

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE

EXAMINATION FOR ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 1

(Semester II: 2006-2007)

PHILOSOPHY

PH1101E / GEM1004 REASON AND PERSUASION

April / May 2007 - Time Allowed: 2 Hours

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

1. This examination paper contains **TWENTY-TWO** questions and comprises **TWENTY- ONE** printed pages.
2. There is only one section to the examination. It is multiple-choice, 22 questions, worth 1 point apiece, for a total of 22 points.
3. This is an **OPEN BOOK** Examination.

SECTION I**QUESTIONS 1-22; MULTIPLE CHOICE**

1 point for each right answer, for a total of 22 points. No penalty for wrong answers.

Instructions:

A separate bubble form accompanies this question paper. Enter all information and answers on this form in number 2B pencil (not ink). Enter the module code in Section A. Enter and bubble-shade your matriculation number in Section B very carefully. Follow specific instructions in the instruction box on the bubble form. When filling in Section C, take care to bubble-shade answers only for questions 1-22, even though the form has space for answers to 100 questions.

Passage 1, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (p. 13):

E: I say holiness is doing what I'm doing now—namely, prosecuting wrong-doers, whether the crime is murder or temple robbery or anything else, and whether the culprit is your father or mother or anyone else, and not prosecuting is unholy. And please note, Socrates, that I can point you to a certain proof—one which I have already offered to others—that this is the law and that it is right for things to turn out this way, and that we must not let a wrong-doer escape *no matter who* he might be. As it happens, these people themselves believe that Zeus is the best and most just of gods, but they admit that Zeus bound his own father for the injustice of devouring his sons—and that he in his turn castrated *his* father on similar grounds. Yet they're angry at me for prosecuting my father for wrongdoing! And so they contradict themselves in what they claim about the gods and about me.

QUESTION 1

In passage 1, Euthyphro claims or implies all of the following but one. Which is the one thing he does not say or imply?

- A) His critics are angry at him.
- B) His critics contradict themselves.
- C) Like Euthyphro, Zeus prosecuted his father out of reverence for the gods.
- D) Like Zeus, Euthyphro is prosecuting his father because to do so is just.
- E) Like Euthyphro, his critics believe that Zeus is the most just of gods.

QUESTION 2

Let the following be an adequate formalization of the “certain proof” Euthyphro offers in passage 1. (Assume, for argument purposes, this is the argument Euthyphro means to offer.)

- P1: Zeus is the best and most just of gods.
- P2: Whatever the best and most just of gods does must be best and most just.
- P3: Zeus punished his own father for wrongdoing.
- C1: It is best and most just to punish one’s own father if he has committed wrongdoing. (from P1,2,3)
- P4: If there were anyone a son had a duty to shield from prosecution for wrongdoing, it would be his own father.
- C2: If it is just to prosecute even your own father for wrongdoing, it must be just to prosecute anyone for wrongdoing. (from C1, P4)
- C3: We must not let a wrong-doer escape no matter who he might be. (from C2)

Which of the following steps in the argument are not made explicit in passage 1?

- A) P1
- B) P3
- C) P4
- D) C2
- E) both C) and D)

Passage 2, from Plato’s “Euthyphro” (pp. 31-2):

S: Is holiness then—being the care of the gods—also a benefit to them, something that makes the gods better? Would you agree that when you do something holy you improve some one of the gods?

E: No, by Zeus, I would not!

S: I didn’t think that was what you meant—quite the contrary—but that’s why I asked what you meant by ‘care of the gods’. I couldn’t believe you meant this kind of care.

E: Quite right, Socrates. I didn’t mean this kind of care at all.

S: Very well, but what kind of care of the gods would holiness be?

E: The kind of care, Socrates, that slaves take of their masters.

S: I understand. Holiness is shaping up to be a kind of service to the gods.

E: Exactly.

S: Could you tell me: what is the *goal* that service to a doctor serves to bring about? Don't you think it would be health?

E: I think so.

S: What about being of service to shipbuilders? What goal would that service aim to accomplish?

E: Clearly, Socrates, the building of a ship.

S: And as to being of service to housebuilders: the goal would be houses?

E: Yes.

S: Tell me then, my good sir, what is the point of the service men provide to gods? You obviously know since you say that you, of all men, have the most complete knowledge of divinity.

E: And I speak the truth, Socrates.

S; Tell me then, by Zeus: what magnificent result is it that the gods achieve when they employ us as servants?

E: Many fine things, Socrates.

S: And the same goes for generals, my friend. All the same, you would not have any trouble telling me that the main point of what they do is to achieve victory in war. Isn't that so?

E: Of course.

S: Farmers too, I think, produce many fine things, but still, the main point of what they do is to bring forth goods from the earth.

E: Quite so.

S: Well then, what is the main point of the many fine things that the gods achieve?

E: I told you just a little while ago, Socrates, that it is no easy matter to arrive at precise knowledge of these things.

QUESTION 3

In passage 2, Euthyphro is reluctant to affirm any positive account of the nature of 'care' and 'service' to the gods. All of the following are plausible reasons for his reluctance except one. Which is the one?

- A) He does not want to imply that mortals can benefit the gods.
- B) He does not want to imply that gods can benefit mortals.
- C) He does not want to imply that mortals can improve the gods.
- D) He does not want to imply that holy acts help the gods to achieve their goals.
- E) He does not want to say what goals the gods seek to achieve.

Passage 3, from Plato's "Euthyphro" (p. 35):

S: So we have to begin again at the very beginning, to investigate what holiness is. And I won't willingly give up before I figure it out. Don't think me unworthy; instead, concentrate your attention to a supreme degree and tell the truth. For you know this thing, if any man does, and so I will clutch you as tightly as if you were Proteus himself, until you tell me. If you did *not* know precisely what is holy, and what unholy, you would never have undertaken to prosecute your aged father for murder on behalf of a servant. You would have been afraid to risk the wrath of the gods, in case you should be acting wrongly, and you would have felt shame before your fellow men. As it stands I am certain you believe you know *precisely* what is holy and what not. So tell me, my good Euthyphro, and don't keep secret what you think it is.

QUESTION 4

In passage 3, Socrates expresses the opinion that if anyone knows what holiness is, it has to be Euthyphro. What reason does Socrates give for thinking so? (HINT: obviously Socrates is being ironic. For question purposes, simply take him at his word.)

- A) Socrates gives no reason.
- B) Euthyphro must know what holiness is, because he is so slippery.
- C) Euthyphro must know what holiness is, because he thinks Socrates is unworthy.
- D) Euthyphro must know what holiness is, because only a holy man would be justified in prosecuting his own father.
- E) Euthyphro must know what holiness is, because you would not prosecute your own father unless you were sure it was holy to do so.

Passage 4, from Plato's "Meno", (pp. 44-45):

M: It's really not that hard to say, Socrates. First, if you want the virtue of a man, it is easy to say that a man's virtue consists in being able to manage public affairs and thereby help his friends and harm his enemies—all the while being careful to come to no harm himself. If you want the virtue of a woman, it's not difficult to describe: she must manage the home well, keep the household together, and be submissive to her husband; the virtue of a child, whether boy or girl, is another thing altogether, and so is that of an elderly man—if you want that—or if you want that of a free man or a slave. There are lots of different virtues, as a result of which it is not at all hard to say what virtue is. There is virtue for every action and every stage in life, for every person and every capacity, Socrates. And the same goes for wickedness.

S: It must be my lucky day, Meno! Here I was, looking for just one virtue, and you happen by with a whole swarm! But, Meno, following up on this figurative swarm of mine, if I were to ask you what is the true nature of the bee, and you said, 'there are all sorts of different sorts of bees,' what would you say if I went on to ask: 'Do you mean that there are all these bees, of every sort, and that they differ from one another insofar as they are bees? Or are they don't differ from one another, insofar as they are bees, but they differ in other respects—in how beautiful they are, for example, or how big, and so on and so forth?' Tell me, what would you answer if I asked you this?

M: I would say that one bee doesn't differ from another from another insofar as they are all bees.

QUESTION 5

By means of his bee analogy, Socrates is, in effect, objecting to Meno's account of virtue, in passage 4. Which of the following is the best statement of the objection?

- A) Meno must not understand the nature of virtue.
- B) Meno must not understand the nature of bees.
- C) Meno must not understand that the nature of virtue must be like the nature of bees.
- D) Meno has not said what all cases of virtue have in common.
- E) Meno has not said what all kinds of bees have in common.

Passage 5, from Plato's "Meno", pp. 60-2

S: Very well. According to Meno—hereditary guest friend of the Great King—virtue is getting your hands on the cash. Do you qualify this definition, Meno, with the words 'justly' and 'piously'? Or is it all the same to you—virtue either way—if you make your fortune unjustly?

M: Certainly not, Socrates.

S: You would call it evil, then?

M: That I would.

S: It seems, then, that the getting of gold must go along with justice or moderation or piety or some other element of virtue; if it does not, it won't be virtue, no matter what good things are obtained.

M: Yes. How could there be virtue if these elements were missing?

S: Then failing to acquire gold and silver, whether for oneself or for another, if these other elements were missing from the situation, would be a case of virtue?

M: So it seems.

S: It follows that getting hold of the goods will not be virtue any more so than failing to do so is. Apparently it's the case that whatever is done with justice will be virtue, and whatever is done in the absence of these good qualities will be vice.

M: I think it has to be as you say.

QUESTION 6

Which of the following is the best statement of Socrates' objection to the account of virtue under consideration in passage 5. The thing Meno says is virtue:

- A) is neither necessary nor sufficient for virtue.
- B) is sufficient but not necessary for virtue.
- C) is necessary but not sufficient for virtue.
- D) is not necessary for virtue.
- E) is not sufficient for virtue.

Passage 6 (continuing on from passage 5):

S: We said a little while ago that each of these things was a *part* of virtue—namely, justice and moderation and all such things?

M: Yes.

S: Then it seems you have been playing me for a fool, Meno.

M: How so, Socrates?

S: Because I begged you just now not to break apart or portion out virtue, and I gave examples of how you should formulate your answer. You paid no attention, going on to tell me that virtue is being able to get good things justly; and this, you say, is part of virtue.

M: Yes, I do.

S: It follows then, from what you have agreed to, that doing whatever you do with *just one part* of virtue, is virtue. For you say that justice is a part of virtue, and that other, similar qualities are too. Why do I mention this? Because, although I begged you to tell me about virtue as a whole, you have fallen very far short of telling me what it is. Instead you say that every action is *virtue* if it is performed with *a part of virtue*, just as if you had already told me all about virtue as a whole and I must comprehend it instantly—even as you mince the thing to bits! I think we have to take it from the top, my dear Meno, and you must face the same old question again: what *is* virtue, if every action that is performed with a part of virtue is virtue? For that is what you are saying when you say every action performed justly is virtuous. Or maybe you don't think you should have to answer the same question all over again, because you think someone could know the nature of a part of virtue, while remaining ignorant of the whole?

M: I don't think so.

QUESTION 7

Concerning the proposition that 'every action that is performed with a part of virtue is virtue', which of the following is Socrates attempting to show, in passage 6?

- A) That Meno is committed to it.
- B) That it is absurd.
- C) That Meno himself cannot really believe it.
- D) That it wrongly treats a part of something as the whole of that something.
- E) All of A-D.

Passage 7, from Plato's "Meno" (pp. 82-3):

S: Well, the least you can do is loosen my collar just one notch, and consent to examine the question—whether virtue can be taught or has some other nature—by means of hypothesis. By hypothesis I mean a method geometers often employ. For example, if someone were to ask them whether a certain area can be inscribed as a triangle in a given circle, one of them might say: 'I don't yet know whether *this* area has *that* property, but I think I have a hypothesis that will move us forward with the problem, namely: if the area in question is such that when you apply it to the diameter of the circle, you find it falls short by an area equal to the applied figure, then I think you have *one* consequence, and if it is impossible for it to fall short by this much, then some *other* consequence results. So, I want to make a hypothesis before telling you my conclusion about whether it is impossible to inscribe this area in the circle or not.' Let us do the same with virtue, since we know neither what it is, nor what properties it has. Let us investigate whether it is teachable or not by means of a hypothesis, like so: of all the sorts of things existing in the soul, what sort would virtue have to be, in order to be teachable or not? First of all, if it is something like or unlike knowledge, can it be taught, or not—or rather, as we have been putting it, can it be recollected, or not? Let's not bother to disagree about which of the two names we employ. Here's the thing: can it be taught? Or isn't it completely obvious to everyone that the one and only thing a man can be taught is knowledge?

M: That would be my view.

S: Then if virtue *is* a kind of knowledge, it is clear that it could be taught.

M: Of course.

S: That question was quickly settled, then—if virtue is one sort of thing, it will be teachable, and if another, not.

M: Yes.

S: The next point to consider, it seems, will be whether virtue is knowledge, or something other than knowledge.

M: That does seem to be the next question.

QUESTION 8

At the end of passage 7, why does Socrates say that the 'next point to consider ... will be whether virtue is knowledge'?

- A) Because if virtue can be shown to be knowledge, they will have established a definition of virtue.
- B) Because if virtue can be shown to be knowledge, they will have established that virtue must be teachable.
- C) Because if virtue is something besides knowledge, they will have established that virtue must not be teachable.
- D) Both B and C.
- E) Both A and B.

QUESTION 9

Which of the following is/are inconsistent with claims made by Socrates in passage 7?

- A) It is possible to teach falsehoods and nothing false can be knowledge.
- B) From the fact that only knowledge is teachable, it does not follow that all knowledge is teachable.
- C) Virtue is a kind of knowledge.
- D) Virtue is not a kind of knowledge.
- E) Both A and B.

Passage 8, from Plato's *Republic*, Book I (pp. 170-72):

Yes, Cephalus, I said. But I think most people wouldn't buy it, coming from you. They would say you bear your old age well not because of your character but because of your money. For, they say, 'it's easy being rich.'

You're right, he replied. They wouldn't buy it, and there's something to that, but not as much as you might think. I could answer back the same way Themistocles answered that Seriphian who insulted him, saying he wasn't famous on his own account but because he was Athenian. To that he said: 'It's true. I couldn't have been a famous Seriphian, but you'd be a nobody Athenian.' The same applies to those who are poor and miserable in old age. A man of good sense won't find it easy being both old and poor. But being rich won't make you happy if you lack good sense.

QUESTION 10

Which of the following is the best statement of what Cephalus says is wrong with the statement 'it's easy being rich', in passage 8?

- A) It implies being rich is sufficient for happiness.
- B) It implies being rich is necessary for happiness.
- C) It implies that being rich is necessary and sufficient for happiness.
- D) It implies that being rich is neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness.
- E) Both A) and B).

Passage 9, from Plato's *Republic*, Book I, (pp. 180-22):

Tell me then, O noble heir to the argument: what it is that Simonides had to say about justice that you feel is correct?

He said that to give back what is owed to each person is just. I think in saying that he spoke well.

It's not easy to doubt the word of a wise and inspired man like Simonides, but his meaning—though maybe it's clear to you—is far from clear to me. To go back to what we were just saying, of course he doesn't mean that I should return weapons to anyone if he asks for them back when mad. And yet a thing held in trust is a sort of debt owed, isn't it?

True.

The weapons shouldn't be given back to anyone whatsoever, if he should ask for them sometime when he is mad?

Certainly not.

When Simonides said justice was the repayment of what is owed, he meant something different from this sort of case?

Something very different, by Zeus, for he thinks that a friend ought to do good to a friend, never evil.

I see. You mean, then, that to return a thing owed to another—for example, to give back gold that someone has deposited with you—if some harm would come about due to the return, and if both parties are friends, is not the repayment of what is owed. That is what you would think he would say?

Exactly.

And are enemies also to receive what we owe them?

Certainly, he said, they are to receive what we owe them. An enemy, I take it, owes an enemy that which is due or proper to him—namely, something bad.

Simonides apparently spoke of the nature of justice in that way poets speak—very obscurely; for he really meant that justice is giving to each man what befits him; this he termed a debt.

That must have been what he meant, he said.

QUESTION 11

In passage 9, Socrates' example of the madman who wants his weapons back is intended to clarify the sense in which Polemarchus is using a term to define justice. Which term is the case supposed to clarify?

- A) Justice
- B) Friend
- C) Proper
- D) Owe
- E) Good

Passage 10, from Plato's *Republic*, Book I, (pp. 222-223):

Thrasymachus: You imagine that the shepherds or cowherds are considering the good of the sheep and cattle, and that when they fatten and tend them they are looking out for anything other than their own self-interest or that of their masters. And in particular you imagine that the rulers of states, I mean those who truly rule, think any differently about their subjects than a man about his flock, and that they are looking out for anything but their own interests, day and night. Oh, no, and you are so far off the mark in your ideas of the just and unjust that you don't even realize that justice and the just are literally this: another's advantage—the advantage of the ruler and the stronger, and a source of harm for the subject or servant. And injustice is the opposite; injustice lords it over those who are both simple, in every sense of the word, and just. They, being subjects, do what is to the advantage of the stronger man. They serve him and minister to his pleasure, which is very far from being their own. You must look at the matter, my extraordinarily simple-minded friend, in the following way: the just man is always a loser compared to the unjust man. First, he loses when it comes to private contracts: when a just man has an unjust partner, and the partnership is at an end, you will find that the unjust man walks away with more and the just man gets less. Second, in dealings with the state: when it's time to pay taxes, the just man pays more and the unjust man less on estates of equal value. Likewise, when there is anything to be gotten the one gains nothing, the other much. Look also at what happens when it comes to serving in public office: apart from any other loss, the just man can count on his personal affairs suffering from his neglect, while he, because of his justice, makes no profit from the state. To make matters still worse, he is hated by his friends and associates because he refuses to help them bend and break the law. But the tables are turned in the case of the unjust man. I am speaking, as I have been from the very start, of the man with the power to commit fraud on a massive scale. Consider such a man, then, if you wish to judge for yourself how much more he personally profits by being unjust, rather than just. You'll see what I mean most

easily if we turn to that highest form of injustice—the case in which the criminal is the happiest man on earth, and his victims, and those who refuse to commit crimes are the most miserable. In a word, I speak of tyranny, when, by force or fraud, property is stolen from its owners not little by little but wholesale. Everything goes into one bag: sacred things as well as profane—private and public. Were someone to commit these acts on a petty scale and fail to get away with it, he would be severely punished and regarded with the worst kind of contempt. Those who commit such partial forms of injustice are called temple robbers, kidnappers, burglars, con-men and thieves. But if men will go to the additional trouble of relieving their victims of their freedom as well as their property—enslaving the citizens—why, then, far from being called these insulting names they are deemed happy and blessed, not only by their fellow-citizens, but by all who hear that they have ascended to the very pinnacle of perfect injustice. For it is not the fear of *doing* wrong, but of *being a victim* of it, that calls forth people's denunciations of injustice. Thus, Socrates, injustice, committed on a grand scale, is a stronger, freer, more masterful thing than justice, and—as I declared from the very start—justice is the advantage of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest.

QUESTION 12

Which of the following is the best statement of Thrasymachus' thesis concerning why injustice must be more personally advantageous than justice, in passage 10.

- A) There is no such thing as justice.
- B) There is no such thing as injustice.
- C) Rulers are like shepherds, subjects are like sheep.
- D) Ideally, injustice should be pursued on a grand scale.
- E) Injustice means pursuit of self-interest; justice entails its neglect.

QUESTION 13

The underlined portions of passage 10 only make sense if Thrasymachus is taking his audience to consist of men who are:

- A) Subjects, not rulers.
- B) Rulers, not subjects.
- C) Philosophers, not rulers.
- D) Rulers, not philosophers.
- E) Both B and D.

Passage 11, from Descartes' "First Meditation", (pp.249-50):

So now that my mind is free of all cares, and I have arranged to be left in peaceful solitude, I will apply myself seriously and freely to the general demolition of my beliefs.

To achieve this end it will not be necessary for me to prove that all my beliefs are false, since it might not come to that. Rather, because reason now teaches me that I should be just as careful about withholding assent from uncertain, doubtful things as from patent falsehoods, the least bit of doubt on any point will suffice for complete rejection. And for this it will not be necessary to examine each article individually, which would be an endless task. Once the foundation of a building is undermined, everything above goes with it. So I will go straight for the basic principles underlying all my former beliefs.

Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true and assured I have gotten either from the senses or through the senses. But from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once.

QUESTION 14

In passage 11, Descartes writes of 'basic principles'. Which of the following is/are those 'principles', per the passage?

- A) Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true and assured I have gotten either from the senses or through the senses.
- B) From time to time I have found that the senses deceive.
- C) It is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once.
- D) Both A and B.
- E) Both A and C.

For purposes of questions 15-18, let a skeptical argument be any that tends, per Descartes' proposed demolition project, to call beliefs into doubt. Let an anti-skeptical argument be any that aims to remove doubts raised by skeptical arguments.

QUESTION 15

The underlined portion of passage 11 is best regarded as stating:

- A) A skeptical argument.
- B) An anti-skeptical argument.

Passage 12 (continuing on from passage 11)

Yet although the senses sometimes deceive us with respect to barely perceivable and distant objects, one finds that concerning many other matters no reasonable doubt is possible, even though these things are known through the senses: for example, that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in my hand, and other things of a similar nature. And how could it be denied that these are my hands, or that this is my body?

QUESTION 16

Passage 12 is best regarded as stating:

- A) A skeptical argument.
- B) An anti-skeptical argument.

Passage 13 (continuing on from passage 12)

Unless, perhaps, I were to compare myself to madmen, whose brains are so disordered and clouded by chronic vapors of bile that they staunchly maintain they are kings when they are paupers; that they are dressed in purple and gold when they are naked; or that they have jugs for heads, or bodies made of glass.

QUESTION 17

Passage 13 is best regarded as stating:

- A) A skeptical argument.
- B) An anti-skeptical argument.

Passage 14 (continuing on from passage 13)

But these are the insane, and I would think myself just as far gone if I took them as my model, and conducted my life accordingly.

QUESTION 18

Passage 14 is best regarded as stating:

- A) A skeptical argument.
- B) An anti-skeptical argument.

Passage 15, from Descartes' "Second Meditation" (p. 256):

I have convinced myself there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it follow now that I don't exist either?

No. If I persuaded myself of anything, then certainly I existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who deliberately and constantly deludes me. In that case, too, I undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me. And let him deceive me to his heart's content, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So, after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, 'I am, I exist', is necessarily true whenever uttered by me or conceived by my mind.

But I do not yet sufficiently understand what this 'I' is that now necessarily exists. So I must be careful not to mistake something else for this 'I', and so make a mistake concerning that very item of knowledge I maintain is most certain and evident of all. Which is why I will now meditate anew on what I originally believed myself to be before I embarked on this present train of thought. I will then subtract anything capable of being weakened in the least by the arguments I have brought forth, so that what is left at the end may be no more nor less than that which is certain and unshakeable.

QUESTION 19

Which of the following is the best statement of why Descartes thinks he must 'meditate anew', per the underlined portion of passage 15?

- A) He believes he is being deceived by a 'deceiver of supreme power'.
- B) He must investigate 'what this 'I' is that now necessarily exists.'
- C) He needs to prove that 'there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies.'
- D) He needs to refute the notion that 'there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies.'
- E) He must verify that 'I am, I exist' is 'necessary true whenever uttered by me or conceived by my mind.'

Passage 16, from Mill's *On Liberty*, Chapter 1 (p. 275):

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

QUESTION 20

Which of the following is the best statement of Mill's principle in passage 16?

- A) You may force someone to do something for their own good.
- B) You may force someone to do something for your own good.
- C) You may interfere with someone's liberty to prevent harm to them.
- D) You may interfere with someone's liberty to prevent harm to others.
- E) You may attempt to persuade but not coerce others to do what you want.

Passage 17, from Mill's *On Liberty* [continuing passage 16]:

It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion (a period long since reached in all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), compulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others.

QUESTION 21

All of the following are true statements about passage 17, except one. Which is the one?

- A) Mill acknowledges cases in which his 'doctrine' does not apply.
- B) Mill argues that, although there are cases in which his 'doctrine' appears not to apply, really it applies in these cases as well—since they are cases in which despots work to make the doctrine applicable.
- C) Mill argues that despotism is sometimes justified.
- D) Mill implies that it was best for Akbar and Charlemagnes' subjects to obey them.
- E) Mill implies that Akbar and Charlemagne were despots.

Passage 18, [continuing on, a few sentences past the end of passage 17]:

If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a *prima facie* case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation. There are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform; such as, to give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection; and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow-creature's life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury. The latter case, it is true, requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the former. To make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is the rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evil, is, comparatively speaking, the exception. Yet there are many cases clear enough and grave enough to justify that exception. In all things which regard the external relations of the individual, he is *de jure* amenable to those whose interests are concerned, and if need be, to society as their protector. There are often good reasons for not holding him to the responsibility; but these reasons must arise from the special expediencies of the case: either because it is a kind of case in which he is on the whole likely to act better, when left to his own discretion, than when controlled in any way in which society have it in their power to control him; or because the attempt to exercise control would produce other evils, greater than those which it would prevent. When such reasons as these preclude the enforcement of responsibility, the conscience of the agent himself should step into the vacant judgment-seat, and protect those interests of others which have no external protection; judging himself all the more rigidly, because the case does not admit of his being made accountable to the judgment of his fellow creatures.

QUESTION 22

All of the following are true statements about passage 18, except one. Which is the one?

- A) Mill distinguishes between compelling inaction, to prevent harm, and compelling action, to prevent harm.
- B) Mill says it is sometimes justified to compel citizens to prevent harm to other citizens.
- C) Mill says there are cases in which it would be advisable to compel citizens to inaction, rather than letting them perform acts they are, in fact, morally obliged to perform.
- D) Mill says it is sometimes justified to compel citizens to provide benefits to other citizens.
- E) Mill says there are cases in which it would be inadvisable to compel citizens to perform acts that, in fact, they are morally obliged to perform.

END OF PAPER