

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE

EXAMINATION FOR ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 1

(Semester 3: 2007-2008)

PHILOSOPHY

PH1101E/GEM1004 REASON AND PERSUASION

JUNE 2008 - Time Allowed: 2 Hours

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

1. This examination paper contains **TWENTY** questions and comprises **TWENTY-TWO** printed pages.
2. There is only one section to the examination. It is multiple-choice, 20 questions, worth 1 point apiece, for a total of 20 points.
3. This is a **CLOSED BOOK** Examination.

SECTION I

QUESTIONS 1-20; MULTIPLE CHOICE

1 point for each right answer, for a total of 20 points. No penalty for wrong answers.

Instructions:

A separate bubble form accompanies this question paper. Enter all information and answers on this form in number 2B pencil (not ink). Enter the module code in Section A. Enter and bubble-shade your matriculation number in Section B very carefully. Follow specific instructions in the instruction box on the bubble form. When filling in Section C, take care to bubble-shade answers only for questions 1-20, even though the form has space for answers to 100 questions.

QUESTION 1

All of the following are true statements about our readings except one. Which one is not true?

- A) Euthyphro is a priest.
- B) Anytus is a character in *Euthyphro*.
- C) Meno is a professional speaker.
- D) Descartes' famous statement, 'I think, I am,' comes in the "Second Meditation".
- E) J.S. Mill thinks the only circumstances in which infringement of individual liberty is permissible is to prevent harm to others.

Passage 1, from Plato's *Euthyphro*:

S: Is it a case, then, of your father killing another relative? But I suppose that much is obvious. You certainly wouldn't be prosecuting your father for killing a stranger.

E: It's ridiculous, Socrates, for you to think it makes a difference whether the victim is a stranger or a relative. One should only consider whether the killer acted justly or not; if he acted justly, let him go; if not, prosecute even a killer who shares your hearth and home. You are just as polluted if you intentionally remain under the same roof with a person like that, instead of purifying both yourself and him by bringing charges. The victim was a dependent of mine, and when we were farming in Naxos he acted as our servant. In a drunken rage, he killed one of our household slaves, so my father bound him hand and foot, threw him into some ditch, then sent a man here to inquire of a religious advisor what should be done. In the meantime, he didn't show any consideration to the man as he lay there bound, and neglected him, thinking that as he was a murderer it wouldn't be a big deal if he were to die—which is just what happened. He died from hunger, the cold and his bonds before the messenger came back from the religious advisor. Now my father and other relatives are furious that I am prosecuting him for murder on behalf of a murderer—when, they say, my father didn't even murder him! And besides, even if he *had* just *completely* murdered him, the dead man, being a murderer, doesn't deserve a second thought. They say it is impious for a son to prosecute a father for murder—that's how wrong they are, Socrates, about how things stand in the divine realm with respect to holiness and unholiness.

QUESTION 2

Euthyphro could agree with all of the following, except one. Which one could he not agree to, without contradicting what he says in passage 1?

- A) It is a more serious crime to kill strangers than family members.
- B) It is a more serious crime to kill family members than strangers.
- C) It is not possible to kill a human being justly.
- D) It is possible to kill a human being justly.
- E) It is impious for a son to prosecute a father for any crime whatsoever.

Passage 2, from Plato's *Euthyphro*:

S: Then the best thing that could possibly happen to me, admirable Euthyphro, is to become your student and, before the suit from Meletus starts, go offer to settle with him. I would say to him that even in the past I thought it was very important to know about divine matters, and now, since he says I do wrong by treating religious subjects carelessly and innovating in them, I have enrolled myself as your pupil. I would say to him: 'Meletus, if you grant that Euthyphro is wise in these matters, then grant that I have correct beliefs too, and don't drag me into court. If you don't grant it, sue my teacher, not me, for corrupting the old—both me and his father—by teaching me, and by admonishing and punishing his father.' If he won't buy it, and doesn't either drop the charge, or else pin it on you instead of me, I'll try out the same line of defense in court as I did in my settlement offer to him.

QUESTION 3

All of the following are plausible statements about passage 2 except one. Which is the one?

- A) Plato says he wants to become Euthyphro's student so he can respond more effectively to Meletus' charges.
- B) If Euthyphro's views about divinity are true, Socrates can claim to have the same beliefs. This can be a defense against Meletus' charges.
- C) If Socrates enrolls as Euthyphro's student and Euthyphro's views about divinity prove false, it will not be Socrates' fault but Euthyphro's. This can be a defense against Meletus' charges.
- D) Socrates proposes that, if he becomes Euthyphro's pupil, Meletus may be willing to settle his suit out of court.
- E) Socrates says he wants to become Euthyphro's student because he thinks Euthyphro can teach him how to defend himself in this and any other court case.

Passage 2, from Plato's *Euthyphro*:

Socrates: My friend, you did not teach me adequately when I inquired as to what holiness is. You told me that the thing you happen to be doing at the moment—namely, prosecuting your father for murder—is holy.

Euthyphro: And what I said was true, Socrates.

S: That may be. But there are lots of other things, Euthyphro, that you would also claim are holy.

E: Yes, there are.

S: Keep in mind, then, that this isn't what I asked you to do—to give me one or two examples out of the many holy actions. Rather, I asked what essential form all holy actions exhibit, in virtue of which they are holy. For you did agree all unholy actions are unholy and all holy actions holy in virtue of some shared form, or don't you remember?

E: I remember.

S: Tell me then what this form is, so that I can pay close attention to it and use it as a paradigm to judge any action, whether committed by you or anyone else: if the action be of the right form, I will declare it holy; otherwise, not.

QUESTION 4

Which of the following is the best statement of why Euthyphro's explanation of the nature of holiness is inadequate, according to Socrates in passage 3?

- A) Euthyphro has not provided any examples of holiness.
- B) Euthyphro has only provided examples of holiness.
- C) The examples Euthyphro gives are not, in fact, good examples of holiness.
- D) The examples Euthyphro gives may not, in fact, be good examples of holiness.
- E) The examples Euthyphro gives are, in fact, good examples of holiness.

Passage 4, from *Euthyphro*:

S: Pull yourself together, my good man, because the thing I'm saying is not that hard to grasp. I am saying the opposite of what that poet said, who wrote: *Zeus, who has brought all that to pass, and made it grow, you will not name/For where there is fear there is also shame*. I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you why?

E: Please do.

S: I don't think that 'where there is fear there is also shame,' for I think many people who fear disease and poverty and many other things feel fear but are not *ashamed* of what they fear. Don't you agree?

E: I do indeed.

S: But where there is *shame* there *is* also fear. For is there anyone who feels shame and contrition about some matter, who does not at the same time fear and dread a reputation for wickedness?

E: He will fear it.

QUESTION 5

Which of the following is the best statement of why Socrates thinks what the poet says cannot be true, in passage 4?

- A) The poet only gives examples of fear, rather than a proper definition.
- B) The poet only gives examples of shame, rather than a proper definition.
- C) There are counter-examples to the poet's claim.
- D) Shame causes fear, so fear cannot be the cause of shame.
- E) Fear does not cause shame, so shame can be the cause of fear.

Passage 5, from Plato's *Meno*:

Meno: Can you tell me, Socrates, is virtue the sort of thing you can teach? Or is it not the sort of thing you can teach, but you could pick it up by practicing it? Or maybe it's neither: virtue is something that naturally arises in men, or they get it some other way?

Socrates: Thessalians used to be famous and greatly admired among Greeks, Meno, for being such good riders and for being so rich. Nowadays, it seems, they are famous for wisdom also, particularly your friend Aristippus' people, the citizens of Larissa. The credit goes to Gorgias, for when he moved to your city he converted the leading men of the *Aleuadae*—your lover Aristippus among them—into lovers of wisdom, and the other leading Thessalians as well. And in particular, he got all of you into the habit of answering any chance question put to you in a confident and magnificent manner—just in the manner of those who truly know. This is because he himself is always ready to answer any Greek who chooses to question him, on whatever subject they wish to ask, and he has an answer for absolutely everyone. On the other hand, here in Athens, my dear Meno, it's just the opposite. It's as though there were a wisdom drought; maybe the wisdom has all drained away from our locale to where you come from. So if you want to ask this sort of question to one of the folks around here, there isn't a one of them that won't laugh and say: 'Good stranger, maybe I seem to you to be an especially gifted man, one who knows whether virtue can be taught or how it comes about. Me, I'm so far from knowing whether virtue can be taught or not that I don't know what the thing in question—virtue—even is at all.' And I myself, Meno, am just as badly off as all my fellow citizens in this regard, and I blame no one but myself for my utter ignorance about virtue. And if I don't know what something is, how could I know what it's like? Unless you think it's possible that someone who has no idea who Meno is could know whether he is handsome and rich and a real gentleman, or rather the complete opposite? Do you think he could?

QUESTION 6

One of the following statements about passage 5 is false. Which one?

- A) Socrates implies that knowing "what something is" is necessary for knowing "what it's like".
- B) Socrates implies that knowing "what something is" is sufficient for knowing "what it's like".
- C) Socrates implies that knowing "what something is" is necessary and sufficient for knowing "what it's like".
- D) Socrates implies that knowing "what something is" is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowing "what it's like".
- E) All of B-D are false.

Passage 6, from Plato's *Meno*:

S: It must be my lucky day, Meno! Here I was, looking for just one virtue, and you happen by with a whole swarm! But, Meno, following up on this figurative swarm of mine, if I were to ask you what is the true nature of the bee, and you said, 'there are all sorts of different sorts of bees,' what would you say if I went on to ask: 'Do you mean that there are all these bees, of every sort, and that they differ from one another insofar as they are bees? Or are they don't differ from one another, insofar as they are bees, but they differ in other respects—in how beautiful they are, for example, or how big, and so on and so forth?' Tell me, what would you answer if I asked you this?

M: I would say that one bee doesn't differ from another from another insofar as they are all bees.

S: What if I went on to say: 'Tell me this further thing Meno: what do you call that quality in respect to which they do not differ from one another, but are all alike' Doubtless you would have some answer for me?

M: I would.

S: The same goes for all the virtues. Even if they come in all sorts of different varieties, all of them have one and the same form which makes them virtues, and it's this form that a person should keep a close eye on when, in response to someone's question, he is giving a clear answer to the question of what virtue really is.

QUESTION 7

Which of the following is the best statement of the point Socrates is making, in passage 6, by means of his bee example.

- A) There are different kinds of bees.
- B) There aren't different kinds of bees.
- C) There must be something all kinds of bees have in common, making them bees.
- D) There may be something all kinds of bees have in common, making them bees.
- E) If there is something all the bees have in common, then that must be what makes them bees.

Passage 7, from Plato's *Meno*:

M: I think, Socrates, that virtue is, as the poet says, "to find joy in beautiful things and have power." Therefore I say that virtue is to want the best things in life, and have the power to get them.

S: Do you mean that the man who desires the best things in life desires good things?

M: That's certainly right.

S: Do you take it for granted that there are people who desire bad things, and others who desire good things? Don't you think, my good man, that all men desire good things?

M: I certainly don't.

S: You think some want bad things, then?

M: Yes.

S: Do you mean that they think the bad things are good, or that they know they are bad and nevertheless want them anyway?

M: I think there are both kinds.

S: Do you think, Meno, that anyone, knowing that bad things are bad, still wants them?

M: I certainly do.

S: Wants in what way? To have for himself?

M: Yes, to have them: what else?

S: Does he think the bad things benefit the one who has them, or does he perfectly well know they will harm whoever has them?

M: There are some who believe bad things benefit them, others who know that they harm them.

S: And do you think that those who believe that bad things benefit them *know* that they are bad?

M: No, that doesn't seem right at all.

S: It's clear, then, that those who do not know things to be bad do not want what is bad. What they want are things they *think* are good, but which are in fact bad. It follows that those who have no knowledge about these things and believe them to be good clearly want good things. Isn't that right?

M: In the case of these people, that's probably so.

S: Well then, those who you say want bad things, while believing that bad things harm the one who possesses them—do they actually know they will be harmed by them?

M: They must.

S: And don't they think those who are harmed are wretched to the extent that they are harmed?

M: That seems unavoidable.

S: And don't they think those who are wretched are miserable?

M: I think so.

S: Is there anyone who wants to be wretched and miserable?

M: I don't think so, Socrates.

S: Then no one wants what is bad, Meno—unless he wants to be in such a state. For what else is misery, if not wishing for bad things and having your wish come true?

M: What you are saying is probably true, Socrates. No one really wants what is bad.

QUESTION 8

If Socrates' argument in passage 7 is a good one (valid, sound), what does it show about Meno's definition?

- A) Meno's definition implies that everyone is virtuous.
- B) Meno's definition implies that everyone is virtuous, which is absurd.
- C) Meno's definition cannot be right.
- D) It must be the case that all human beings satisfy at least one of the two conditions Meno says define virtue.
- E) All of A-D.

QUESTION 9

Which of the following statements is/are inconsistent with Socrates' conclusion in passage 7?

- A) Sometimes people want cigarettes, and cigarettes are bad.
- B) Sometimes people want cigarettes because they taste good.
- C) If people want cigarettes, then they must be good.
- D) If people don't want cigarettes, then they must be bad.
- E) Both A and D.

Passage 8, from Plato's *Republic*:

[Cephalus] Thus I lay it down that this is the chief value of acquiring wealth, not to every man but to a man of good sense. Namely, he need not deceive or defraud anyone, even unintentionally. Nor does he leave this world afraid that he owes sacrifices to the gods or debts to men. Having money is more than a little help in this regard. And of course it has many other uses. But on balance—setting one thing against another—I, for one, affirm that this is the most profitable use of wealth, for an intelligent man.

[Socrates] Well put, Cephalus, I replied. But concerning this thing you have been talking about—namely, justice—shall we say, without qualification, that it is this? To speak the truth and give back whatever you may owe anyone? Isn't doing these very things sometimes just and sometimes unjust? I mean something like this. If you have a friend who leaves weapons with you, when he is of sound mind, then asks for them back after he goes mad, no one would say that you should give them back, or that someone who did return them was a just man; no more than you would say you should always speak the truth to someone in such a seriously disturbed frame of mind.

QUESTION 10

All of the following, except one, would be responses Cephalus might make to Socrates' argument in passage 8. Which one response is clearly not relevant or appropriate, for purposes of defending Cephalus' account of the value of wealth?

- A) You cannot always buy justice by paying your debts. But sometimes you can. And this is the best use for your money.
- B) Cephalus did not provide a good definition of justice. But that is not what Socrates asked for. Socrates asked what money is good for.
- C) If 'speaking truth and paying one's debts' is not a good definition of justice, then it must be unjust to speak truth and pay one's debts.
- D) Most of the time, the just thing to do is tell the truth and pay your debts. Therefore, on balance, this is the best use for your wealth: to allow you to do these things.
- E) Socrates is arguing that some cases of apparent debt may not amount to true debts. This is no doubt correct, but it is also consistent with the claim that the best use of your money is for paying debts—*true* debts, that is.

Passage 9, from Plato's *Republic*, book I:

Socrates: Then in what joint venture of gold or silver is the just man to be preferred?

Polemarchus: When you want the money to be kept safely in trust. You mean when money is not wanted, but put away somewhere for the time being?

Precisely.

That is to say, justice is useful while the money is useless?

That is the inference.

In the same way, when you want to keep a pruning knife safe, justice is useful to the individual and to the state; but when you want to use it, better call a gardener?

So it seems.

And when you want to keep a shield or lyre safe, not use them, you would say justice is useful; but when you want to use them, a soldier or musician is the man for you?

Necessarily.

And so on and so forth in all other such things; always justice is useful when the things concerned are useless, useless when they are useful?

It would follow.

Justice surely doesn't turn out to be worth much if it's only useful in connection with useless things. But let us consider a further point: isn't it true that the man who is the best at landing punches—in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting—is also best at blocking punches?

Certainly.

He who is best at preventing or curing disease is also best at inducing it?

I think so.

He who is best at securing an army camp is also best at stealing a march on the enemy, regarding all their stratagems and affairs?

Certainly.

Then he who is a good holder of anything is also a good thief of it? That, I suppose, would follow.

Then if the just man is good at holding money, he is good at stealing it. According to our argument, so it would seem.

Then, at the end of it all, the just man has turned out to be a sort of thief. This is a lesson you likely learned from Homer. He had a soft spot for Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, about whom he said:

He exceeded all men in theft and lies.

So you, Homer and Simonides all agree that justice is an art of theft, practiced 'to help friends and harm foes,'—that was what you were saying?

QUESTION 11

Which of the following is/are inconsistent with what Socrates' claims in passage 9?

- A) If something is not being used, it does not follow that it is useless.
- B) If something is not being used, it is presently useless.
- C) If someone is good at stealing, it does not follow that he is a thief.
- D) If someone is good at stealing, it follows that he is a thief.
- E) Both A and C.

Passage 10, from Plato's *Republic*, Book I:

Thrasymachus: You imagine that the shepherds or cowherds are considering the good of the sheep and cattle, and that when they fatten and tend them they are looking out for anything other than their own self-interest or that of their masters. And in particular you imagine that the rulers of states, I mean those who truly rule, think any differently about their subjects than a man about his flock, and that they are looking out for anything but their own interests, day and night. Oh, no, and you are so far off the mark in your ideas of the just and unjust that you don't even realize that justice and the just are literally this: another's advantage—the advantage of the ruler and the stronger, and a source of harm for the subject or servant. And injustice is the opposite; injustice lords it over those who are both simple, in every sense of the word, and just. They, being subjects, do what is to the advantage of the stronger man. They serve him and minister to his pleasure, which is very far from being their own. You must look at the matter, my extraordinarily simple-minded friend, in the following way: the just man is always a loser compared to the unjust man. First, he loses when it comes to private contracts: when a just man has an unjust partner, and the partnership is at an end, you will find that the unjust man walks away with more and the just man gets less. Second, in dealings with the state: when it's time to pay taxes, the just man pays more and the unjust man less on estates of equal value. Likewise, when there is anything to be gotten the one gains nothing, the other much. Look also at what happens when it comes to serving in public office: apart from any other loss, the just man can count on his personal affairs suffering from his neglect, while he, because of his justice, makes no profit from the state. To make matters still worse, he is hated by his friends and associates because he refuses to help them bend and break the law. But the tables are turned in the case of the unjust man. I am speaking, as I have been from the very start, of the man with the power to commit fraud on a massive scale. Consider such a man, then, if you wish to judge for yourself how much more he personally profits by being unjust, rather than just. You'll see what I mean most easily if we turn to that highest form of injustice—the case in which the criminal is the happiest man on earth, and his victims, and those who refuse to commit crimes are the most miserable. In a word, I speak of tyranny, when, by force or fraud, property is stolen from its owners not little by little but wholesale. Everything goes into one bag: sacred things as well as profane—private and public. Were someone to commit these acts on a petty scale and fail to get away with it, he would be severely punished and regarded with the worst kind of contempt. Those who commit such partial forms of injustice are called temple robbers, kidnappers, burglars, con-men and thieves. But if men will go to the additional trouble of relieving their victims of their freedom as well as their property—enslaving the citizens—why, then, far from being called these insulting names they are deemed happy and blessed, not only by their fellow-citizens, but by all who hear that they have ascended to the very pinnacle of perfect injustice. For it is not the fear of *doing* wrong, but of *being a victim* of it, that calls forth people's

denunciations of injustice. Thus, Socrates, injustice, committed on a grand scale, is a stronger, freer, more masterful thing than justice, and—as I declared from the very start—justice is the advantage of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man’s own profit and interest.

QUESTION 12

Judging from passage 10, Thrasymachus would agree with all of the following but one. Which is the one?

- A) There is no such thing as justice.
- B) Injustice is freer than justice.
- C) Rulers are like shepherds, subjects are like sheep.
- D) Ideally, injustice should be pursued on a grand scale.
- E) Injustice means pursuit of self-interest; justice entails its neglect.

QUESTION 13

In passage 10, Thrasymachus offers an explanation of why tyrants are “deemed happy and blessed ... by all who hear that they have ascended to the very pinnacle of perfect injustice.” Which of the following is the best statement of his explanation?

- A) People agree with Thrasymachus that justice is the advantage of the stronger. So they think tyrants are just, hence happy and blessed.
- B) People know tyrants are unjust, but they are afraid to say so.
- C) People are unable to recognize tyrants, because the tyrants use propaganda to convince them that their thefts are really justice.
- D) People do not see the similarity between common thieves and tyrants, so they do not understand that the latter are just stealing on a grand scale.
- E) The people like anything that is done on grand scale.

Passage 11, from Descartes' "First Meditation":

It has been some years since I was for the first time struck by how many falsehoods I had taken for truths when I was very young, and by how doubtful and uncertain everything subsequently based on such questionable material had to be. In this way I came to see the need, once in my life, to demolish all that I had accepted up to that point, and to make a fresh start from the very foundations, if I wanted to achieve anything solid and lasting in the sciences. But the project looked truly enormous, so I waited until I was old and mature enough to be sure there could never be a better time for taking up the task. This led me to put the project off for so long that now I would at fault if, instead of taking it up, I spent what time remains to me in deliberations. So now that my mind is free of all cares, and I have arranged to be left in peaceful solitude, I will apply myself seriously and freely to the general demolition of my beliefs.

To achieve this end it will not be necessary for me to prove that all my beliefs are false, since it might not come to that. Rather, because reason now teaches me that I should be just as careful about withholding assent from uncertain, doubtful things as from patent falsehoods, the least bit of doubt on any point will suffice for complete rejection. And for this it will not be necessary to examine each article individually, which would be an endless task. Once the foundation of a building is undermined, everything above goes with it. So I will go straight for the basic principles underlying all my former beliefs.

Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true and assured I have gotten either from the senses or through the senses.

QUESTION 14

All of the following, except one, are considerations in favor of Descartes undertaking 'the general demolition of his beliefs' in passage 11?

- A) His mind is free of all cares, and he has arranged to be left in peaceful solitude.
- B) He wants to achieve something solid and lasting in the sciences.
- C) He has been struck by how many falsehoods he took for truths when very young.
- D) He can demolish whole classes of beliefs at once, rather than having to examine each belief individually.
- E) Once the foundation of his beliefs is undermined, he will be able to prove that all of his beliefs are false.

Passage 12, from Descartes' "First Meditation:

And how could it be denied that these are my hands, or that this is my body? Unless, perhaps, I were to compare myself to madmen, whose brains are so disordered and clouded by chronic vapors of bile that they staunchly maintain they are kings when they are paupers; that they are dressed in purple and gold when they are naked; or that they have jugs for heads, or bodies made of glass. But these are the insane, and I would think myself just as far gone if I took them as my model, and conducted my life accordingly.

What a brilliant argument! As if I were not a man in the habit of sleeping at night and, while asleep, having the same sorts of experiences madmen do while awake—indeed, sometimes even less probable ones. And how often, asleep at night, have I become convinced of quite ordinary things—that I am here in my dressing-gown, seated by the fire—when in fact I am lying undressed in bed! Yet at the moment I surely see this paper with open eyes; I shake my head and it is not asleep; I deliberately and intentionally stretch out my hand and feel what I feel. None of this would happen with such distinctness to one asleep. As if I did not remember all the times I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep! The more carefully I reflect on all this, the more clearly I see that there are never any sure signs by means of which one can distinguish wakefulness from sleep. As a result, I begin to feel stupefied, and this feeling only reinforces the notion that I may be asleep.

QUESTION 15

What is the most plausible statement of the relevance of the considerations about madness to the considerations about dreaming, in passage 12.

- A) The madness argument shows that the conclusion of the dream argument is correct.
- B) The madness argument shows that the conclusion of the dream argument is incorrect.
- C) The dream argument proves that madness is a form of dreaming.
- D) The dream argument proves that it is not so unreasonable to compare ourselves to madmen.
- E) The dream argument proves that it is unreasonable to compare ourselves to madmen.

Passage 13, from Descartes' "First Meditation":

Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true and assured I have gotten either from the senses or through the senses.

Passage 14, from Descartes' "Second Meditation":

Let us consider those things people commonly think they understand most distinctly of all: namely, those bodies that we touch and see. I do not mean bodies in general - for general perceptions are apt to be somewhat more confused - but one particular body. Let us take, for example, this piece of wax, just come from the comb. It has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey it contained; it retains some of the scent of the flowers from which it was gathered; its color, shape and size are apparent; it is hard, cool and can be readily handled; if you tap it with your knuckle it makes a sound. In short, it has everything which seems necessary to enable a body to be known as distinctly as possible. But see how, even as I speak, I place the wax by the fire: what remained of its taste evaporates, its scent dissipates, its color changes, its shape is lost, its size increases; it becomes liquid and hot; you can hardly touch it, and if you do it no longer makes a sound, But does the same wax remain? It must be granted that it does; no one denies it, no one thinks otherwise. So what was it about the wax that I understood with such distinctness? Evidently none of the features that I gleaned by means of the senses; for whatever had to do with taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has now changed – yet the wax remains.

QUESTION 16

If the claim made in passage 13 is true, what follows about the argument in passage 14?

- A) Nothing.
- B) The conclusion must be false.
- C) The conclusion must be true.
- D) Both A) and B).
- E) Both B) and C).

Passage 15, from Descartes' "Second Meditation:

But what am I to say about this mind, or about myself? For so far I do not admit there is anything else to me except for a mind. What do I say – do I declare – concerning this 'I' which seems to perceive the wax so distinctly? Surely my awareness of my own self is not just much more true and certain than my awareness of the wax, but also much more distinct and evident. For if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I see it, clearly this same fact entails much more evidently that I myself also exist. It is possible that what I see is not really the wax; it is possible that I do not even have eyes with which to see anything. But when I see, or think I see (I am not here distinguishing the two), it is simply not possible that I who am now thinking am not something. By the same token, if I judge that the wax exists, since I can touch it, the same result follows, namely that I exist. If I judge that it exists, since I can imagine it, or for any other reason, exactly the same thing follows. And the result that I have grasped in the case of the wax may be applied to everything else located outside me.

QUESTION 17

Which of the following is the best statement of the conclusion of the argument offered in passage 15?

- A) My mind exists.
- B) The wax exists.
- C) I exist.
- D) I know myself better than I know the wax.
- E) I know the wax better than I know myself.

Passage 16, from Mill's *On Liberty*, chapter 1:

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else.

QUESTION 18

Suppose the government wants to ban violent video games. Four of the following reasons for doing so are clearly inconsistent with Mill's principle, as stated in passage 16. One is potentially consistent with it. Which is the one?

- A) Seeing violence may be harmful to those who chose to play these video games.
- B) The violent acts depicted in these games would be illegal, if committed in real life.
- C) The violent acts depicted in these games would violate Mill's principle, if committed in real life.
- D) Since it is not possible to persuade people not to play these games, it is necessary to ban them.
- E) Violent video games have been demonstrated to cause players to harm others, in real life.

QUESTION 19

Which of the following is the best statement of Mill's principle, as stated in passage 16?

- A) I may only harm anyone to prevent harm to others.
- B) I may only harm anyone to prevent infringements of my liberty.
- C) I may only infringe anyone's liberty to prevent harm to myself or others.
- D) I may only infringe anyone's liberty to prevent harm to that person.
- E) I may only infringe anyone's liberty to prevent loss of liberty to others.

Passage 17, from J.S. Mill, *On Liberty* (p. 278):

The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental or spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest. Though this doctrine is anything but new, and, to some persons, may have the air of a truism, there is no doctrine which stands more directly opposed to the general tendency of existing opinion and practice. Society has expended fully as much effort in the attempt (according to its lights) to compel people to conform to its notions of personal, as of social excellence.

QUESTION 20

All of the following are false statements about passage 17 except one. Which is the one true statement?

- A) Mill asserts that the reason why freedom is good is that it is each individual's right to be free.
- B) Mill asserts that the reason why freedom is good is that greater good for everyone means greater good for every single individual.
- C) Mill asserts that his doctrine of liberty is not new.
- D) Mill asserts that mankind are 'greater gainers' by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.
- E) Mill asserts that the greatest gains for mankind come through the suffering of each individual.

END OF PAPER