

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE

EXAMINATION FOR ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 1

(Semester 2: 2007-2008)

PHILOSOPHY

PH1101E/GEM1004 REASON AND PERSUASION

APRIL / MAY 2008 - Time Allowed: 2 Hours

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

1. This examination paper contains **TWENTY** questions and comprises **NINETEEN** printed pages.
2. There is only one section to the examination. It is multiple-choice, 20 questions, worth 1 point apiece, for a total of 20 points.
3. This is an **OPEN BOOK** Examination.

SECTION I**QUESTIONS 1-20; MULTIPLE CHOICE**

1 point for each right answer, for a total of 20 points. No penalty for wrong answers.

Instructions:

A separate bubble form accompanies this question paper. Enter all information and answers on this form in number 2B pencil (not ink). Enter the module code in Section A. Enter and bubble-shade your matriculation number in Section B very carefully. Follow specific instructions in the instruction box on the bubble form. When filling in Section C, take care to bubble-shade answers only for questions 1-20, even though the form has space for answers to 100 questions.

Passage 1, from an introduction to Plato's philosophy:

The *Euthyphro* is a dialogue between Euthyphro and Socrates as they stand outside the Athens courthouse. Socrates is about to be tried and condemned to death, and yet still finds the time to discuss the crucial distinction between a morality based on religious belief and one based on philosophical reasoning. Socrates shows that it is almost impossible to derive a consistent moral code from the gods. They continually quarrel and it is never possible to please all of them all of the time.

QUESTION 1

All of the following, except one, are examples of 'gods-derived moral codes' that would be consistent—or at least not inconsistent for the reason cited by the author of passage 1. Which is the one?

- A) The morally right thing to do is whatever the most powerful god wants you to do.
- B) The morally right thing to do is whatever the majority of the gods want you to do.
- C) The morally right thing to do is whatever the gods want you to do.
- D) The morally right thing to do is whatever the god of justice wants you to do.
- E) The morally right thing to do is please as many gods as you can, while angering as few as you can.

Passage 2 [continuing from where passage 1 leaves off]:

Most importantly, though, Plato (or is it Socrates) gets Euthyphro to admit a crucial difference.

What is morally right is not necessarily always pious ... religion is loveable because it is loved, and morality is loved because it is loveable.

Passage 3, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (25):

Socrates: But if that which is god-beloved and that which is holy were one and the same, dear Euthyphro, and if the holy were *loved because it was holy*, then what is god-beloved would be loved by the gods because it was—god-beloved!

QUESTION 2

Let's suppose that, in passage 2, 'religion is loveable because it is loved' is equivalent to 'holy things are only loved because they are god-beloved.' Which of the following is the best statement of what Socrates is pointing out, in passage 3, about this view of religion?

- A) It is true.
- B) It is consistent.
- C) It is Euthyphro's view.
- D) It is Socrates' view.
- E) It is non-explanatory.

Passage 4, from Plato's *Euthyphro* [continuing on from Passage 3]:

But now you see we have two quite different sorts of cases here—very different from one another. We have someone who loves a thing, making it be loved; and we have a lovable thing, which makes someone love it. I'm afraid that when I asked you what holiness is, Euthyphro, you didn't want to make its nature clear to me. Instead, you told me about one of its properties—namely the property holiness has of being loved by all the gods.

QUESTION 3

All of the following, except one, are plausible paraphrases of what Socrates is getting at, in criticizing Euthyphro's definition of 'holiness' in passages 3 and 4. Which one of the following is he clearly not saying, in passage 3 and 4?

- A) The nature of holiness must be an essential sort of lovability, distinct from any facts about who loves it.
- B) If 'holiness' just means 'loved by all the gods', nothing will turn out to be holy; because the gods quarrel about everything.
- C) Euthyphro's account makes it incoherent to suppose the gods have a reason for loving holy things; but this is absurd.
- D) Euthyphro wants it to be the case that, in loving holy things, we imitate the gods. But the gods themselves can't be imitating themselves; so this is absurd.
- E) The fact that all the gods love holy things can be an effect of the nature of holiness, but cannot be that nature itself.

QUESTION 4

Complete the following sentence so it becomes a plausible analogy to Socrates' point about the nature of holiness, in passage 4. Let holiness be analogous to winning. (You work out the rest.)

If every winner gets a gold medal, then ...

- A) having a gold medal is a property of all winners. Nevertheless, 'gets a gold medal' is not an account of what it is to win.
- B) having a gold medal is a necessary condition of being a winner. To provide a necessary condition for a thing is to give an account of its nature.
- C) having a gold medal is a sufficient condition of being a winner. To provide a sufficient condition for a thing is to give an account of its nature.
- D) there must be agreement as to what constitutes being a winner.
- E) Both B and C.

QUESTION 5

Per the terms of the analogy in question 4: if holiness is analogous to being a winner, then a gold medal must be analogous to what?

- A) Philosophy.
- B) The gods.
- C) The gods' love.
- D) Holiness.
- E) Both C and D.

Passage 5 [from the same Introduction to Plato, continuing from where Passage 3 left off]:

As is usually the case, Socrates pushes Euthyphro into a verbal and conceptual maze from which he cannot escape. Worried by all this rather irregular talk from a notorious blasphemer, Euthyphro is very reluctant to arrive at any unorthodox conclusions, and so makes his excuses. Socrates' views, after all, are the very ones he is about to be tried for.

Passage 6, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (7):

S: It sounds like an outlandish business, my friend, when you first hear it. He says I fabricate gods. He indicts me, so he says, on behalf of the old gods, whom I don't believe in, since I'm busy making new ones.

E: I see, Socrates. This is due to the divine sign you say comes to you now and again. This man has written out his indictment against you as against an innovator in divine matters. He comes to court to slander you, knowing such matters can easily be made to appear in a bad light before the crowd. That's how it is with me, too. Whenever I speak up concerning divine matters in the assembly, and foretell the future, they laugh me down as if I were crazy.

QUESTION 6

Which of the following would seem to be true statements about the relationship between passages 5 and 6.

- A Passage 5 says Euthyphro worries Socrates is a blasphemer. Passage 6 contains evidence that this is the case.
- B Passage 5 says Euthyphro worries Socrates is a blasphemer. Passage 6 contains evidence that this is not the case.
- C Passage 5 says Euthyphro is reluctant to reach unorthodox conclusions. Passage 6 contains evidence that this is the case.
- D Passage 5 says Euthyphro is reluctant to reach unorthodox conclusions. Passage 6 contains evidence that this is not the case.
- E Both B and D.

Passage 7, from Plato's *Meno* (44):

M: It's really not that hard to say, Socrates. First, if you want the virtue of a man, it is easy to say that a man's virtue consists in being able to manage public affairs and thereby help his friends and harm his enemies—all the while being careful to come to no harm himself. If you want the virtue of a woman, it's not difficult to describe: she must manage the home well, keep the household together, and be submissive to her husband; the virtue of a child, whether boy or girl, is another thing altogether, and so is that of an elderly man—if you want that—or if you want that of a free man or a slave. There are lots of different virtues, as a result of which it is not at all hard to say what virtue is. There is virtue for every action and every stage in life, for every person and every capacity, Socrates. And the same goes for wickedness.

QUESTION 7

Which of the following is Meno committed to by the account he offers in passage 7?

- A) If X is necessary for person Y to be virtuous, then X is not necessary for person Z to be virtuous.
- B) X can be necessary for person Y to be virtuous, but not necessary for person Z to be virtuous.
- C) If X is necessary for person Y to be virtuous, then X is sufficient for person Y to be virtuous.
- D) Both A & B.
- E) All of A, B and C.

Passage 8, from Plato's *Meno* [continuing on from passage 7]:

S: It must be my lucky day, Meno! Here I was, looking for just one virtue, and you happen by with a whole swarm! But, Meno, following up on this figurative swarm of mine, if I were to ask you what is the true nature of the bee, and you said, 'there are all sorts of different sorts of bees,' what would you say if I went on to ask: 'Do you mean that there are all these bees, of every sort, and that they differ from one another insofar as they are bees? Or are they don't differ from one another, insofar as they are bees, but they differ in other respects—in how beautiful they are, for example, or how big, and so on and so forth?' Tell me, what would you answer if I asked you this?

M: I would say that one bee doesn't differ from another insofar as they are all bees.

QUESTION 8

Which of the following is the best statement of the point of Socrates is making with his bee analogy, in passage 8?

- A) It must be his lucky day.
- B) There are different sorts of bees.
- C) If something is a bee, then necessarily it is a bee.
- D) An account of something's nature must fit all cases of that thing.
- E) Human virtue must be like bee virtue.

Passage 9, from Plato's *Meno* [continuing on from passage 8]:

S: What if I went on to say: 'Tell me this further thing Meno: what do you call that quality in respect to which they do not differ from one another, but are all alike.' Doubtless you would have some answer for me?

M: I would.

S: The same goes for all the virtues. Even if they come in all sorts of different varieties, all of them have one and the same form which makes them virtues, and it's this form that a person should keep a close eye on when, in response to someone's question, he is giving a clear answer to the question of what virtue really is.

QUESTION 9

In passage 9, Socrates says Meno would 'doubtless have some answer' to a certain question. Meno agrees he would. Which of the following is Meno saying he could provide, if asked:

- A) A definition of 'virtue'.
- B) Virtue.
- C) The form that all bees share.
- D) A bee.
- E) Both A and C.

QUESTION 10

In passage 9, suppose we read Socrates as setting the following standard for Meno to meet: to provide an adequate account of the nature of x, it is sufficient to name some quality all x's share. Assume all of the following statements are true. Which of the following would Socrates then be committed to calling an adequate account of the nature of bees.

- A) All bees have the quality of being called 'bee'.
- B) All bees have the quality of being animals.
- C) All bees have the quality of being in time and space.
- D) None of A-C
- E) All of A-C.

Passage 10, from Plato's *Republic*, Book I (208):

[Thrasymachus] roared out to the whole lot of us: what utter nonsense have you been spouting, Socrates? And why do the both of you prize idiots give way to what the other says? If you really want to know what justice is, Socrates, you should not *only* ask questions, and then win the competition by refuting what anyone answers. After all, you know it's easier to win when you ask than when you answer. Now *you* answer the question yourself, and say what *you* think justice is. And I won't have any of this 'justice is what ought to be' or 'the beneficial', or 'the profitable', or 'the advantageous', but express clearly and precisely whatever you say, for I'm not going to accept anything of that sort from you ...

Thrasymachus, I said, with just a slight hitch in my voice, don't be so critical of us. Polemarchus and I may be guilty of making mistakes in our argument, but you should know we weren't doing it on purpose. If we were looking for a piece of gold, you wouldn't say that we were 'giving way to each other,' and thereby destroying our chances of finding it. Why, then, when we are seeking justice—a thing more precious than much gold—do you assert that we are stupidly giving in to each other and not doing our utmost to get at the truth? You know it isn't so, my good friend; it's just that we aren't capable. And since that is the way of it, people like you—who are so terribly clever—should pity us instead of being angry.

QUESTION 11

In the context of *Republic*, book I as a whole, all of the following are plausible statements about passage 10 except one. Which is the one?

- A) Thrasymachus argues that Socrates debating style cannot aim at the discovery of truth, since it can only refute.
- B) Thrasymachus implies from Socrates' debating style that he aims to defeat his debating partner.
- C) Socrates argues that Thrasymachus must be wrong to suggest that Socrates is deliberately claiming or granting things he does not believe.
- D) Socrates suggests Thrasymachus knows Socrates and Polemarchus are collaborating in a search for truth.
- E) Socrates thinks Thrasymachus is more capable of searching for truth than Socrates himself.

Passage 11, from Plato's *Republic*, Book I (216-7)

[Socrates speaking] Tell me, Thrasymachus, is this what you meant to say justice was? What the stronger thought to be his advantage, whether it really is or not? Shall we say this is what you mean?

[Thrasymachus speaking] Absolutely not, he said. Do you think I would call someone who makes a mistake 'the stronger' at just the moment when he makes some mistake?

Yes, I said, my distinct impression was that this was exactly what you did when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible but might sometimes make mistakes

You argue like a slanderous witness in court, Socrates. For example, do you call someone who is mistaken about the sick 'a doctor' just in virtue of the fact that he is mistaken? Or do you say that he who makes mistakes in math is a mathematician when he is making the mistake, and precisely because he is mistaken? We do say 'the doctor has made a mistake' or 'the mathematician has made a mistake' or 'the grammarian has made a mistake', but this is just a loose way of talking. For I think none of them, insofar as he is what we call him, ever makes a mistake. So, to be perfectly strict about it—since you are such a stickler for strictness—no skilled craftsman ever makes a mistake. It is when his knowledge fails him that he goes astray, and in that moment of failure he is not really a skilled craftsman. And so, no craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes a mistake while he is a ruler in the strict sense, though people do commonly say, 'the doctor has made a mistake' or 'the ruler has made a mistake'. It is in this common way of speaking, then, that you must take the answer I gave you just now. To be perfectly precise we should say that the ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, does not make mistakes, and does not mistake his own advantage when he lays down commands, and this the subject must do. Therefore—as I said in the first place, and now I say it again—justice is the advantage of the stronger.

QUESTION 12

All of the following are true statements about passage 11 except one. Which is the one?

- A) Thrasymachus rejects a proposed definition of 'justice'.
- B) Thrasymachus rejects Socrates' demand for strict definitions.
- C) Thrasymachus maintains that justice is the advantage of the stronger.
- D) Thrasymachus says that, strictly, doctors cannot make mistakes in treating their patients.
- E) Thrasymachus says that, strictly, skilled craftsmen cannot make mistakes.

Passage 12 from Plato's *Republic*, Book I [continuing on from passage y]:

... [Socrates speaking:] please define in what sense you speak of 'the ruler' and 'stronger'. Do you mean the so-called ruler or the ruler in the precise sense, whom you were just telling us about? For whose advantage, as being the stronger, will it be just for the inferior to act?

I mean the ruler in the strictest of all senses, he said.

QUESTION 13

Which of the following statements are true about passages 11 and 12?

- A) Thrasymachus would call someone who has power to command, who give orders not in his or her own self-interest, a 'so-called ruler'.
- B) Thrasymachus would call someone who has power to command, who give orders in his or her self-interest, a 'ruler in the precise sense'.
- C) Thrasymachus implies it is just for the weak to obey the strong, even if this is against the self-interest of the weak.
- D) Both A and B
- E) All of A through C.

Passage 13, from Plato's *Republic*, Book I [continuing on from passage 12]:

... [Socrates] what does the physician do, in the strict sense you articulated just now? Does he heal the sick, or does he make money? And remember, I am now speaking of the true physician.

He heals the sick, he replied.

And the ship's pilot—I mean, the true pilot—is he a captain of sailors or a mere sailor?

A captain of sailors.

I don't think we have to take into account the fact that he sails about in a ship, nor the fact that he is called a sailor. He's not called a pilot because of his sailing, but because of his craft and his authority over the sailors.

That's exactly right, he said.

Now, I said, for each of these cases, isn't there something that is advantageous?

Certainly.

Towards which the craft, I said, is directed; it seeks to secure and furnish this advantage to them?

Yes, that's the point.

And is there any advantage for each of the crafts aside from its becoming as perfect as possible?

What are you talking about?

It's like this, I said. Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficient, or whether it has needs. I would reply: the body has all kinds of needs. This is why the art of medicine was invented, because the body can fall ill and lacks the capacity to heal itself. The art was constructed to this end, to provide these advantages to the body. Do you think I would be right in saying this, I asked, or not?

Quite right, he replied.

But how about this? Does the art of medicine get sick itself? Or can any other art be in need of some virtue or quality—as the eye can need sight, and the ear hearing, so that they require some art to seek out and provide this advantage to them? Can there be any fault in the art itself, so that each art requires some further art to seek out what is advantageous to it, and another art must be found for the second one, and so on to infinity? Or does each art look out for its own advantage? Or does each art in fact need neither itself nor another art to seek out a remedy for any defect? For no art has either any defect or error in itself, nor is it the business of any art to seek what is advantageous to anything other than the art's subject. For isn't every true art pure and faultless, so long as it is precisely and entirely itself? - Consider that we are speaking in your precise sense. Is it so, or not?

It appears to be so, he said.

Then medicine does not serve the interests of medicine, but the interests of the body?

True, he said.

And the point of the art of caring for horses is not to care for itself, just to care for horses, nor does any other art look after itself—since it doesn't need anything—but rather that thing of which it is the art?

So it seems he said.

But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the rulers of, and stronger than, their subjects?

He conceded this point with great reluctance.

QUESTION 14

Which of the following is (are) reasons why Thrasymachus concedes Socrates' final point "with great reluctance", in passage 13?

- A) It implies that the arts are rulers of, and stronger than, their subjects. From this it follows that the arts are the rulers over men, whereas Thrasymachus said the opposite.
- B) It implies that, strictly, those who practice the art of ruling serve the interests of the stronger.
- C) It implies that, strictly, those who practice the art of ruling do not serve the interests of the stronger.
- D) It implies that, strictly speaking, those who practice the art of ruling do not serve their own self-interest.
- E) Both C and D.

Passage 14, from Descartes' "First Meditation" (249):

It has been some years since I was for the first time struck by how many falsehoods I had taken for truths when I was very young, and by how doubtful and uncertain everything subsequently based on such questionable material had to be. In this way I came to see the need, once in my life, to demolish all that I had accepted up to that point, and to make a fresh start from the very foundations, if I wanted to achieve anything solid and lasting in the sciences. But the project looked truly enormous, so I waited until I was old and mature enough to be sure there could never be a better time for taking up the task. This led me to put the project off for so long that now I would at fault if, instead of taking it up, I spent what time remains to me in deliberations. So now that my mind is free of all cares, and I have arranged to be left in peaceful solitude, I will apply myself seriously and freely to the general demolition of my beliefs.

To achieve this end it will not be necessary for me to prove that all my beliefs are false, since it might not come to that. Rather, because reason now teaches me that I should be just as careful about withholding assent from uncertain, doubtful things as from patent falsehoods, the least bit of doubt on any point will suffice for complete rejection. And for this it will not be necessary to examine each article individually, which would be an endless task. Once the foundation of a building is undermined, everything above goes with it. So I will go straight for the basic principles underlying all my former beliefs.

Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true and assured I have gotten either from the senses or through the senses.

QUESTION 15

Which of the following is the best statement of what Descartes declares to be the point of 'the general demolition of his beliefs' in passage 14?

- A) His mind is free of all cares, and he has arranged to be left in peaceful solitude.
- B) This is a precondition for achieving anything solid and lasting in the sciences.
- C) He has been struck by how many falsehoods he took for truths when very young.
- D) Reason teaches him that he should withhold assent from uncertain, doubtful things as from patent falsehoods.
- E) Once the foundation of his beliefs is undermined, all of his beliefs will collapse.

QUESTION 16

In passage 14, Descartes declares that he will go straight for 'basic principles' underlying all his former beliefs. Which of the following states or articulates what those principles are, according to the passage?

- A) Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true and assured I have gotten either from the senses or through the senses.
- B) I will go straight for the basic principles underlying all my former beliefs.
- C) Reason now teaches me that I should be just as careful about withholding assent from uncertain, doubtful things as from patent falsehoods.
- D) It will not be necessary for me to prove that all my beliefs are false, since it might not come to that.
- E) The least bit of doubt on any point will suffice for complete rejection.

Passage 15, from Descartes' "Second Meditation" (260):

Let us consider those things people commonly think they understand most distinctly of all: namely, those bodies that we touch and see. I do not mean bodies in general - for general perceptions are apt to be somewhat more confused - but one particular body. Let us take, for example, this piece of wax, just come from the comb. It has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey it contained; it retains some of the scent of the flowers from which it was gathered; its color, shape and size are apparent; it is hard, cool and can be readily handled; if you tap it with your knuckle it makes a sound. In short, it has everything which seems necessary to enable a body to be known as distinctly as possible. But see how, even as I speak, I place the wax by the fire: what remained of its taste evaporates, its scent dissipates, its color changes, its shape is lost, its size increases; it becomes liquid and hot; you can hardly touch it, and if you do it no longer makes a sound, But does the same wax remain? It must be granted that it does; no one denies it, no one thinks otherwise. So what was it about the wax that I understood with such distinctness? Evidently none of the features that I gleaned by means of the senses; for whatever had to do with taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has now changed – yet the wax remains.

QUESTION 17

If the claims made in passage 15 is true, what follows about the things Descartes identifies as the 'principles' underlying his beliefs, in passage 14?

- A) They have turned out to be reliable principles.
- B) They have turned out to be unreliable principles.
- C) They have turned out to be the basis for his beliefs, after all.
- D) They have turned out not to be the basis of his beliefs, after all.
- E) Both B) and D).

Passage 16, from J. S. Mill, *On Liberty*, chapter 1 (269):

Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant – society collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it – its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.

QUESTION 18

Which one of the following claims does Mill make (clearly commit himself to) in passage 16?

- A) 'Tyranny of the magistrate' will always be a 'tyranny of prevailing opinion and feeling'.
- B) 'Tyranny of the magistrate' will never be a 'tyranny of prevailing opinion and feeling'.
- C) Social tyranny is 'restricted to the acts which it [society] may do by the hands of its political functionaries'.
- D) Social tyranny is not 'restricted to the acts which it [society] may do by the hands of its political functionaries'.
- E) Since society is not a person, it must always exercise tyranny through a magistrate.

QUESTION 19

By 'interference of collective opinion with individual independence', in passage 16, Mill means:

- A) Something he thinks is never legitimate.
- B) Something he thinks is always legitimate.
- C) Something he thinks is sometimes legitimate.
- D) The tyranny of the majority.
- E) Both A and D.

Passage 17, from Mill's *On Liberty*, Chapter 2 (286):

Whatever people believe, on subjects on which it is of the first importance to believe rightly, they ought to be able to defend against at least the common objections. But, some one may say, 'Let them be *taught* the grounds of their opinions. It does not follow that opinions must be merely parroted because they are never heard controverted. Persons who learn geometry do not simply commit the theorems to memory, but understand and learn likewise the demonstrations; and it would be absurd to say that they remain ignorant of the grounds of geometrical truths, because they never hear any one deny, and attempt to disprove them.' Undoubtedly: and such teaching suffices on a subject like mathematics, where there is nothing at all to be said on the wrong side of the question. The peculiarity of the evidence of mathematical truths is, that all the argument is on one side. There are no objections, and no answers to objections. But on every subject on which difference of opinion is possible, the truth depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of conflicting reasons. Even in natural philosophy, there is always some other explanation possible of the same facts; some geocentric theory instead of heliocentric, some phlogiston instead of oxygen; and it has to be shown why that other theory cannot be the true one: and until this is shown and until we know how it is shown, we do not understand the grounds of our opinion. But when we turn to subjects infinitely more complicated, to morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life, three-fourths of the arguments for every disputed opinion consist in dispelling the appearances which favor some opinion different from it. The greatest orator, save one, of antiquity, has left it on record that he always studied his adversary's case with as great, if not with still greater, intensity than even his own. What Cicero practised as the means of forensic success, requires to be imitated by all who study any subject in order to arrive at the truth. He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion. The rational position for him would be suspension of judgment, and unless he contents himself with that, he is either led by authority, or adopts, like the generality of the world, the side to which he feels most inclination.

QUESTION 20

In passage 17, Mill is arguing against a specific proposal. Which of the following is the best statement of the proposal he opposes?

- A) There is nothing wrong with restricting the expression of unorthodox beliefs, so long as people are taught the reasons for the orthodox beliefs.
- B) There is nothing wrong with restricting the expression of orthodox beliefs, so long as people are permitted to hear the reasons for unorthodox beliefs.
- D) There is nothing wrong with restricting the expression of unorthodox beliefs, since the presentation of the arguments for the orthodox beliefs will inevitably address those beliefs.
- D) There is no such thing as orthodox beliefs, since there are always reasons to think something else instead
- E) There is no such thing as orthodox or unorthodox belief, since these matters are relative to the individual believer.

END OF PAPER