180:

This paradox has been often exposed. It is one thing to say that I know what is good for X, while he himself does not; and even to ignore his wishes for its – and his – sake; and a very different one to say that he has *eo ipso* chosen it, not indeed consciously, not as he seems in everyday life, but in his role as a rational self which his empirical self may not know – the 'real' self which discerns the good, and cannot help choosing it once it is revealed. This monstrous impersonation, which consists in equating what X would choose if he were something he is not, or at least not yet, with what X actually seeks and chooses, is at the heart of all political theories of self-realization. It is one thing to say that I may be coerced for my own good, which I am too blind to see: this may, on occasion, be for my benefit; indeed it may enlarge the scope of my liberty. It is another to say that if it is my good, then I am not being coerced, for I have willed it, whether I know this or not, and am free (or 'truly' free) even while my poor earthly body and foolish mind bitterly reject it, and struggle with the greatest desperation against those who seek, however benevolently, to impose it.

#### QUESTION 19

Which of the following claims would be an example of the sort of 'monstrous impersonation' Berlin criticizes in passage 15?

- A) You should not force children to take their medicine, even if it would be good for them, because force is coercion, and coercion is wrong.
- B) You may in some cases force children to take their medicine, if it would be good for them, because coercion is justified in some cases in which people are incapable of making good choices for themselves.
- C) You must force children to take their medicine, if it would be good for them, because coercion is justified in all cases in which people are incapable of making good choices for themselves.
- D) If the child would take its medicine, if it knew what was good for it, it follows that the child actually wants to take its medicine, even if apparently it does not.
- E) Even if the child would take its medicine, if it knew what was good for it, it does not follow that the child actually wants to take its medicine, even if apparently it does not.

Passage 16, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty" [continues passage 15]:

This magical transformation, or sleight of hand [i.e. the 'monstrous impersonation' of passage 15]. . . can no doubt be perpetrated just as easily with the 'negative' concept of freedom, where the self that should not be interfered with is no longer the individual with his actual wishes and needs as they are normally conceived, but the 'real' man within, identified with the pursuit of some ideal purposes not dreamed of by his empirical self . . . But the 'positive' conception of freedom as self-mastery, with its suggestion of a man divided against himself, has in fact, and as a matter of history, of doctrine and of practice, lent itself more easily to this splitting of personality into two: the transcendent, dominant controller, and the empirical bundle of desires and passions to be disciplined and brought to heel. It is this historical fact that has been influential. This demonstrates (if demonstration of so obvious a truth is needed) that conceptions of freedom directly derive from views of what constitutes a self, a person, a man.

### QUESTION 20

Berlin claims all of the following, except one, in passage 16? Which of the following does he not claim?

- A) It is possible to commit the 'monstrous impersonation' Berlin criticizes in passage 15 while favoring a 'negative' conception of freedom.
- B) A conception of human beings as divided between 'true' selves and 'empirical' selves tends to go with a 'positive' conception of freedom.
- C) Conceptions of freedom directly derive from views of what constitutes a self.
- D) 'Positive' freedom tends to go with a conception of the self as a bundle of desires and passions held captive by a dominant controller. Positive freedom, then, is freedom from this coercive control and captivity.
- E) Both C) and D).

**END OF PAPER**