

SECTION I**QUESTIONS 1-20; MULTIPLE CHOICE**

1 point for each right answer, for a total of 20 points. No penalty for wrong answers.

Instructions:

A separate bubble form accompanies this question paper. Enter all information and answers on this form in number 2B pencil (not ink). Enter the module code and your contact number in Section A. Enter and bubble-shade your matriculation number in Section B very carefully. Follow specific instructions in the instruction box on the bubble form. When filling in Section C, take care to bubble-shade answers only for questions 1-20, even though the form has space for answers to 100 questions.

Passage 1, from Plato's "Euthyphro" (pdf, p. 12-13):

Euthyphro: I think, Socrates, that godliness and holiness are that part of justice concerned with the care of the gods, while the part of justice concerned with the care of men comprises the rest.

Socrates: It seems to me you put that very well, but I still need to gather a bit more information. I don't yet know what you mean by 'care', for you don't mean 'care of the gods' in the same sense as 'care' of other things. We say, for example – don't we? – that not everyone knows how to take care of horses, only the horse-breeder does.

E: Yes, I do mean it that way.

S: So horse breeding is the care of horses.

E: Yes.

S: Nor is it the case that everyone can care for dogs, but the hunter knows how.

E: That is so.

S: So hunting is the care of dogs.

E: Yes.

S: And cattle-raising the care of cattle.

E: Quite so.

S: While holiness and godliness is the care of the gods, Euthyphro. Is that what you mean?

E: It is.

S: Now in each case care has the same effect; it aims at benefiting and securing the good of the cared-for thing. In the case of horses cared for by horse breeders, for instance, they are the better for it. Or don't you think so?

E: I do.

S: So dogs are benefited by dog breeding, cattle by cattle raising, and so on and so forth. Unless you have some notion that care aims at harming the thing cared for?

E: By Zeus, no.

S: It aims to benefit the object of care?

E: Of course.

S: Is holiness then – being the care of the gods – also a benefit to them, something that makes them better? Would you agree that when you do something holy you improve some one of the gods?

E: By Zeus, no!

S: I didn't think that was what you meant – quite the contrary; and that is why I asked what you meant by 'care of the gods'. I couldn't believe you meant this kind of care.

E: Quite right, Socrates. I didn't mean this kind of care at all.

S: Very well, but what kind of care of the gods would holiness be?

E: The kind of care, Socrates, that slaves take of their masters.

S: I understand. Holiness is shaping up to be a kind of service to the gods.

E: Quite so.

QUESTION 1

Which one of the following does Euthyphro explicitly deny, in passage 1?

- A) Holiness is a kind of justice.
- B) Justice is a matter of taking care of things.
- C) There is a kind of care that does not improve the one who is cared for.
- D) There is a kind of care that does not benefit the one who is cared for.
- E) Care of the gods aims at improving the gods.

QUESTION 2

What is the best statement of what Socrates' argument, in passage 1, is supposed to show? (*HINT: The argument is part of the dialogue as a whole; the question of what Socrates is trying to show overall is debatable. Treat the passage as isolated for purposes of answering this question.*)

- A) That holiness cannot be a part of justice, since it does not benefit its objects.
- B) That holiness cannot be a part of justice, since it does not improve its objects.
- C) That Euthyphro must define 'care' carefully, if he wants to avoid absurd consequences.
- D) That Euthyphro must define 'holiness' carefully, if he wants to avoid absurd consequences.
- E) That Euthyphro must define 'service' carefully, if he wants to avoid absurd consequences.

Passage 2, from Plato's "Euthyphro" [continues where passage 1 leaves off]:

Socrates: Could you tell me: what would be the point of being of service to a doctor? Wouldn't it be the improvement of health, don't you think?

Euthyphro: I think so.

S: What about being of service to shipbuilders? What would you be hoping to achieve?

E: Clearly, Socrates, the building of a ship.

S: And as to being of service to housebuilders: that would subserve the building of a house?

E: Yes.

S: Tell me then, my good sir, what is the point of the service men provide to gods? You obviously know since you say that you, of all men, have the most complete knowledge of divinity.

E: And I speak the truth, Socrates.

S: Tell me then, by Zeus: what excellent purpose is it that the gods achieve with the help of us, their servants?

E: Many fine things, Socrates.

S: And the same goes for generals, my friend. All the same, you would not have any trouble telling me that the main point of what they do is to achieve victory in war.

E: Of course.

S: Farmers too, I think, produce many fine things, but the main point of what they do is to bring forth goods from the earth.

E: Quite so.

S: Well then, how would you encapsulate the many fine things that the gods achieve?

E: I told you just a little while ago, Socrates, that it is no easy matter to arrive at precise knowledge of these things. Nevertheless, to put it simply, I say that if a man knows how to please the gods in word and deed – with prayer and sacrifice – then his are holy actions that support and sustain private houses and public affairs alike. The opposite of these pleasing actions are unholy, overturning and destroying everything.

QUESTION 3

In passage 2, Socrates' analogies aim at forcing Euthyphro to admit which of the following?

- A) If a man knows how to please the gods in word and deed then his actions are holy.
- B) If holiness is service to the gods, it must benefit them, or facilitate some divine project.
- C) Holiness must benefit the gods, or facilitate some divine project.
- D) If service to the gods does produce some good, it cannot be holy.
- E) If service to the gods does not produce some good, it cannot be just.

Passage 3, from Plato's "Meno" (pdf, p. 2)

Socrates: Meno, by the gods, what do you yourself say virtue is? ...

Meno: It's really not that hard to say, Socrates. First, if you want the virtue of a man, it is easy to say that a man's virtue consists in being able to manage public affairs and thereby help his friends and harm his enemies – all the while being careful to come to no harm himself. If you want the virtue of a woman, it's not difficult to describe: she must manage the home well, keep the household together, and be submissive to her husband; the virtue of a child, whether boy or girl, is another thing altogether, and so is that of an elderly man – if you want that – or if you want that of a free man or a slave. There are lots of different virtues, as a result of which it is not at all hard to say what virtue is. There is virtue for every action and every stage in life, for every person and every capacity, Socrates. And the same goes for wickedness.

S: It must be my lucky day, Meno! Here I was, looking for just one virtue, and you happen by with a whole swarm! But, Meno, following up on this figurative swarm of mine, if I were to ask you what sort of being a bee is, and you said, 'there are all sorts of different sorts of bees,' what would you say if I went on to ask: 'Do you mean that there are all sorts of different sorts of bees insofar as they are bees? Or are they no different, insofar as they are bees, but they differ in other respects – in how beautiful they are, for example, or how big, and so on and so forth?' Tell me, what would you answer if I asked you this?

QUESTION 4

By means of his bee analogy, in passage 3, Socrates is attempting to make Meno see he has made a mistake. Which of the following is the best statement of what that mistake allegedly is?

- A) There cannot be different sorts of bees, since they are all the same sort of thing, namely, bees.
- B) Even if there are different sorts of bees, any definition of what bees are should focus on what they all have in common.
- C) There cannot be many different sorts of virtue, since there must be something that all virtuous things have in common.
- D) Even if there are different sorts of virtue, any definition of what virtue is should focus on what they all have in common.
- E) Whatever is true of the definition of bees must be true of the definition of virtue.

Passage 4, from Plato's "Meno", (pdf, p. 8)

Socrates: As everything in Nature is akin, and the soul has learned all, nothing prevents a man who has recalled one single thing - a process men call 'learning' - from discovering everything else; nothing, that is, if he is brave and does not weary of the search; for searching and learning are entirely recollection. We must, therefore, not credit your debater's quibble. It would make us lazy, and is music to the ears of spineless men; whereas my argument will make them enthusiastic and keen searchers. I trust that this is true, and so I want to inquire along with you into the nature of virtue.

Meno: Yes, Socrates, but what exactly do you mean when you say we 'do not learn' - that what we call learning is recollection? Can you teach me that this is so?

S: As I said just now, Meno, you are unscrupulous. Here you are, asking if I can teach you how there is no learning, only recollection, in order to show me up at once as contradicting myself.

M: No, by Zeus, Socrates, I had no such intention; I'm just used to this way of talking. If you can somehow show me things are as you say, I invite you to do so.

QUESTION 5

In passage 4, Socrates accuses Meno of attempting to catch him out in a contradiction. What is the contradiction?

- A) It is possible to learn that there is no learning.
- B) It is possible to teach that there is teaching.
- C) It is possible to recollect that there is recollection.
- D) Teachers will learn from pupils who 'do not learn.'
- E) Pupils will learn if teachers tell them, 'do not learn.'

Passage 5, from Plato's "Meno", (pdf, p. 29)

Socrates: So you tell me now, aren't there good men and true to be found among your people?

Meno: Certainly.

S: Well, then, do they make themselves available to the young as teachers? Do they agree that they are teachers, and that virtue can be taught?

M: No, by Zeus, Socrates; sometimes you can hear them say it can be taught; other times, that it cannot.

S: Should we say that they are teachers of this subject, when they do not even agree on this point?

M: I do not think so, Socrates.

S: Furthermore, do you think these sophists – who alone profess to be so crafty and wise – are teachers of virtue?

M: This is what I admire most in Gorgias, Socrates – that you would never hear him promising such a thing. Indeed, he makes fun of others when he hears them making this claim. He says you should turn people into clever speakers.

S: You do not think, then, that the sophists are teachers of virtue?

M: I cannot say, Socrates; like most people, at times I think they are, at other times I think they are not.

QUESTION 6

All of the following can reasonably be inferred on the basis of passage 5 except one. Which one is not a reasonable inference?

- A) Meno thinks some sophists claim to teach virtue but Gorgias does not.
- B) Meno sometimes thinks being able to speak cleverly does not make one virtuous.
- C) Meno thinks uncertainty whether you can teach something is evidence you cannot teach it.
- D) Meno sometimes thinks it is admirable not to pretend to be able to do more than you can.
- E) Meno thinks that non-sophists are more likely to be able to teach virtue than sophists.

Passage 6, from Plato's "Republic", (pdf, p. 4)

Cephalus: Wealth goes a long way towards preserving a man from having to lie or defraud anyone. When such a man departs to the world below his money has bought him peace of mind from cares about sacrifices owed to the gods or debts owed to men. And so on balance – weighing all the many benefits wealth may bring – I would say this is the greatest, to anyone with the intelligence to see it is so.

Socrates: Well put, Cephalus, I replied; but concerning this thing you have been talking about – namely, justice – what is it? Just: speak truth and pay one's debts? Isn't there more to it? And isn't doing those things sometimes just, and at other times unjust? Suppose, for example, I have a friend who leaves weapons in my care, when he is of sound mind, and then asks for them back after he has gone insane. Should I give this madman his weapons? No one would say that was the right thing to do, or that someone who did give them back was a just man, any than they would say you should always speak the truth to someone in such a seriously disturbed frame of mind.

You're absolutely right, he replied.

But then, I said, 'speaking truth and paying one's debts' is not a correct definition of justice.

QUESTION 7

Although it is not entirely clear from passage 6, Socrates can be read as attempting to refute Cephalus' claims, in passage 6, about the value of wealth. All of the following, except one, are strong responses Cephalus could make, if Socrates is trying to refute him. Which one response would not be a good one, for purposes of resisting refutation?

- A) From the fact that 'speak truth and pay one's debts' is not a correct definition of justice, it does not follow that the greatest benefit of being rich is not the capacity of money to "preserve a man from having to lie or defraud anyone".
- B) From the fact that 'speak truth and pay one's debts' is not a correct definition of justice, it does not follow that speaking truth and paying one's debts is not generally just.
- C) From the fact that 'speak truth and pay one's debts' is not a correct definition of justice it does not follow that no definition of justice is possible.
- D) If it is sometimes just to lie and defraud people, then wealth may sometimes not be needed to be just. It does not follow that the greatest benefit of being rich is not the capacity of money to "preserve a man from having to lie or defraud anyone" in cases when that is not the just thing to do.
- E) Cephalus' claim that "wealth goes a long way towards preserving a man from having to lie or defraud anyone", and that this is the greatest benefit of wealth, is perfectly consistent with Socrates' point that justice should not be defined as 'speak truth and pay one's debts'. Socrates is wrong to hint that Cephalus is committed to this wrong definition.

Passage 7, from Plato's "Republic", (pdf, pp. 7-8)

Socrates: In what joint venture of gold or silver is the just man to be preferred?

Polemarchus: When you want the money to be kept safely in trust.

You mean when money is not wanted, but put away somewhere for the time being?

Precisely.

That is to say, justice is useful while the money is useless?

That is the inference.

In the same way, when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, justice is useful to the individual and to the state; but when you want to use it, better call a gardener?

Clearly.

And when you want to keep a shield or lyre safe, not use them, you would say justice is useful; but when you want to use them, a soldier or musician is the man for you?

Certainly.

And so on and so forth in all other such things; always justice is useful when the things concerned are useless, useless when they are useful?

It would follow.

Justice surely doesn't turn out to be worth much if it's only useful in connection with useless things.

But let us consider a further point: isn't it true that the man who is the best at landing punches – in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting – is also best at blocking punches?

Certainly.

He who is best at preventing or curing disease is also best at inducing it?

True.

He who is best at securing an army camp is also best at stealing a march on the enemy, regarding all their stratagems and affairs?

Certainly.

Then he who is a good holder of anything is also a good thief of it?

That, I suppose, would follow.

Then if the just man is good at holding money, he is good at stealing it.

According to our argument, so it would seem.

Then, at the end of it all, the just man has turned out to be a sort of thief. This is a lesson I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer. One of his favorites was Autolycus, the grandfather of Odysseus, whose praises are sung like so:

"He exceeded all men in theft and lies."

So you, Homer and Simonides all agree that justice is an art of theft, practiced "to help friends and harm foes," – that was what you were saying?

No, certainly not – though now I don't know what I did mean.

QUESTION 8

Which of the following does Socrates seem prepared to grant in passage 7?

- A) If something is not being used, it does not follow that it is presently useless.
- B) If something is not being used, it follows that it is presently useless.
- C) If someone is good at stealing, it does not follow that he is a thief.
- D) If someone is good at stealing, it follows that he is a thief.
- E) Both B and D.

Passage 8, from Plato's "Republic" (pdf, pp. 13-14)

Socrates: I will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a horse has some function?

Thrasymachus: I should.

S: And the use or function of a horse – or of anything – would be that which could not be accomplished, or not as well, by any other thing?

T: I don't follow you.

S: Let me explain: can you see, except with your eyes?

T: Certainly not.

S: Or hear, except with your ears?

T: No.

S: These then may truly be said to be the functions of these organs?

T: They may.

S: But you can cut off a vine-branch with a dagger or with a chisel – in any number of ways, in fact?

T: Of course.

S: And yet nothing works quite as well as a pruning-hook, am I right?

T: True.

S: So we can say, then, that this is the function of a pruning-hook?

T: We may.

S: Then I think you should not have too much trouble understanding the question I asked – whether the function of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or as well, by any other thing?

T: I see what you mean ... and agree.

QUESTION 9

Given his usage of 'function' in passage 8, Socrates is committed to the truth of all of the following except one. (Which one of the following can he consistently deny?)

- A) If something that is not a horse does everything a horse can do, only better, then horses have no function.
- B) Everything has some function.
- C) If it became possible to see with your ears better than you can see with your eyes, your eyes would cease to have the function of seeing.
- D) To determine the function of something, it is not enough to know what it does. One must know that nothing else does as well or better.
- E) It is not the function of a dagger to do just anything a dagger happens to be able to do.

Passage 9, from Descartes' "First Meditation" (pdf, pp. 1-2)

And how often, asleep at night, have I become convinced of quite ordinary things - that I am here in my dressing-gown, seated by the fire - when in fact I am lying undressed in bed! Yet at the moment I surely see this paper with open eyes; I shake my head and it is not asleep; I deliberately and intentionally stretch out my hand and feel what I feel. None of this would happen with such distinctness to one asleep. As if I did not remember all the times I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep! The more carefully I reflect on all this, the more clearly I see that there are never any sure signs by means of which one can distinguish wakefulness from sleep. As a result, I begin to feel stupefied, and this feeling only reinforces the notion that I may be asleep.

Therefore, let us now suppose we dream: that these things - that my eyes are open, that I shake my head and stretch out my hands - are not true. Perhaps, indeed, I do not even have such things as hands or a body at all. On the other hand, at least this much has to be admitted: the visions which come in sleep are like paintings, insofar as they are things that can only be fashioned in the likeness of real things. Therefore at least these general kinds of things - eyes, head, hands and bodies as such - are not figments of imagination but are real and exist. For even when painters try to invent satyrs and sirens with the most peculiar shapes, they cannot give them natures which are new in every way; they simply mix and match the limbs of different animals. Or if somehow they manage to make up something so new that nothing remotely similar has ever been seen before - something that is, therefore, completely fictitious and unreal - at least the colors used to make it up must be real. By similar reasoning, although these general kinds of things - eyes, head, hands, so forth - could be imaginary, this much must be granted: that certain other still simpler and more universal things are real. These are, as it were, the true colors from which we form all our mental images of things, whether true or false.

QUESTION 10

Which of the following is true about the underlined portion of passage 9?

- A) Descartes assumes he is asleep because he feels stupefied, a feeling that reinforces his argument that he is asleep.
- B) Descartes assumes the best case scenario from the point of view of his method of doubt, i.e. the scenario on which doubting does him the most good. He is emphasizing the merits of his method.
- C) Descartes assumes the worst, i.e. that he is dreaming, by way of hypothetically investigating whether any of his beliefs can be insulated from doubt in a worst-case situation.
- D) Descartes states the conclusion of the dream argument. There are no sure signs by which he can know he is awake. Ergo, it is uncertain he is awake. He is committed to denying anything uncertain. Ergo, he must be asleep.
- E) Descartes anticipates the conclusion of his argument concerning the 'painting analogy'. From the fact that all our thoughts are formed from things completely fictitious and unreal, it follows that we dream; ergo, we must be asleep.

Passage 10, from Descartes' "Second Meditation", (pdf, p. 5)

But what am I to say about this mind, or about myself? For so far I do not admit there is anything else to me except for a mind. What do I say – do I declare – concerning this 'I' which seems to perceive the wax so distinctly? Surely my awareness of my own self is not just much more true and certain than my awareness of the wax, but also much more distinct and evident. For if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I see it, clearly this same fact entails much more evidently that I myself also exist. It is possible that what I see is not really the wax; it is possible that I do not even have eyes with which to see anything. But when I see, or think I see (I am not here distinguishing the two), it is simply not possible that I who am now thinking am not something. By the same token, if I judge that the wax exists, since I can touch it, the same result follows, namely that I exist. If I judge that it exists, since I can imagine it, or for any other reason, exactly the same thing follows. And the result that I have grasped in the case of the wax may be applied to everything else located outside me.

QUESTION 11

Which of the following, if true, would provide grounds for doubting that the argument in passage 10 is sufficient to establish Descartes' official conclusion in the "Second Meditation": 'the nature of mind is better known than the body'.

- A) It might be possible to be certain the mind exists without having any conception of its nature.
- B) From the fact that Descartes knows with certainty the mind exists, it follows that he must know its nature.
- C) The wax is like all other physical objects in nature.
- D) It is not possible to know that something exists without knowing its true nature.
- E) All of B-D.

Passage 10, from Descartes' "First Meditation", (pdf, p. 1):

Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true and assured I have gotten either from the senses or through the senses.

Passage 11, from Descartes' "Second Meditation", (pdf, p. 6):

We say we see the wax itself, if it is there before us, not that we judge it to be there from its color or shape. And this might lead me to conclude without further ado that knowledge of the wax comes from what the eye sees, and not from the scrutiny of the mind alone. But if I then look out the window and see men crossing the square, as I just happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax. Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which could conceal ghosts or mechanical men? But I judge that they are men. And so something which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of judgment which is in my mind.

QUESTION 12

Passage 11 is effectively a commentary on the thesis of passage 10. Call the thesis T. Which of the following statements about passage 11 is/are true?

- A) Descartes is illustrating why he thinks T is true.
- B) Descartes is illustrating why he thinks T is false.
- C) Descartes suggests that ordinary usage of words like 'see' makes it easy to accept something like T.
- D) Descartes is saying that T is false because some things one might think are learned through the senses are in fact known by 'the scrutiny of the mind'.
- E) All of B through D.

Passage 12, from Mill's *On Liberty*, Chapter 1 (pdf, p. 3):

But, in political and philosophical theories, as well as in persons, success discloses faults and infirmities which failure might have concealed from observation. The notion, that the people have no need to limit their power over themselves, might seem axiomatic, when popular government was a thing only dreamed about, or read of as having existed at some distant period of the past. Neither was that notion necessarily disturbed by such temporary aberrations as those of the French Revolution, the worst of which were the work of an usurping few, and which, in any case, belonged, not to the permanent working of popular institutions, but to a sudden and convulsive outbreak against monarchical and aristocratic despotism. In time, however, a democratic republic [the United States of America] came to occupy a large portion of the earth's surface, and made itself felt as one of the most powerful members of the community of nations; and elective and responsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact. It was now perceived that such phrases as 'self-government', and 'the power of the people over themselves', do not express the true state of the case. The 'people' who exercise the power, are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised, and the 'self-government' spoken of, is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest.

QUESTION 13

Which of the following is the best paraphrase of the underlined portion of passage 12.

- A) Success and failure are two sides of the same coin. You cannot have one without the other.
- B) There is no difference between success and failure. (Since this is absurd, Mill hereby shows the argument to this conclusion is flawed.)
- C) Since failure – like success – is always partial, never complete, you should never stop trying.
- D) You may not see the problems with a theory or idea until it is put into successful practice.
- E) You may not see the problems with a theory or idea until it fails in practice, just as you may not see the advantages of an idea until it succeeds in practice.

QUESTION 14

The underlined portion of passage 12 states a general thesis about ideas/theories. What idea/theory does Mill then consider as an example?

- A) "People have no need to limit their power over themselves."
- B) The French Revolution was a failure.
- C) The founding of the United States as a democratic republic was a success.
- D) "Such phrases as 'self-government', and 'the power of the people over themselves', do not express the true state of the case."
- E) "The 'people' who exercise the power, are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised, and the 'self-government' spoken of, is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest."

QUESTION 15

In passage 12, what point is Mill making about the French Revolution and the United States?

- A) It took the success of the French Revolution to make people see how, in the United States, each citizen is governed not by himself, but by all the rest.
- B) It took the success of the French Revolution to make people see how, in the United States, it need not be the case that "the 'people' who exercise the power, are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised."
- C) The successful establishment of the United States made people see something that the failures of the French Revolution did not: namely, the notion that "people have no need to limit their power over themselves" is essentially flawed.
- D) The successful establishment of the United States made people see something that the failures of the French Revolution did not: namely, "people have no need to limit their power over themselves."
- E) The French Revolution succeeded in a different way than did the founding of the United States. The latter established a 'great existing fact'. By contrast, the French Revolution collapsed, but thereby exposed essential institutional flaws of the United States.

Passage 13, from Mill's *On Liberty*, Chapter 2 ("excerpts" pdf, pp. 4-5):

There is a class of persons (happily not quite so numerous as formerly) who think it enough if a person assents undoubtingly to what they think true, though he has no knowledge whatever of the grounds of the opinion, and could not make a tenable defence of it against the most superficial objections. Such persons, if they can once get their creed taught from authority, naturally think that no good, and some harm, comes of its being allowed to be questioned. Where their influence prevails, they make it nearly impossible for the received opinion to be rejected wisely and considerately, though it may still be rejected rashly and ignorantly; for to shut out discussion entirely is seldom possible, and when it once gets in, beliefs not grounded on conviction are apt to give way before the slightest semblance of an argument. Waiving, however, this possibility—assuming that the true opinion abides in the mind, but abides as a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument—this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth.

Passage 14, from Plato's "Meno" (pdf, p. 33):

True opinions, for as long as they remain, are fine things and do nothing but good. But they don't hang around for long; they escape from a man's mind, so that they are not worth much until one tethers them with chains of reasons why. And these, Meno my friend, are threads of memory, as previously agreed. After opinions are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge; secondly, they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized more highly than correct opinion; knowledge differs from correct opinion in being tied down.

QUESTION 16

Passages 13 and 14 express similar opinions about true belief and knowledge but Mill makes at least one admission that Plato does not. Which is it?

- A) It is sometimes necessary to settle for true opinion, if one cannot attain knowledge.
- B) It is sometimes necessary to attain true knowledge, if one cannot form an opinion.
- C) True opinion may actually be solid and unshakeable in the face of argument.
- D) Opinion, so long as it happens to be true, does nothing but good.
- E) Knowledge, so long as it is true, may be just as good as opinion.

QUESTION 17

Passages 13 and 14 express similar opinions about true belief and knowledge but Plato makes at least one admission that Mill does not. Which is it? (*HINT: Yes, this is almost the same as question 16, but note that Mill and Plato have switched places.*)

- A) It is sometimes necessary to settle for true opinion, if one cannot attain knowledge.
- B) It is sometimes necessary to attain true knowledge, if one cannot form an opinion.
- C) True opinion may actually be solid and unshakeable in the face of argument.
- D) Opinion, so long as it happens to be true, does nothing but good.
- E) Knowledge, so long as it is true, may be just as good as opinion.

Passage 15, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", (p. 168):

Political theory is a branch of moral philosophy, which starts from the discovery, or application, of moral notions in the sphere of political relations. I do not mean, as I think some Idealist philosophers may have believed, that all historical movements or conflicts between human beings are reducible to movements or conflicts of ideas or spiritual forces, nor even that they are effects (or aspects) of them. But I do mean that to understand such movements or conflicts is to understand the ideas or attitudes to life involved in them, which alone make such movements a part of human history, and not mere natural events. Political words and notions and acts are not intelligible save in the context of the issues that divide the men who use them. Consequently our own attitudes and activities are likely to remain obscure to us, unless we understand the dominant issues of our own world. The greatest of these is the open war that is being fought between two systems of ideas which return different and conflicting answers to what has long been the central question of politics – the question of obedience and coercion. 'Why should I (or anyone) obey anyone else?' 'Why should I not live as I like?' 'Must I obey?' 'If I disobey, may I be coerced?' 'By whom, and to what degree, and in the name of what, and for the sake of what?'

QUESTION 18

On the basis of passage 15, which one of the following would Berlin deny?

- A) All historical movements or conflicts between human beings are reducible to movements or conflicts of ideas or spiritual forces.
- B) Political theory is a branch of moral philosophy.
- C) In order to understand debates about obedience and coercion, it is necessary to understand the practical issues in response to which these debates arise.
- D) In order to understand debates about obedience and coercion, it is not necessary to understand the practical issues in response to which these debates arise.
- E) Both A and D

Passage 16, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", p. 180:

This paradox has been often exposed. It is one thing to say that I know what is good for X, while he himself does not; and even to ignore his wishes for its – and his – sake; and a very different one to say that he has *eo ipso* chosen it, not indeed consciously, not as he seems in everyday life, but in his role as a rational self which his empirical self may not know – the 'real' self which discerns the good, and cannot help choosing it once it is revealed. This monstrous impersonation, which consists in equating what X would choose if he were something he is not, or at least not yet, with what X actually seeks and chooses, is at the heart of all political theories of self-realization. It is one thing to say that I may be coerced for my own good, which I am too blind to see: this may, on occasion, be for my benefit; indeed it may enlarge the scope of my liberty. It is another to say that if it is my good, then I am not being coerced, for I have willed it, whether I know this or not, and am free (or 'truly' free) even while my poor earthly body and foolish mind bitterly reject it, and struggle with the greatest desperation against those who seek, however benevolently, to impose it.

QUESTION 19

Which of the following claims would be an example of the sort of 'monstrous impersonation' Berlin criticizes in passage 16?

- A) You should not force the mentally ill to take medication for their condition, because force is coercion, and coercion always wrong.
- B) You may force the mentally ill to take medication for their condition only if their illness is so severe that they are incapable of assessing their own need for medication.
- C) You must force the mentally ill to take any medication that would improve their condition, because there is no reason anyone should suffer needlessly.
- D) If it is the case that a mentally ill patient, once medicated, will agree that it was a good thing to take the medication, it follows that forcing the patient to take the medication is not coercion.
- E) Both C and D.

Passage 17, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", (p. 191-2)

Those who believed in freedom as rational self-direction were bound, sooner or later, to consider how this was to be applied not merely to a man's inner life, but to his relations with other members of his society. Even the most individualistic among them – and Rousseau, Kant and Fichte certainly began as individualists – came at some point to ask themselves whether a rational life not only for the individual but also for society, was possible, and if so, how it was to be achieved. I wish to be free to live as my rational will (my 'real self') commands, but so must others be. How am I to avoid collisions with their wills? Where is the frontier that lies between my (rationally determined) rights and the identical rights of others? For if I am rational, I cannot deny that what is right for me must, for the same reasons, be right for others who are rational like me. A rational (or free) State would be a State governed by such laws as all rational men would freely accept; that is to say, such laws as they would themselves have enacted had they been asked what, as rational beings, they demanded; hence the frontiers would be such as all rational men would consider to be the right frontiers for rational beings.

But who, in fact, was to determine what these frontiers were? Thinkers of this type argued that if moral and political problems were genuine – as surely they were – they must in principle be soluble; that is to say, there must exist one and only one true solution to any problem. All truths could in principle be discovered by any rational thinker, and demonstrated so clearly that all other rational men could not but accept them . . . My claim to unfettered freedom can prima facie at times not be reconciled with your equally unqualified claim; but the rational solution of our problem cannot collide with the equally true solution of another, for two truths cannot logically be incompatible; therefore a just order must in principle be discoverable – an order of which the rules make possible correct solutions of all possible problems that could arise in it.

QUESTION 20

In passage 17, Berlin discusses a class of thinkers who (as he puts it) set up the notion of 'freedom as rational self-direction' as an ideal not just for individuals but for society as a whole. Berlin claims thinkers of this type will argue for all of the following views except one. Which one?

- A) Moral and political problems are genuine.
- B) Moral and political problems are in principle soluble.
- C) Moral and political problems have one and only one true solution.
- D) No true solution to any problem can be incompatible with any true solution to any other problem.
- E) Since everyone is rational, everyone will accept true solutions to genuine problems.

END OF PAPER