

SECTION I**QUESTIONS 1-21; MULTIPLE CHOICE**

1 point for each right answer, for a total of 21 points. No penalty for wrong answers.

Instructions:

A separate bubble form accompanies this question paper. Enter all information and answers on this form in number 2B pencil (not ink). Enter the module code in Section A. Enter and bubble-shade your matriculation number in Section B very carefully. Follow specific instructions in the instruction box on the bubble form. When filling in Section C, take care to bubble-shade answers only for questions 1-21, even though the form has space for answers to 100 questions.

Passage 1, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (pdf, p. 4):

S: So tell me now, by Zeus, that thing you just said you knew so well: namely what is righteous and unrighteous, regarding murder and everything else. I take it holiness always consists in some one thing, with regard to every action; and unholiness is always the opposite of holiness, and the same as itself. For everything unholy always appears to us in the same form – namely as a form of unholiness.

E: Most certainly, Socrates.

S: Tell me what you say, then; what is holiness and what is unholiness?

E: I say holiness is doing what I do now – namely, prosecuting wrongdoers, whether the crime is murder or temple robbery or anything else, and whether the culprit is your father or mother or anyone else; not to prosecute is unholy. And please note, Socrates, that I can quote the law as a heavy proof this is so. I have already said to others that such actions are proper – not to give way to the ungodly, whoever they may be. These people themselves believe that Zeus is the best and most just of gods; yet they acknowledge that, for the crime of swallowing his own sons, Zeus bound his own father, who in his turn castrated his own father on similar grounds. Yet everyone is mad at me for prosecuting my father for wrongdoing. They hereby contradict themselves in what they claim about the gods and about me.

QUESTION 1

Which of the following is the best statement of the contradiction to which Euthyphro thinks his critics are committed, as per the underlined bit of passage 1?

- A) If it is wrong to prosecute one's father, what Zeus did to his father was bad and unjust. Zeus is the best and most just of gods. Ergo, if it is wrong to prosecute one's father, Zeus is both best and most just and bad and unjust. This is a contradiction.
- B) Euthyphro's critics contradict themselves in what they claim about the gods and about Euthyphro. Ergo, they are wrong.
- C) Holiness means prosecuting wrongdoers, even your own family members. Unholiness means not prosecuting. Ergo, prosecuting one's father for wrongdoing is both holy and unholy. This is a contradiction.
- D) Everyone is mad at Euthyphro for prosecuting his father for wrongdoing, but he is doing the right thing. This is a contradiction.
- E) Euthyphro is citing a family relation – Zeus as his holy father – to prove that concerning ethics one should ignore family relations. This is a contradiction.

QUESTION 2

Which of the following is both consistent with everything Euthyphro says his critics believe, and would explain away the apparent inconsistency in their beliefs?

- A) Zeus is the best and most just of gods.
- B) Zeus was right to prosecute his own father for wrong-doing.
- C) Zeus did not really prosecute his own father for wrong-doing. That story is just a myth.
- D) Even the best and most just of gods, Zeus, need not be infallible. When he prosecuted his father, he may have done a wrong, unjust thing.
- E) The best and most just of gods, Zeus, must be infallible. If he does something, it must always be just and for the best.

Passage 2, from Plato's *Euthyphro* [a few lines after passage 1]:

Socrates: My friend, you did not teach me adequately when I inquired as to what holiness is. You told me what you are doing now – namely, prosecuting your father for murder – is holy.

Euthyphro: And I spoke truth, Socrates.

S: That may be. You do concede, however, that there are many other holy actions.

E: There are.

S: Keep in mind, then, that I didn't ask for a couple examples of holy actions. I asked what form all holy actions exhibit, making them holy. For you did agree all unholy actions are unholy and all holy actions holy in virtue of some shared form, or don't you remember?

E: I do.

QUESTION 3

In passage 2, Socrates points out that Euthyphro has answered the question inadequately. Which of the following Q&A sets contains an answer that makes the same type of mistake Euthyphro makes?

- A) Q: What is a city?
A: Singapore is a city.
- B) Q: What is a city?
A: Malaysia is a city.
- C) Q: What is a city?
A: A large, densely populated urban area.
- D) Q: What is a city?
A: A large, sparsely populated rural area.
- E) Q: What is an example of a city?
A: Singapore is a city.

Passage 3, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (pdf, p. 5):

E: Well then, what the gods love is holy; what is unloved by them is unholy.

S: Magnificent, Euthyphro! You have now answered in just the way I wanted. As to whether your answer is a true one – that's a little something I don't know just yet; but you are obviously going to show me things are as you say.

E: Certainly.

S: Come then, let us examine what has been said. A man or deed loved by the gods is holy, whereas one hated by the gods is unholy. They are not one and the same – in fact, they are diametrical opposites: the holy and the unholy. Isn't that so?

E: It is indeed.

S: This seems to you a sound proposition?

E: I think so, Socrates.

S: We have also declared, Euthyphro, that the gods exist in a state of discord, that they are at odds, indeed that they hate one another. Haven't we said this, too?

E: We have.

S: What sorts of things are they which, when causes of argument, are causes of anger and enmity? Let's look at it this way. If you and I were to get into an argument about which of two numbers was the larger, would this turn us into furious enemies; or would we sit down, count up, and quickly smooth our differences?

E: That is certainly just what we would do.

S: Likewise, if we had a fight about bigger and smaller, we would avail ourselves of measurement and swiftly settle the matter.

E: That is so.

S: And we would employ a scale, I think, if we disagreed about what was heavier and what lighter?

E: Of course.

S: What sorts of things might we argue about that would make us angry and hostile, if we couldn't reach agreement? Maybe you don't have an immediate answer; but see whether you think it's these things: justice and injustice, beauty and ugliness, the good and the bad. Aren't these the very things for causing disputes which, when they prove unresolvable, provoke irreconcilable differences between you, me and everyone else.

E: That's just how it goes in arguments about such things, Socrates.

S: What about the gods, Euthyphro? If in fact they get in arguments, won't they be about these sorts of things?

E: That must be how it is, Socrates.

S: Then according to your argument, good Euthyphro, different gods consider different things to be just, beautiful, ugly, good, and bad – for they wouldn't be at odds unless they disagreed about these things, would they?

E: You are right.

S: Each of them loves what each considers beautiful, good, and just, and each hates the opposite of these things?

E: Certainly.

S: But you say the same things are considered just by some gods, unjust by others. It is disputes over such things that set them at odds and at war. Isn't it so?

E: It is.

S: The same things, then, are loved by the gods and hated by the gods, and will be both god-loved and god-hated.

E: It seems likely.

S: And the same things will be both holy and unholy, according to the terms of this argument?

E: I'm afraid so.

QUESTION 4

Which of the following is the best statement of the awkward consequence Euthyphro confronts at the end of passage 3?

- A) It entails that some things will be both holy and unholy.
- B) It entails that nothing will be both holy and unholy.
- C) It entails that some things will be neither holy nor unholy.
- D) It entails that some things will be either holy or unholy.
- E) It entails that the things the gods fight about will be questions of justice and injustice, beauty and ugliness, the good and the bad.

Passage 4, from Plato's *Meno* (pdf, p. 8):

M: I think, Socrates, that virtue is, as the poet says, "to find joy in beautiful things and have power." Therefore I say that virtue is to want all the best things in life, and to have the power to get them.

S: Do you mean that the man who desires the best things in life desires good things?

M: That's certainly right.

S: Do you take it for granted that there are people who desire bad things, and others who desire good things? Don't you think, my good man, that all men desire good things?

M: I certainly don't.

S: You think some want bad things, then?

M: Yes.

S: Do you mean that they believe the bad things to be good, or that they know they are bad and want them anyway?

M: I think there are both kinds.

S: Do you think, Meno, that anyone, knowing that bad things are bad, still wants them?

M: I certainly do.

S: Wants in what way? To have for himself?

M: What else?

S: Does he think the bad things benefit he who has them, or does he perfectly well know they will harm him?

M: There are some who believe bad things benefit them, others who know that they harm them.

S: And do you think that those who believe that bad things benefit them know they are bad?

M: No, that's something I can't quite believe.

S: It's clear, then, that those who do not know things to be bad do not want what is bad. What they want are things they think are good, that are in fact bad. It follows that those who have no knowledge about these things and believe them to be good clearly want good things. Isn't that right?

M: It is likely.

S: Well then, those who you say want bad things, believing bad things harm

those who have them, know they will be harmed by them?

M: Necessarily.

S: And don't they think those who are harmed are miserable to the extent that they are harmed?

M: That seems unavoidable.

S: And don't they think those who are miserable are unhappy?

M: I think so.

S: Does anyone want to be miserable and unhappy?

M: I do not think so, Socrates.

S: Then no one wants what is bad, Meno – unless he wants to be in such a state. For what else is misery if not wishing for bad things, and having one's wish come true?

M: You are probably right, Socrates. No one really wants what is bad.

S: Weren't you saying just now that virtue is the desire for good things, and the power to acquire them?

M: Yes, I was.

S: It seems everyone satisfies the 'desire for' part of this definition, and no one is better than anyone else in this respect.

QUESTION 5

Meno says those who are virtuous 1) want good things and 2) have the power to get them. Which of the following is the best statement of Socrates' criticism of this definition of 'virtue' in passage 4?

- A) 1) and 2) may be necessary but not sufficient for virtue.
- B) 1) and 2) may be sufficient but not necessary for virtue.
- C) 1) and 2) may be neither necessary nor sufficient for virtue.
- D) Necessarily, everyone wants good things, so condition 1) cannot fail to be met.
- E) Necessarily, no one has the power to get good things, so condition 2) cannot be met.

QUESTION 6

Which of the following, if true, would support Socrates' conclusion in passage 4? (HINT: all the wrong answers look like objections or counter-examples.)

- A) 'Good' just means 'is desirable'. To say 'everyone wants good things' is true in virtue of the meaning of the word 'good'.
- B) To desire X is not necessarily to desire X for oneself. Therefore, to desire X, if X is harmful, is not necessarily to desire to harm oneself.
- C) Drug addicts clearly want their drugs, and many of them know the drugs are bad for them. Therefore, at least some people want something they know is bad.
- D) The possession of 'bad things' does not always bring unhappiness. A thief may steal money, enjoy what the money buys, and never get caught.
- E) Both A and B would support Socrates' conclusion.

Passage 5, from Plato's *Meno* (pdf, p. 7):

S: Both of you subscribe to Empedocles' theory of effluvia, am I right?

M: Certainly.

S: And so you believe there are channels through which effluvia make their way?

M: Definitely.

S: And certain effluvia fit certain channels, while others are either too small or too big?

M: That is so.

S: And there is a thing you call sight?

M: There is.

S: From this, 'comprehend what I state,' as Pindar says, for color is an effluvium off of shapes that fits the organ of sight and is perceived.

M: That seems to me a most excellent answer, Socrates!

S: ... I think you can deduce from this answer what sound is, and smell, and many such things.

QUESTION 7

All of the following except one follow from Socrates' proposed definition (in passage 5) of color. Which one does not follow?

- A) All things have effluvia that fit at least some channels.
- B) The reason we cannot smell the yellow color of a ripe lemon is that certain effluvia off of lemons fit into channels in our eyes but not our noses.
- C) The reason we cannot see the sound of a trumpet is that certain effluvia off trumpets fit into channels in our ears but not our eyes.
- D) It is not only possible for certain effluvia to be too big to fit into certain channels in our eyes, ears, etc.; it is also possible for them to be too small to fit.
- E) The color green is an effluvium off of shapes.

Passage 6, from Plato's *Republic*, Book 1 (pdf, p. 10):

Socrates: But should the just man injure anyone at all?

Polemarchus: Undoubtedly he should injure those who are both wicked and his enemies.

When horses are injured, are they thereby improved or made worse?

They become worse.

Worse, that is, with respect to those virtues that make horses into good horses – not, say, with respect to those virtues that make dogs into good dogs?

The horses are made worse as horses.

And injured dogs are made worse with respect to their doggish virtues, not their horsely ones?

Of course.

And about men, won't we have to say that when injured they are made worse with respect to their proper virtues as men?

Certainly.

But justice is the special virtue of humans?

Necessarily.

Then men who are harmed, my dear friend, are necessarily made unjust?

It seems likely.

But can the musician, by performing music, make men unmusical?

Impossible.

Or the rider by riding make bad riders?

Not at all.

Then can the just by justice make men unjust? In general, can good men make evil ones by means of virtue?

Assuredly not.

For I don't think it's the characteristic function of heat to make things cold; rather, the opposite of heat has that function.

Yes.

Nor does dryness, but rather its opposite, make things wet.

That's quite right.

Nor then is it the characteristic function of the good to do harm, but that of its opposite?

It seems so.

And the just man is a good man?

Certainly.

Then to injure someone, whether a friend or anyone else at all, is not the act of a just man, but an unjust man – his very opposite?

I think what you've said is the absolute truth, Socrates.

QUESTION 8

Which of the following does Socrates not imply, in passage 6?

- A) The just man should injure those who are wicked even if they are not his enemies.
- B) The just man should injure no one, not even his enemies.
- C) Those who injure anyone are unjust.
- D) Those who injure no one are just.
- E) Both A and D.

QUESTION 9

In passage 6, Socrates maintains that the just man will never injure anyone. Which of the following is the best statement of Socrates' argument to that conclusion?

- A) The just man is a good man. The greatest good is the greatest happiness. Therefore, justice is the greatest happiness. Injury causes unhappiness; nothing comes from its opposite, so unhappiness cannot produce happiness. So the just man will never injure anyone.
- B) The just man is a happy man. The greatest good is the greatest happiness. Therefore, justice is the greatest good. Injury causes unhappiness; nothing comes from its opposite, so unhappiness cannot produce goodness. So the just man will never injure anyone.
- C) Since justice is the special virtue of human beings, and things that are injured lose their virtue, to injure a human being is to make it less just. But nothing produces its opposite, so justice cannot produce injustice. So the just man will never injure anyone.
- D) Since justice is the special virtue of human beings, and things that are less virtuous cause more injury, it is impossible that a less virtuous thing can cause more injury. But nothing produces its opposite, so justice cannot produce injustice. So the just man will never injure anyone.
- E) Since justice is virtue, virtue is goodness, and the greatest good is the greatest happiness, the most just man will be the happiest man, and the happiest man will not harm anyone, for no one harms him.

QUESTION 10

Which of the following would be inconsistent with Socrates' conclusion in passage 6?

- A) It is unjust to punish anyone for committing any crime, since punishment is an injury.
- B) It is just to punish someone for committing a crime, even though punishment is an injury.
- C) It is just to punish someone for committing a crime, but only if the punishment improves the criminal and does not injure him.
- D) It is just to punish someone for committing a crime, even if the punishment results in injury, but only if injustice to the criminal produces more justice for society as a whole.
- E) B and D.

Passage 7, from Descartes' "First Meditation", (pdf, p. 1):

Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true and assured I have gotten either from the senses or through the senses.

Passage 8, from Descartes' "Second Meditation", (pdf, p. 6):

We say we see the wax itself, if it is there before us, not that we judge it to be there from its color or shape. And this might lead me to conclude without further ado that knowledge of the wax comes from what the eye sees, and not from the scrutiny of the mind alone. But if I then look out the window and see men crossing the square, as I just happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax. Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which could conceal ghosts or mechanical men? But I judge that they are men. And so something which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of judgment which is in my mind.

QUESTION 11

Which of the following statements about the relationship between passages 7 and 8 is/are true?

- A) 8 gives an argument for why 7 is true.
- B) 8 gives an argument for why 7 is false
- C) 8 offers an explanation why 7 seems true.
- D) 8 offers an explanation why 7 seems false.
- E) Both B and C.

Passage 9, from Descartes' *First Meditation* (pdf, p. 2):

For even when painters try to invent satyrs and sirens with the most peculiar shapes, they cannot give them natures which are new in every way; they simply mix and match the limbs of different animals. Or if somehow they manage to make up something so new that nothing remotely similar has ever been seen before - something that is, therefore, completely fictitious and unreal - at least the colors used to make it up must be real. By similar reasoning, although these general kinds of things - eyes, head, hands, so forth - could be imaginary, this much must be granted: that certain other still simpler and more universal things are real. These are, as it were, the true colors from which we form all our mental images of things, whether true or false.

This class appears to include corporeal nature in general, and its extension; the shape of extended things; the quantity, or size and number of these things; the place in which they may exist, the time through which they may endure, and so on.

QUESTION 12

Which of the following is the best statement of the argument Descartes advances in passage 9?

- A) Just as painted images must be composed of color, so mental images must be composed of color.
- B) Just as painted images must be composed of color, so mental images must be composed of color. And these colors must be true in order for the images to be true.
- C) Just as painted images must be composed of color, so mental images must be composed of color. So even if the images are false to their subjects, the colors themselves are true.
- D) Just as painted images must be composed of color, so mental images must be composed of color. So even if that images and thoughts portray cannot be known to be true, the colors can be known to exist.
- E) Just as painted images must be composed of colors, so mental images must be composed of certain other simple elements.

Passage 10, from Descartes' "First Meditation" [continues where passage 9 stops]:

Since I sometimes think others go wrong in matters concerning which they think they possess the most perfect knowledge, may I not similarly go wrong every time I add two and three, or count the sides of a square, or in some even simpler matter, if that is imaginable? But perhaps God would not have permitted me to be deceived in this way, since he is said to be 'most supremely good'. On the other hand, if it were inconsistent with his goodness to have created me in such a way that I am constantly deceived, it would seem equally alien to his goodness to allow me to be deceived on occasion – a proposition that cannot possibly be maintained.

QUESTION 13

Which proposition is it that Descartes says 'cannot possibly be maintained', as per the final line of passage 10?

- A) A supremely good God exists.
- B) It is uncertain whether a supremely good God exist.
- C) It is inconsistent with God's goodness that I would be permitted to be constantly deceived.
- D) It is uncertain whether, if a supremely good God exists, he would permit me to be constantly deceived.
- E) It is not the case that I am deceived on occasion.

QUESTION 14

Which of the following is the best statement of the conclusion of Descartes' argument in the underlined portion of passage 10?

- A) You should believe you are occasionally deceived about some things.
- B) You should believe that you are radically deceived about everything.
- C) Even if God is supremely good, you may be occasionally deceived about some things.
- D) Even if God is supremely good, you may be radically deceived about everything.
- E) Even if God is not supremely good, you cannot be radically deceived about everything.

Passage 11, from Mill's *On Liberty*, chapter 1:

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else.

QUESTION 15

Which of the following would allow Mill to support a law against suicide, consistent with his principle as stated in passage 11?

- A) The principle governs 'society', not political or legal authorities or bodies such as might pass a law against suicide, so the law would be consistent with the principle.
- B) Since suicide concerns only the individual, any law against suicide will necessarily be inconsistent with Mill's principle.
- C) A law against suicide by individuals deemed not to know what is right or wisest for them could be consistent with Mill's principle.
- D) A law against suicide passed by a democratic majority could be consistent with Mill's principle.
- E) A law against suicides harmful to others besides the victim could be consistent with Mill's principle.

Passage 12, from Berlin's "Two Concepts of Liberty":

The first of these political senses of freedom or liberty (I shall use both words to mean the same), which (following much precedent) I shall call the 'negative' sense, is involved in the answer to the question 'What is the area within which the subject – a person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?' The second, which I shall call the 'positive' sense, is involved in the answer to the question 'What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?' The two questions are clearly different, even though the answers to them may overlap.

QUESTION 16

Taking 'negative' and 'positive' liberty in the senses explained in passage 12, which of the following is true of Mill's principle, as stated in passage 11.

- A) Mill's principle guarantees my complete negative liberty by guaranteeing my complete positive liberty.
- B) Mill's principle guarantees my complete positive liberty by guaranteeing my complete negative liberty.
- C) Mill's principle guarantees a degree of negative liberty by securing an area of non-interference by others over my actions.
- D) Mill's principle guarantees a degree of positive liberty by preventing others from 'remonstrating, reasoning, entreating and persuading' me to act in accordance with their wishes.
- E) Both A and C.

Passage 13, from Mill's *On Liberty*, chapter 1:

All that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people. Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed, by law in the first place, and by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law. What these rules should be, is the principal question in human affairs; but if we except a few of the most obvious cases, it is one of those which least progress has been made in resolving. No two ages, and scarcely any two countries, have decided it alike; and the decision of one age or country is a wonder to another. Yet the people of any given age and country no more suspect any difficulty in it, than if it were a subject on which mankind had always been agreed. The rules which obtain among themselves appear to them self-evident and self-justifying. This all but universal illusion is one of the examples of the magical influence of custom, which is not only, as the proverb says a second nature, but is continually mistaken for the first.

QUESTION 17

Which of the following is the best statement of what Mill means by 'the magical influence of custom' in passage 13?

- A) Custom allows "enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people".
- B) Custom allows the healthy imposition of rules of conduct "on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law."
- C) Custom fosters healthy pluralism. It allows people and countries to differ in their opinions about how to live, thereby making everyone a "wonder" to one another.
- D) Custom makes things seem natural and inevitable which are in fact arbitrary and contingent.
- E) Custom provides guidance about "the principle question in human affairs", namely the rules by which we should guide our lives.

Passage 14, from Mill's *On Liberty*, chapter 2:

The time, it is to be hoped, is gone by when any defence would be necessary of the 'liberty of the press' as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed, against permitting a legislature or an executive, not identified in interest with the people, to prescribe opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to hear. This aspect of the question, besides, has been so often and so triumphantly enforced by preceding writers, that it needs not be specially insisted on in this place. Though the law of England, on the subject of the press, is as servile to this day as it was in the time of the Tudors, there is little danger of its being actually put in force against political discussion, except during some temporary panic, when fear of insurrection drives ministers and judges from their propriety; and, speaking generally, it is not, in constitutional countries, to be apprehended that the government, whether completely responsible to the people or not, will often attempt to control the expression of opinion, except when in doing so it makes itself the organ of the general intolerance of the public.

QUESTION 18

Which of the following is the most accurate statement of Mill's assessment, in passage 14, of the degree of press freedom in England in his day?

- A) The liberty of the press is completely secure, since no serious argument against that liberty is advanced by anyone.
- B) The liberty of the press is not completely secure because it is not secured by law.
- C) The liberty of the press is not completely secure because, even though it is secured by law, temporary panics drive judges and ministers to ignore the law.
- D) The liberty of the press is not secured by law, but tends to be secure in practice, due to the consensus in favor of it, and the lack of serious argument against.
- E) The liberty of the press is not secured by law, but tends to be secure in practice, due to the consensus in favor of it, despite serious argument against.

Passage 15, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty":

Mill confuses two distinct notions. One is that all coercion is, in so far as it frustrates human desires, bad as such, although it may have to be applied to prevent other, greater evils; while non-interference, which is the opposite of coercion, is good as such, although it is not the only good. The other is that men should seek to discover the truth, or to develop a certain type of character of which Mill approved – critical, original, imaginative, independent, non-conforming to the point of eccentricity, and so on – and that truth can be found, and such character can be bred, only in conditions of freedom. Both these are liberal views, but they are not identical, and the connection between them is, at best, empirical. No one would argue that truth or freedom of self-expression could flourish where dogma crushes all thought. But the evidence of history tends to show ... that integrity, love of truth and fiery individualism grow at least as often in severely disciplined communities, among, for example, the puritan Calvinists of Scotland or New England, or under military discipline, as in more tolerant or indifferent societies; and if this is so, Mill's argument for liberty as a necessary condition for the growth of human genius falls to the ground.

QUESTION 19

Which of the following is the best statement of the alleged confusion Berlin discusses in passage 15?

- A) Mill fails to see that liberty can flourish in intolerant circumstances just as in tolerant circumstances.
- B) Mill conflates a defense of liberty as inherently good with a defense of liberty as a means to a good end.
- C) Mill conflates genius with independence and non-conformity.
- D) Mill conflates the absence of coercion with simple non-interference.
- E) Mill conflates the value of discovering truth with the value of having a certain type of character.

Passage 16, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty":

We recognise that it is possible, and at times justifiable, to coerce men in the name of some goal (let us say, justice or public health) which they would, if they were more enlightened, themselves pursue, but do not, because they are blind or ignorant or corrupt. This renders it easy for me to conceive of myself as coercing others for their own sake, in their, not my, interest. I am claiming that I know what they truly need better than they know it themselves ... But I may go on to claim a good deal more than this. I may declare that they are actually aiming at what in their benighted state they consciously resist, because there exists within them an occult entity – their latent rational will, or their 'true' purpose – and that this entity, although it is belied by all they overtly feel and do and say, is their 'real' self ... and that this inner spirit is the only self that deserves to have its wishes taken into account. Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their 'real' selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man (happiness, performance of duty, wisdom, a just society, self-fulfilment) must be identical with his freedom – the free choice of his 'true', albeit often submerged and inarticulate, self.

QUESTION 20

On the basis of passage 16, it would be reasonable to infer that Berlin would agree with one of the following claims. Which is it?

- A) It is more dangerous to coerce people for the sake of what they 'really need', but don't realize they need, than it is to coerce people for the sake of what they 'really' want, but don't realize they want.
- B) From the fact that you can sometimes know what people 'really need', even though they don't know it, it follows that you can know what people 'really want', even though they don't know it.
- C) Coercion is not always wrong.
- D) Coercion is a matter of saying what someone 'really' needs or 'really' wants, and forcing this on them 'for their own sakes'.
- E) If you coerce people for the sake of what they really 'need', even though they are too blind, ignorant or corrupt' to want it, you will inevitably deceive yourself about people's true desires.

Passage 17, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty":

Coercion is not, however, a term that covers every form of inability. If I say that I am unable to jump more than ten feet in the air, or cannot read because I am blind ... it would be eccentric to say that I am to that degree enslaved or coerced. Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act. You lack political liberty or freedom only if you are prevented from attaining a goal by human beings. Mere incapacity to attain a goal is not lack of political freedom.

QUESTION 21

Berlin's definition of 'coercion' in passage 17 strictly implies which of the following? (HINT: by 'strictly' I mean: go by the letter of passage 17.)

- A) Only human beings are capable of coercion.
- B) No human beings are capable of coercion
- C) Coercion is wrong, because it implies deliberate interference with the actions of others.
- D) Coercion is not necessarily wrong, because deliberate interference with the actions of others is not necessarily wrong.
- E) A and C.

END OF PAPER