

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE

EXAMINATION FOR ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 1

(Semester 1: 2007-2008)

PHILOSOPHY

PH1101E/GEM1004 REASON AND PERSUASION

NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2007 - Time Allowed: 2 Hours

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

1. This examination paper contains **TWENTY** questions and comprises **TWENTY-FOUR** printed pages.
1. There is only one section to the examination. It is multiple-choice, 20 questions, worth 1 point apiece, for a total of 20 points.
1. This is an **OPEN BOOK** Examination.

SECTION I**QUESTIONS 1-20; MULTIPLE CHOICE**

1 point for each right answer, for a total of 20 points. No penalty for wrong answers.

Instructions:

A separate bubble form accompanies this question paper. Enter all information and answers on this form in number 2B pencil (not ink). Enter the module code in Section A. Enter and bubble-shade your matriculation number in Section B very carefully. Follow specific instructions in the instruction box on the bubble form. When filling in Section C, take care to bubble-shade answers only for questions 1-20, even though the form has space for answers to 100 questions.

Passage 1, from Plato's *Euthyphro*, p. 15:

Socrates: My friend, you did not teach me adequately when I inquired as to what holiness is. You told me that the thing you happen to be doing at the moment—namely, prosecuting your father for murder—is holy.

Euthyphro: And what I said was true, Socrates.

S: That may be. But there are lots of other things, Euthyphro, that you would also claim are holy.

E: Yes, there are.

S: Keep in mind, then, that this isn't what I asked you to do—to give me one or two examples out of the many holy actions. Rather, I asked what essential form all holy actions exhibit, in virtue of which they are holy. For you did agree all unholy actions are unholy and all holy actions holy in virtue of some shared form, or don't you remember?

E: I remember.

S: Tell me then what this form is, so that I can pay close attention to it and use it as a paradigm to judge any action, whether committed by you or anyone else: if the action be of the right form, I will declare it holy; otherwise, not.

QUESTION 1

Which of the following is the best statement of Socrates' objection, in passage 1, to Euthyphro's account of holiness?

- A) Euthyphro has offered examples of holiness, not its essential form.
- A) The thing Euthyphro is doing is not holy.
- A) The thing Euthyphro is doing may not be holy.
- A) All holy actions are holy in virtue of some shared form.
- A) Euthyphro denies there are holy actions besides his own.

Passage 2, from Plato's *Euthyphro*, pp. 28-9:

Socrates: This is the kind of thing I was asking about before: where there is justice, must there be holiness? Or is it rather that where there is holiness, there is also justice, since justice is not coextensive with holiness—holiness is a part of justice? Shall we say so, or do you think otherwise?

Euthyphro: No, that's fine; I think what you say is right.

QUESTION 2

By agreeing with Socrates in passage 2, Euthyphro is committing himself to a position inconsistent with which of the following? (Which of the following can Euthyphro *not* agree to without contradicting himself?)

- A) If something is unjust, it is unholy.
- A) If something is unholy, it is unjust.
- A) To decide questions of justice, it is sufficient to consider what religion commands.
- A) To decide questions of justice, it is insufficient to consider what religion commands.
- A) A and C.

Passage 3, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (continuing from passage 2):

Socrates: See what comes next: if holiness is part of justice, we must, it seems, find out what part of justice it might be. Now if you asked me a similar question about the thing I just mentioned—what part of the concept of number is even, and what kind of number it were, I would say, 'a number which can be divided evenly, rather than unevenly, by two.' Or don't you think so?

Euthyphro: I do.

QUESTION 3

In passage 3, Socrates can be read as making all of the following analogies but one. Which is the one?

- A) Justice is like number.
- A) Holiness is like number.
- A) Justice is like holiness.
- A) Holiness is like even numbers.
- A) Divisibility by two is like the essence of holiness.

Passage 4, from Plato's *Euthyphro*, p. 35:

Socrates: You surely remember how, a little while ago, we said that holiness and what is loved by the gods were not the same, but distinct from one another. Or don't you remember?

Euthyphro: I do.

S: Don't you see that now you are saying that what is dear to the gods is what is holy? Is this the same as what is loved by the gods, or isn't it?

E: It certainly is.

S: Either we were wrong about what we agreed to before, or—if we were right then—we're wrong now.

E: That seems to be so.

QUESTION 4

Which of the following is the best statement of Socrates' objection to Euthyphro, in passage 4?

- A) 'What is loved by the gods' means the same as 'what is dear to the gods'.
- A) Earlier Euthyphro said holiness is what is loved by the gods. Now he says it is what is dear to the gods.
- A) Euthyphro has not explained what the difference is between 'being loved by' and 'being dear to'.
- A) Since Euthyphro has reached a conclusion inconsistent with one reached earlier, one of the two conclusions must be mistaken.
- A) Since what is holy and what is loved by the gods are two different things, Euthyphro is wrong to conclude that what is dear to the gods is what is holy.

Passage 5, from Plato's *Meno*, pp. 57-8:

Socrates: Do you think, Meno, that anyone, knowing that bad things are bad, still wants them?

Meno: I certainly do.

S: Wants in what way? To have for himself?

M: Yes, to have them: what else?

S: Does he think the bad things benefit the one who has them, or does he perfectly well know they will harm whoever has them?

M: There are some who believe bad things benefit them, others who know that they harm them.

S: And do you think that those who believe that bad things benefit them *know* that they are bad?

M: No, that doesn't seem right at all.

S: It's clear, then, that those who do not know things to be bad do not want what is bad. What they want are things they *think* are good, but which are in fact bad. It follows that those who have no knowledge about these things and believe them to be good clearly want good things. Isn't that right?

Meno: In the case of these people, that's probably so.

Socrates: Well then, those who you say want bad things, while believing that bad things harm the one who possesses them—do they actually know they will be harmed by them?

M: They must.

S: And don't they think those who are harmed are wretched to the extent that they are harmed?

M: That seems unavoidable.

S: And don't they think those who are wretched are miserable?

M: I think so.

S: Is there anyone who wants to be wretched and miserable?

M: I don't think so, Socrates.

S: Then no one wants what is bad, Meno—unless he wants to be in such a state. For what else is misery, if not wishing for bad things and having your wish come true?

M: What you are saying is probably true, Socrates. No one really wants what is bad.

QUESTION 5

The underlined portion of passage 5 seems potentially contradictory. Suppose I want to drink what is in *that* glass, thinking it is water; but really the glass contains poison. Socrates seems to be saying that I really do *not* want to drink the liquid in the glass, because that would be a case of wanting 'what is bad'. But he also seems to admit that I *do* want to drink something that is 'in fact bad'—namely the liquid in the glass. Suppose we resolve the contradiction as follows. In this sort of case I really want one thing that is *good* (e.g. a glass of water, which may be non-existent) and *also* really want something else that is *bad* (e.g. a glass of poison, about which I have false beliefs.) If we resolve the contradiction in this way, Socrates' conclusion will have to be rewritten as well, to avoid another apparent contradiction. Which of the following is a plausible rewrite? (Which of the following is a plausible statement of what Socrates ought to conclude from his own argument, understood in the way we are reading it?)

- A) Everyone wants something bad.
- B) No one wants what is bad.
- C) If someone wants something bad, they also want something good.
- D) If someone wants something good, they also want something bad.
- E) Both C and D.

Passage 6, from Plato's *Meno*, pp. 60-1:

Socrates: Let's see whether what you have said is true in another respect—for you may well be right. You say that the capacity to get good things is virtue?

Meno: I do.

S: And by good things you mean, for example, health and wealth?

M: I also mean amassing plenty of gold and silver—and winning honors and public office.

S: So, by 'good things' you don't mean other sorts of things than these?

M: No, I mean all things of this kind.

S: Very well. According to Meno—hereditary guest friend of the Great King—virtue is getting your hands on the cash. Do you qualify this definition, Meno, with the words 'justly' and 'piously'? Or is it all the same to you—virtue either way—if you make your fortune unjustly?

M: Certainly not, Socrates.

S: You would call it evil, then?

M: That I would.

S: It seems, then, that the getting of gold must go along with justice or moderation or piety or some other element of virtue; if it does not, it won't be virtue, no matter what good things are obtained.

M: Yes. How could there be virtue if these elements were missing?

S: Then failing to acquire gold and silver, whether for oneself or for another, if these other elements were missing from the situation, would be a case of virtue?

M: So it seems.

S: It follows that getting hold of the goods will not be virtue any more so than failing to do so is. Apparently it's the case that whatever is done with justice will be virtue, and whatever is done in the absence of these good qualities will be vice.

M: I think it has to be as you say.

QUESTION 6

In the underlined portion of passage 6, Meno arrives at which of the following conclusions?

- A) Justice is necessary for virtue.
- A) Justice is sufficient for virtue.
- A) The capacity to get good things is necessary for virtue.
- A) The capacity to get good things is sufficient for virtue.
- A) Both A and B.

Passage 7, from Plato's *Meno*, pp. 61-2:

Socrates: We said a little while ago that each of these things was a *part of* virtue—namely, justice and moderation and all such things?

Meno: Yes.

S: Then it seems you have been playing me for a fool, Meno.

M: How so, Socrates?

S: Because I begged you just now not to break apart or portion out virtue, and I gave examples of how you should formulate your answer. You paid no attention, going on to tell me that virtue is being able to get good things justly; and this, you say, is part of virtue.

M: Yes, I do.

S: It follows then, from what you have agreed to, that doing whatever you do with *just one part* of virtue, is virtue. For you say that justice is a part of virtue, and that other, similar qualities are too. Why do I mention this? Because, although I begged you to tell me about virtue as a whole, you have fallen very far short of telling me what it is. Instead you say that every action is *virtue* if it is performed with a *part of virtue*, just as if you had already told me all about virtue as a whole and I must comprehend it instantly—even as you mince the thing to bits! I think we have to take it from the top, my dear Meno, and you must face the same old question again: what *is* virtue, if every action that is performed with a part of virtue is virtue? For that is what you are saying when you say every action performed justly is virtuous. Or maybe you don't think you should have to answer the same question all over again, because you think someone could know the nature of a part of virtue, while remaining ignorant of the whole?

M: I don't think so.

QUESTION 7

Which of the following is the best statement of Socrates' conclusion, in passage 7?

- A) Justice cannot be sufficient for virtue.
- A) Justice cannot be necessary for virtue.
- A) Virtue cannot be necessary for justice.
- A) Virtue cannot be sufficient for justice.
- A) Both A and B.

Passage 8, from Plato's *Republic*, Book 1, pp. 169-70:

[Cephalus speaking] At our meetings most of my friends weep and moan—they long for the pleasures of youth, and reminisce about sex and drinking and feasting and everything else like that ... But to me, Socrates, they put the blame in the wrong place. If old age really caused all these evils, I—and every single other old man, for that matter—would feel the way they do. But I don't, and neither do others. I particularly remember what the poet Sophocles said, when he was old and someone asked, 'How's your sex life, Sophocles—can you still make love to a woman?' 'Be quiet,' he replied, 'I'm glad to be done with all that. I'm like a slave who has escaped from a crazy, brutal master.' I thought he was right then, and I still think so today. Because old age certainly does bring with it great tranquility and freedom. When the fierce passions relax their grip on us, then, just as Sophocles says, we escape the clutches not just of one crazy master but a whole gang of them.

QUESTION 8

One of the following is clearly inconsistent with what Cephalus argues in passage 9. Which is the one?

- A) Those who complain about old age are generally suffering from frustrated desires.
- A) The fewer desires you have, the fewer chances for frustrated desire, the better your life goes.
- A) The more desires you have, the more chances to get what you want, the better your life goes.
- A) Old age always kills the desire for sex, drinking and feasting.
- A) Both C and D.

Passage 9, from Plato's *Republic*, book 1, p. 196:

[Polemarchus speaking] Nonetheless, I still say justice is helping friends and harming enemies.

[Socrates speaking] By 'friends' do we mean those who appear to each man to be worthy, or rather those who actually are, even if they don't seem to be? And I would ask the same concerning enemies.

Probably people become friends with those they think are good, and grow to hate the ones they judge evil.

Yes, but don't people often make mistakes about this, so that many of those they believe are good aren't, and vice versa?

People do make mistakes.

Then in their eyes those who are good will be enemies and those who are evil will be friends?

Certainly.

In that case these people will be right to do good to evil people and evil to good ones?

It would seem so.

But the good are just, and the sort who would not do wrong?

True.

Then according to your argument it is right to harm those who do no wrong?

No, Socrates, this result is wrong.

Then I suppose we are right to harm the unjust, and aid the just?

I think it comes out better that way.

But note what follows, Polemarchus. For all those who are mistaken in their judgments about men it will be right to harm their friends, for they are wicked, and aid their enemies, who are actually good. But in affirming this we say the opposite of what we said Simonides meant.

That certainly is the result, he said. Let's make a correction: we probably haven't defined the words 'friend' and 'enemy' properly.

How did we define them, Polemarchus? I asked.

We said that someone who seems good is a friend.

How are we going to fix the problem?

We should say instead that he is a friend who doesn't merely seem, but truly is, good. One who only seems good, but isn't, only seems a friend, but isn't. The same goes for enemies.

You would argue that the good are our friends, the bad our enemies?

Yes.

So you suggest that we add something to our previous definition of the good man. Just now we said that it is just to do good to our friends and evil to our enemies. Now we should add this: it is just to do good to our friends when they are good and evil to our enemies when they are evil?

Yes indeed, he said, that seems very well put.

QUESTION 9

All of the following, except one, are true statements about passage 9. Which is the one?

- A) Polemarchus offers a definition of justice but abandons it when he is shown he has implied it would be right to do evil to good people.
- A) Polemarchus offers a definition of justice but abandons it when he is shown he has implied it would be right to do good to evil people.
- A) Polemarchus agrees with Socrates that doing what seems right, even if it is really a mistake, is not really the right thing to do.
- A) Polemarchus agrees with Socrates that doing what seems right, even if it is really a mistake, is in one sense doing the right thing, in another sense doing the wrong thing.
- A) Given how Polemarchus redefines 'friend' and 'enemy', in the first underlined section, the second underlined section could be simplified: justice is doing good to the good, evil to the evil.

QUESTION 10

All the evidence suggests that Mr. Singh murdered Mrs. Smith. But the evidence was faked by Mr. Smith, the real murderer. Mr. Singh is innocent, and a good man.

On the basis of the view arrived at in passage 9; on the assumption that to be arrested is to suffer a harm, Socrates and Polemarchus are plausibly committed to all of the following but one, concerning the hypothetical case. Which is the one?

- A) Mr. Singh is everybody's friend.
- A) Mr. Smith is nobody's friend.
- A) In light of the evidence, justice demands Mr. Singh be arrested.
- A) Despite the evidence, justice demands that Mr. Singh not be arrested.
- A) Despite the evidence, justice demands that Mr. Smith be arrested.

Passage 10, from Plato's *Republic*, book 1, pp. 213-14:

[Socrates speaking] Now, we both agree that justice is advantage of some sort, but you go on to say 'of the stronger.' I'm not sure about this, and must therefore consider further.

[Thrasymachus speaking] Consider away, he said.

So I will, I said. First tell me, do you admit that it is just for subjects to obey their rulers?

I do.

But are the rulers of each of these states absolutely infallible, or do they sometimes make mistakes?

Obviously, he replied, they sometimes make mistakes.

Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them the right way, sometimes the wrong way?

I agree.

When they make them rightly, they make them to their own advantage; when they make a mistake, the laws are not made to their advantage; do you agree?

Yes.

Anyway, the laws which are made must be obeyed by the subjects—and that is what you call justice?

No doubt about it.

Then justice, by your argument, is not only obedience to the advantage of the stronger, but also the reverse, what is not to his advantage?

QUESTION 11

Socrates thinks the underlined portion of passage 10 follows from the fact that two things Thrasymachus assumes go together may, in certain circumstances, be incompatible. Which are the two?

- A) Subjects must do what is just.
Subjects must do what the ruler commands.
- A) Justice is doing what the ruler commands.
Justice is what is to the ruler's advantage.
- A) Subjects must do what is just.
Subjects must do what is to the ruler's advantage.
- A) Justice is obedience to the advantage of the stronger.
Justice is disobedience to the advantage of the stronger.
- A) Subjects must do what the ruler commands.
Everyone should do what is to his or her own advantage.

Passage 11, from Plato's *Republic*, book 1, p. 216:

[Socrates speaking] Tell me, Thrasymachus, is this what you meant to say justice was? What the stronger thought to be his advantage, whether it really is or not? Shall we say this is what you mean?

Absolutely not, he said. Do you think I would call someone who makes a mistake 'the stronger' at just the moment when he makes some mistake?

Yes, I said, my distinct impression was that this was exactly what you did when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible but might sometimes make mistakes

You argue like a slanderous witness in court, Socrates. For example, do you call someone who is mistaken about the sick 'a doctor' just in virtue of the fact that he is mistaken? Or do you say that he who makes mistakes in math is a mathematician when he is making the mistake, and precisely because he is mistaken? We do say 'the doctor has made a mistake' or 'the mathematician has made a mistake' or 'the grammarian has made a mistake', but this is just a loose way of talking. For I think none of them, insofar as he is what we call him, ever makes a mistake. So, to be perfectly strict about it—since you are such a stickler for strictness—no skilled craftsman ever makes a mistake. It is when his knowledge fails him that he goes astray, and in that moment of failure he is not really a skilled craftsman. And so, no craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes a mistake while he is a ruler in the strict sense, though people do commonly say, 'the doctor has made a mistake' or 'the ruler has made a mistake'. It

is in this common way of speaking, then, that you must take the answer I gave you just now. To be perfectly precise we should say that the ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, does not make mistakes, and does not mistake his own advantage when he lays down commands, and this the subject must do. Therefore—as I said in the first place, and now I say it again—justice is the advantage of the stronger.

Passage 12 (an argument similar to the one Thrasymachus makes in passage 11):

A bad mathematician, doctor, or ruler is, presumably, still a mathematician, doctor or ruler. Still, for purposes of theorizing what these roles involve, it is helpful to idealize them: a mathematician is one who gets correct answers to problems of mathematics, a doctor is one who heals the sick, so forth. These generalizations are strictly false, since there are counter-examples; nevertheless the generalizations are appropriate for two reasons: first, they allow us to simplify our model. Second, they capture the fact that to be a mathematician, doctor, ruler, so forth, is to strive for an ideal. The ideal explains what mathematicians, doctors, rulers, so forth, are *for*.

QUESTION 12

Which of the following claims, made in passage 12, are not made in passage 11? (Let 'craftsman' be a general term for 'craft roles' like: mathematician, doctor, ruler.)

- A) A craftsman making a mistake is still, strictly speaking, a craftsman.
- A) The point of idealization is simplicity.
- A) The point of idealizing craft roles is to explain what their point is.
- A) To say craftsmen are those who practice a given craft successfully is not, strictly, true.
- A) All of A through D.

Passage 13, from Descartes' "First Meditation", pp. 249-50

So now that my mind is free of all cares, and I have arranged to be left in peaceful solitude, I will apply myself seriously and freely to the general demolition of my beliefs.

To achieve this end it will not be necessary for me to prove that all my beliefs are false, since it might not come to that. Rather, because reason now teaches me that I should be just as careful about withholding assent from uncertain, doubtful things as from patent falsehoods, the least bit of doubt on any point will suffice for complete rejection. And for this it will not be necessary to examine each article individually, which would be an endless task. Once the foundation of a building is undermined, everything above goes with it. So I will go straight for the basic principles underlying all my former beliefs.

QUESTION 13

In passage 13, Descartes gives a statement of what will intellectually justify him in the 'general demolition' of his beliefs. Which of the following is the best expression of that justification? He can doubt any given belief:

- A) So long as he can do so 'seriously and freely'.
- A) So long as he can prove that all his beliefs are false.
- A) So long as he can discover any possibility it is false.
- A) So long as doubting it will undermine 'everything above it'.
- A) So long as it is a basic principle underlying all his former beliefs.

Passage 14, from Descartes' "First Meditation", p. 250:

What a brilliant argument! As if I were not a man in the habit of sleeping at night and, while asleep, having the same sorts of experiences madmen do while awake—indeed, sometimes even less probable ones. And how often, asleep at night, have I become convinced of quite ordinary things—that I am here in my dressing-gown, seated by the fire—when in fact I am lying undressed in bed! Yet at the moment I surely see this paper with open eyes; I shake my head and it is not asleep; I deliberately and intentionally stretch out my hand and feel what I feel. None of this would happen with such distinctness to one asleep. As if I did not remember all the times I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep! The more carefully I reflect on all this, the more clearly I see that there are never any sure signs by means of which one can distinguish wakefulness from sleep. As a result, I begin to feel stupefied, and this feeling only reinforces the notion that I may be asleep.

QUESTION 14

All of the following but one are plausibly true of passage 14. Which one is not true?

- A) Descartes claims dreams are like madness.
- A) Descartes claims the experiences we have while dreaming are indistinguishable from those we have while awake.
- A) Descartes is trying to prove that he cannot trust his senses.
- A) Descartes is arguing that dreams can only be about ordinary experiences, since otherwise they would not be indistinguishable from them.
- A) Descartes is not trying to prove he is dreaming.

QUESTION 15

Consider the following argument: dead people do not know they are dead. (Let's suppose this is true, though believers in an afterlife might doubt it.) It does not follow that living people should worry that they might actually be dead. Dead people cannot check whether they are dead, whereas living people have experiences that verify, for them, that they are alive. Likewise, dreaming sleepers may not know they are dreaming. Something about the dream state prevents us from checking whether we are dreaming. But that does not mean those who are awake should worry that they might be dreaming. The experience of being awake is different than that of dreaming, because we can think to check for the sure signs of being awake, while we are actually awake.

If this is a sound argument—valid, with true premises—which of the following claims made in passage 14 must be false?

- A) Descartes is a man “in the habit of sleeping at night and, while asleep, having the same sorts of experiences madmen do while awake.”
- A) Descartes has often, while “asleep at night ... become convinced of quite ordinary things,” which then proved not to have been the case.
- A) While dreaming, Descartes might well think to check whether he is dreaming, without discovering that he is dreaming.
- A) “There are never any sure signs by means of which one can distinguish wakefulness from sleep.”
- A) Both C and D.

Passage 15, from Descartes' "Second Meditation", p. 259:

But what am I, then? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions.

This is no inconsiderable catalogue, if everything on it belongs to me. But does it? Is it not one and the same 'I' who now doubts almost everything, who nevertheless understands some things, who affirms this one thing to be true, who denies everything else, wants to know more, is unwilling to be deceived, imagines many things—if only involuntarily—and is aware of many things which apparently come by way of the senses? Are not all these things just as true as the fact that I exist, even if I am asleep all the while, and even if he who created me is doing all he can to deceive me? What one of all these activities is distinct from my thinking? Which of them can be said to be separate from myself? The fact that it is I who am doubting and understanding and willing is so self-evident that I see no way of making it any clearer. But it is also the case that the 'I' who imagines is the same 'I'. For even if, as I have supposed, none of the objects of imagination are real, the power of imagination really exists and takes its place among my thoughts. Lastly, it is also the same 'I' who has sensory perceptions—that is, who is aware of corporeal things, as it were, through the senses. For example, I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep, so all this is false. All the same, I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called 'having a sensory perception' is strictly just this, and in this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking.

QUESTION 16

Which of the following is the best statement of Descartes' conclusion, in passage 15? Descartes is trying to prove:

- A) He is not dreaming.
- A) He is dreaming.
- A) He exists.
- A) Even if he cannot trust his senses, still he can have knowledge about the sensory perceptions he is having.
- A) Since he can have knowledge about the sensory perceptions he is having, he must be able to trust his senses.

Passage 16, from Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*:

But some care is needed in using Descartes' argument. 'I think, therefore I am' says rather more than is strictly certain. It might seem as though we were quite sure of being the same person to-day as we were yesterday, and this is no doubt true in some sense. But the real Self is as hard to arrive at as the real table and does not seem to have that absolute, convincing certainty that belongs to particular experiences. When I look at my table and see a certain brown colour, what is quite certain at once is not 'I am seeing a brown colour', but rather, 'a brown colour is being seen'. This of course involves something (or somebody) which (or who) sees the brown colour; but it does not of itself involve that more or less permanent person whom we call 'I'. So far as immediate certainty goes, it might be that the something which sees the brown colour is quite momentary, and not the same as the something which has some different experience the next moment.

QUESTION 17

Which of the following is the best statement of the proposition that Russell targets, in passage 16, as not 'strictly certain', so far as Descartes has shown by means of his *cogito* argument ('I think, therefore I am.')

- A) I exist.
- A) I am the same self now that I was in the past.
- A) I am a thing that thinks.
- A) When I see a brown table, I can be sure the table exists.
- A) When I have an experience of a brown table, I am certain I am experiencing a certain shade of brown.

Passage 17, from J.S. Mill, *On Liberty*, chapter 1, pp. 265-6:

The struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly in that of Greece, Rome, and England. But in old times this contest was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government. By liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers. The rulers were conceived (except in some of the popular governments of Greece) as in a necessarily antagonistic position to the people whom they ruled. They consisted of a governing One, or a governing tribe or caste, who derived their authority from inheritance or conquest; who, at all events, did not hold it at the pleasure of the governed, and whose supremacy men did not venture, perhaps did not desire, to contest, whatever precautions might be taken against its oppressive exercise. Their power was regarded as necessary, but also as highly dangerous; as a weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects, no less than against external enemies. To prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures, it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down. But as the king of the vultures would be no less bent upon preying upon the flock than any of the minor harpies, it was indispensable to be in a perpetual attitude of defence against his beak and claws.

QUESTION 18

Which of the following is the best statement of Mill's assessment of the attitudes of subjects to rulers, in 'old times', in passage 17?

- A) The rulers were conceived as undesirable enemies.
- B) The rulers were regarded as either a single individual, or a tribe or caste, and as deriving their authority from inheritance or through conquest.
- C) The power of rulers was regarded as necessary but dangerous.
- D) The rulers were like vultures.
- E) It was necessary to be constantly on the defensive against attacks by the rulers.

Passage 18, from J.S. Mill, *On Liberty*, chapter 1, p. 266:

The aim, therefore, of patriots, was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what they meant by liberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by obtaining a recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights, which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which, if he did infringe, specific resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be justifiable. A second, and generally a later expedient, was the establishment of constitutional checks; by which the consent of the community, or of a body of some sort supposed to represent its interests, was made a necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the governing power.

QUESTION 19

Which of the following is the best statement of the nature of liberty, as understood by the 'patriots' Mill discusses in passage 18? Liberty is a matter of:

- A) Individual freedom from coercion by rulers, laws or society.
- B) Making the ruler suffer for exercising authority over subjects.
- C) Limiting the power of rulers over subjects.
- D) Securing recognition of the right to resist or rebel in certain cases.
- E) Establishment of constitution checks.

Passage 19, from J.S. Mill's *On Liberty*, chapter 2, pp. 283-4:

[For rulers] To prohibit what they think pernicious, is not claiming exemption from error, but fulfilling the duty incumbent on them, although fallible, of acting on their conscientious conviction. If we were never to act on our opinions, because those opinions may be wrong, we should leave all our interests uncared for, and all our duties unperformed. An objection which applies to all conduct can be no valid objection to any conduct in particular. It is the duty of governments, and of individuals, to form the truest opinions they can; to form them carefully, and never impose them upon others unless they are quite sure of being right. But when they are sure (such reasoners may say), it is not conscientiousness but cowardice to shrink from acting on their opinions, and allow doctrines which they honestly think dangerous to the welfare of mankind, either in this life or in another, to be scattered abroad without restraint, because other people, in less enlightened times, have persecuted opinions now believed to be true. Let us take care, it may be said, not to make the same mistake: but governments and nations have made mistakes in other things, which are not denied to be fit subjects for the exercise of authority: they have laid on bad taxes, made unjust wars. Ought we therefore to lay on no taxes, and, under whatever provocation, make no wars? Men, and governments, must act to the best of their ability. There is no such thing as absolute certainty, but there is assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life. We may, and must, assume our opinion to be true for the guidance of our own conduct: and it is assuming no more when we forbid bad men to pervert society by the propagation of opinions which we regard as false and pernicious.

QUESTION 20

Which of the following is the best statement of the conclusion of the argument advanced in passage 19?

- A) It is permissible to forbid the expression of opinions we believe to be false and dangerous.
- B) We must assume our opinions are true.
- C) It is the duty of governments and individuals to form the truest opinions they can.
- D) Ideally, there ought to be no taxes, and no wars.
- E) People should be free to express any opinion not harmful to others.

END OF PAPER