

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE

EXAMINATION FOR ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 1

(Semester 1: 2008 - 2009)

PHILOSOPHY

PH1101E/GEM1004 REASON AND PERSUASION

NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2008 - Time Allowed: 2 Hours

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

1. This examination paper contains **TWENTY** questions and comprises **TWENTY-TWO** printed pages.
2. There is only one section to the examination. It is multiple-choice, 20 questions, worth 1 point apiece, for a total of 20 points.
3. Only *Reason and Persuasion: Three Dialogues by Plato* (2nd edition) or the first edition of the module textbook is allowed.
4. This is a **CLOSED BOOK** Examination.

SECTION I**QUESTIONS 1-20; MULTIPLE CHOICE**

1 point for each right answer, for a total of 20 points. No penalty for wrong answers.

Instructions:

A separate bubble form accompanies this question paper. Enter all information and answers on this form in number 2B pencil (not ink). Enter the module code in Section A. Enter and bubble-shade your matriculation number in Section B very carefully. Follow specific instructions in the instruction box on the bubble form. When filling in Section C, take care to bubble-shade answers only for questions 1-20, even though the form has space for answers to 100 questions.

Passage 1, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (119-20)

S: What about your case, Euthyphro? Are you defendant or prosecutor?

E: Prosecutor.

S: Whom do you prosecute?

E: One whom I am thought insane to indict.

S: You're chasing after someone who is sure to get away?

E: Hardly; he is rather old.

S: Who is it?

E: My father.

S: My dear sir! Your own father?

E: Certainly.

S: What is the charge? What is the case about?

E: Murder, Socrates.

S: By Olympus! Certainly most men would not know how to go about a thing like this and end up in the right, Euthyphro. This isn't a thing for just anyone to do. This is a job for one far advanced in wisdom!

E: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, that is so.

S: Is it a case, then, of your father killing another relative? But I suppose

that much is obvious. It wouldn't make sense to prosecute your father for killing a stranger.

E: What makes no sense, Socrates, is for you to think it makes a difference whether the victim is a stranger or a relative. One should only consider whether the killer acted justly or not; if he acted justly, let him alone; if not, prosecute even a killer who shares your hearth and home. You are just as polluted, remaining under the same roof with such a one, when you should be helping yourself and him by leading the way to divine cleanliness and justice.

QUESTION 1

Which of the following is the best statement of why Socrates thinks 'this is a job for one far advanced in wisdom'?

- A) It is always wrong to prosecute your father.
- B) It is never wrong to prosecute your father.
- C) It is not clear how to prosecute your father rightly.
- D) All killings are just.
- E) All killings are unjust.

QUESTION 2

Which of the following is/are consistent with Euthyphro's claims in passage 1?

- A) All killings are unjust.
- B) All killings are just.
- C) Some killings are just.
- D) Some killings are unjust.
- E) Both C and D.

Passage 2, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (122-3):

S: So tell me now, by Zeus, that thing you just said you knew so well: namely what is righteous and unrighteous, regarding murder and everything else. I take it holiness always consists in some one thing, with regard to every action; and unholiness is always the opposite of holiness, and the same as itself. For everything unholy always appears to us in the same form – namely as a form of unholiness.

E: Most certainly, Socrates.

S: Tell me what you say, then; what is holiness and what is unholiness?

E: I say holiness is doing what I do now – namely, prosecuting wrongdoers, whether the crime is murder or temple robbery or anything else, and whether the culprit is your father or mother or anyone else; not to prosecute is unholy. And please note, Socrates, that I can quote the law as a heavy proof this is so. I have already said to others that such actions are proper – not to give way to the ungodly, whoever they may be. These people themselves believe that Zeus is the best and most just of gods; yet they acknowledge that, for the crime of swallowing his own sons, Zeus bound his own father, who in his turn castrated his own father on similar grounds. Yet everyone is mad at me for prosecuting my father for wrongdoing. They hereby contradict themselves in what they claim about the gods and about me.

QUESTION 3

Which of the following is the best statement of the argument given in passage 2 as to why “holiness always consists in some one thing.”?

- A) In order for holy and unholy things to appear always ‘in the same form’, it must consist in some one thing.
- B) The law can be quoted ‘as heavy proof that this is so’. Thus, holiness always consists in some one thing.
- C) Zeus is the holiest of gods, and Zeus always appears as one thing. Thus, holiness always consists in some one thing.
- D) You cannot define ‘holiness’ by means of examples. Therefore, holiness always consists in some one thing.
- E) If holiness consisted of many things, you might be able to define ‘holiness’ by means of examples. But you cannot. Therefore, holiness always consists in some one thing.

QUESTION 4

In the underlined portion of passage 2, Euthyphro makes an argument. Which of the following is the best statement of the conclusion of that argument?

- A) Euthyphro's critics believe that Zeus is the best and most just of gods.
- B) Zeus is the best and most just of gods.
- C) Everyone is mad at Euthyphro.
- D) Euthyphro's critics are guilty of contradicting themselves.
- E) Holiness must always consist in some one thing.

Passage 3, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (129-30):

E: I think, Socrates, that here we have something no god would dispute: whoever kills anyone unjustly must pay the penalty.

S: Well now, Euthyphro, have you ever heard any man arguing that one who has murdered or otherwise acted unjustly should not pay the penalty?

E: There are endless disputes about this sort of thing, both in and out of the courts, because wrongdoers will say and do anything to avoid getting punished.

S: Do they admit they have done wrong, Euthyphro, but maintain that, even so, they should not be punished?

E: No, they don't admit it.

S: So then they don't say or do just anything. For they don't go so far as to admit this, nor do they go so far as to deny they should pay the penalty if they did wrong. But I think they do deny wrong-doing, don't they?

E: That's how it is.

S: Then they don't dispute that wrongdoers must be punished, only who did wrong, what they did, and when.

E: You are right.

QUESTION 5

Which of the following is the best statement of Socrates' point, in passage 3?

- A) Euthyphro is wrong that 'here we have something no god would dispute', for there are endless disputes between mortals about such things. And the gods are like mortals, when it comes to disagreements.
- B) Even if the gods agree that whoever kills anyone unjustly must pay the penalty, this does not help us to resolve practical disputes about guilt and punishment.
- C) If the gods agree that whoever kills anyone unjustly must pay the penalty, this helps us to resolve practical disputes about guilt and punishment only on the assumption that what the gods agree on must be right.
- D) No one ever argues that one who murders or acts unjustly should not pay the penalty.
- E) Since the gods agree that 'whoever kills anyone unjustly must pay the penalty', on one ever argues that one who murders or acts unjustly should not pay the penalty.

Passage 4, from Plato's *Meno*, (154):

M: It's really not that hard to say, Socrates. First, if you want the virtue of a man, it is easy to say that a man's virtue consists in being able to manage public affairs and thereby help his friends and harm his enemies—all the while being careful to come to no harm himself. If you want the virtue of a woman, it's not difficult to describe: she must manage the home well, keep the household together, and be submissive to her husband; the virtue of a child, whether boy or girl, is another thing altogether, and so is that of an elderly man—if you want that—or if you want that of a free man or a slave. There are lots of different virtues, as a result of which it is not at all hard to say what virtue is. There is virtue for every action and every stage in life, for every person and every capacity, Socrates. And the same goes for wickedness.

S: It must be my lucky day, Meno! Here I was, looking for just one virtue, and you happen by with a whole swarm! But, Meno, following up on this figurative swarm of mine, if I were to ask you what is the true nature of the bee, and you said, 'there are all sorts of different sorts of bees,' what would you say if I went on to ask: 'Do you mean that there are all these bees, of every sort, and that they differ from one another insofar as they are bees? Or are they don't differ from one another, insofar as they are bees, but they differ in other respects—in how beautiful they are, for example, or how big, and so on and so forth?' Tell me, what would you answer if I asked you this?

M: I would say that one bee doesn't differ from another from another insofar as they are all bees.

QUESTION 6

In passage 4, Socrates suggests Meno should agree to a certain view of the nature of bees. Complete the following sentence, so it states that view. 'In order to say what makes a bee a bee, it is ...':

- A) Necessary but not sufficient to say how the bee differs from other bees.
- B) Necessary and sufficient to say how the bee differs from other bees.
- C) Not necessary but sufficient to say how the bee differs from other bees.
- D) Neither necessary nor sufficient to say how the bee differs from other bees.
- E) Both B) and D).

Passage 5, from a scholarly discussion of Plato:

In Plato's *Republic*, Polemarchus' claim that being a just person enhances one's life developed quickly into a decidedly metaethical discussion of the origin and nature of justice. Early in Book I, for instance, Thrasymachus defends the idea that justice is whatever is in the interest of the stronger, arguing that morality is a human creation designed by the rich and powerful to control and exploit others. A myth for the weak-minded, arranged for the advantage of a few, justice imposes burdens most have reason to set aside. So Thrasymachus argues. Glaucon follows up, in Book II, with an alternative, less cynical, proposal. While he too sees morality as a human creation, he sees it as a salutary solution to the serious problems we would otherwise face. He argues that people naturally find themselves unable successfully to ensure that their own wills will rule while, simultaneously, being subject regularly to the will of others. The principles of justice are, he thinks, reasonably introduced and enforced by all as a good way to ensure peace and stability in society. Socrates, in contrast, rejects the idea that justice is a human invention and argues instead that justice provides independent and eternal standards against which human practices, conventions, and institutions can be judged. These different views will likely have implications for what value justice might be. At the same time, though, accepting one or the other view of the nature of justice is compatible with a range of substantive views about what, specifically, justice consists in and about its value.

QUESTION 7

Which of the following is/are asserted, or clearly implied, by passage 5?

- A) Thrasymachus and Glaucon agree that morality is a human creation.
- B) What makes Thrasymachus' theory of morality more cynical than Glaucon's is that he sees morality as a means to an end, rather than a good thing in itself.
- C) What makes Thrasymachus' theory of morality different from Glaucon's is that he sees morality as a tool to benefit the rich and powerful, rather than as a tool to ensure human welfare more generally.
- D) Socrates does not agree with Glaucon about the fundamental nature of morality.
- E) All of A, C and D.

Passage 6, from the same scholarly source as Passage 5, continues where 5 leaves off:

... Socrates's position brings along a suite of puzzles concerning the nature of these transcendent standards. What is their origin and from where do they derive their authority?

Many have thought the right answers to these questions are found in an appeal to God. On their view, moral principles are the expression of God's will — they are His commands to us — and they get their authority from their source. In important ways, though, this merely shifts the puzzles back a step. Whatever problems one might have making sense of eternal transcendent standards re-emerge when trying to make sense of an eternal transcendent being who might issue commands. And, as Plato emphasized in *Euthyphro*, one is also left with the difficulty of explaining why God's commands are authoritative.

One plausible answer might be that God's perfect knowledge of right and wrong, or God's own moral perfection, explains why his commands serve legitimately as standards for us. But that answer assumes that standards of morality exist independently of God's will (either as objects of his knowledge or as standards in light of which He counts as morally perfect), in which case speaking of morality as consisting of God's commands will not explain the origin or nature of these independently existing standards.

QUESTION 8

Why does the author of passage 6 assert that Socrates' position (per Passage 5) is problematic, but not assert that Thrasymachus and Polemarchus' positions likewise 'bring along a suite of puzzles concerning the nature of these transcendent standards'?

- A) Glaucon and Thrasymachus do not believe in 'these transcendent standards', hence do not have to explain their nature.
- B) Glaucon and Thrasymachus believe in 'these transcendent standards', whereas Socrates doubts their nature; hence he, not they, owes an account of their nature.
- C) The author already explained, in passage 5, how Glaucon and Thrasymachus account for the nature of 'these transcendent standards'.
- D) Both B and C.
- E) All of A, B and C.

QUESTION 9

The author of passage 6 offers a criticism of the view that “God's perfect knowledge of right and wrong, or God's own moral perfection, explains why his commands serve legitimately as standards for us.” Which of the following is the best statement of that criticism?

- A) The view is not plausible.
- B) The view is merely plausible.
- C) This view assumes that transcendent standards of morality exist, but they may not.
- D) If we cannot understand the nature of transcendent standards of morality, we can hardly appeal to the nature of a transcendent Being to explain them. Transcendence is as puzzling in the one case as the other.
- E) The fact of God's perfect knowledge may explain why we are justified in following His commands, but does not explain the nature or origin of the moral standards He holds us to.

Passage 7, from the same scholarly source as passage 5 & 6, continues where 6 leaves off:

Alternatively, one might eschew an appeal to God's knowledge or goodness and claim that there is no independent standard for God's will and nature. But that leaves in place the puzzle concerning the authority of moral principles. If we reject the idea that God's commands reflect His knowledge of right and wrong, and reject as well the idea that God is all good, it seems reasonable to wonder why his commands have any special authority.

One might here point to God's power to punish or to His role in our creation. But neither consideration seems to establish legitimate authority on its own. In general, at least, the mere fact that one has the power to enforce one's commands does not establish those commands as legitimate, nor does it ensure that one has a right to punish those who fail to conform to one's commands.

QUESTION 10

Which of the following is the best statement of the author's point, in passage 7?

- A) We must appeal to God's knowledge or goodness and claim that there is no independent standard for God's will and nature.
- B) We may appeal to God's knowledge or goodness while claiming that there is no independent standard for God's will and nature.
- C) We must not appeal to God's knowledge or goodness nor claim that there is no independent standard for God's will and nature.
- D) Denying the existence of an independent standard for God's will and nature does not solve the puzzle concerning the authority of moral principles.
- E) Denying the existence of an independent standard for God's will and nature solves the puzzle concerning the authority of moral principles.

Passage 8, from Plato's *Republic*, Book I (256-7)

Cephalus: Wealth goes a long way towards preserving a man from having to lie or defraud anyone. When such a man departs to the world below his money has bought him peace of mind from cares about sacrifices owed to the gods or debts owed to men. And so on balance – weighing all the many benefits wealth may bring – I would say this is the greatest, to anyone with the intelligence to see it is so.

Socrates: Well put, Cephalus, I replied; but concerning this thing you have been talking about – namely, justice – what is it? Just: speak truth and pay one's debts? Isn't there more to it? And isn't doing those things sometimes just, and at other times unjust? Suppose, for example, I have a friend who leaves weapons in my care, when he is of sound mind, and then asks for them back after he has gone insane. Should I give this madman his weapons? No one would say that was the right thing to do, or that someone who did give them back was a just man, any than they would say you should always speak the truth to someone in such a seriously disturbed frame of mind.

You're absolutely right, he replied. But then, I said, 'speaking truth and paying one's debts' is not a correct definition of justice.

QUESTION 11

Which of the following is the best statement of the point Socrates is making in passage 8 by means of his example of the madman who wants his weapons back?

- A) Justice is a matter of speaking truth and paying one's debts.
- B) Madmen should not be permitted to have weapons.
- C) You are not obliged to tell the truth to those who are in a 'seriously disturbed frame of mind'.
- D) Cephalus has not offered a correct definition of justice.
- E) Both C and D.

QUESTION 12

Suppose Cephalus wanted to argue that his concession at the end of passage 8—‘you are absolutely right’—is consistent with what he claimed in the first paragraph of the passage. Which of the following, if true, might help him make that case?

- A) From the fact that you shouldn't give weapons to madmen it does not follow that it is wrong that, on balance, the best use of money is to allow you to speak truth and pay your debts
- B) Admitting you shouldn't give weapons to madmen is inconsistent with maintaining that, on balance, the best use of money is to allow you to speak truth and pay your debts
- C) Cephalus did not offer a definition of justice, so the fact that what he said will not work as a definition of justice does not show that what he said is not true.
- D) Justice is a matter of how money is spent. So any statement of the best use for wealth should also work as a definition of justice.
- E) Both A and C.

Passage 9, from Plato's *Republic*, Book I (275-6):

Then justice, by your argument, is not only obedience to the advantage of the stronger, but also the reverse, what is not to his advantage?

What are you talking about? he asked.

I am only repeating what you said, I think. Here, let's consider: haven't we admitted that the rulers can mistakenly betray their own advantage by making the commands they do, and also that for those who are ruled to obey these commands is justice? Didn't you say as much?

Yes.

Then you have agreed that it is just to do what is to the disadvantage of those who rule and are stronger, whenever the rulers unintentionally command things which are bad for them. For if, as you say, it is just to perform those very things which the rulers command, in that case – O, wisest of men – is there any escape from the conclusion that it is just to do the opposite of what you say? For the weaker are commanded to do what is to the disadvantage of the stronger?

QUESTION 13

Which of the following is the best statement of Socrates' point, in passage 9?

- A) Rulers sometimes do things that are not in their own interest.
- B) If A), then Thrasymachus' account makes incompatible demands.
- C) Thrasymachus' account of justice is false.
- D) It is always just to do the opposite of what Thrasymachus says.
- E) The weaker should do what is to the disadvantage of the stronger.

Passage 10, from Ian Miller, *Eye For An Eye* (chapter 1):

Our word *even* is *jafn* in Old Norse; they are clearly cognate words deriving from the same Germanic root. *Jafn* lies at the core of Norse notions of justice, so that the word for justice is often rendered as evenness ... injustice, as unevenness (*ójafnað*). A bully, a man who shows no justice or equity in his dealings, is an “unevenman” ... A just man, on the other hand, is even, of even temper and fair in his dealings ... Of one such unevenman it is said that “no one got any justice from him, he fought many duels and refused to pay compensation for the men he killed and no one got payment for the wrongs that he did.” It is not that the unevenman in question kills that makes him unjust, but that he kills and then refuses to pay for the damage. Behaving justly means paying for the people you kill, the harms you inflict. Literally paying. Then you are no longer unjust, for you have restored the balance. An even man evens things out. I do not wish to overstate the case. A rich person could not go around killing for the hell of it and then pay compensation and be excused from being blamed for his unevenness, his arrogance, or his bullying. He still had to kill under some reasonable claim of right.

But who gets to set the going price of a corpse? Does our killer give what he thinks is fair? Do the victim’s kin get to name their price? How does the balance get struck? How do we know we are even? ...

In this light consider the word *odd*. The English word *odd* is borrowed from Old Norse. *Odd(i)* is Norse for a point, for a triangle, for a spit of land, and for an arrowhead or spearhead; in other words, *odd* indicates the effect of adding a third point outside the line formed by the two points that determine the line: the *odd* point makes of a line a triangle, an arrowhead, a spearpoint. They also used *odd* to indicate odd numbers, numbers that were not *jafn*. Now the plot thickens. One of the words they used to designate the person who cast a deciding vote in an arbitration panel was *oddman* ... For us, “being at odds” means we are in the midst of a quarrel, and it meant that in Old Norse too; to resolve that quarrel you needed to get back to even. To do that you often had to bring in an *oddman*, a third party, to declare when the balance was even again if the law did not so provide or the parties could not agree among themselves as to how to strike it. You needed *odd* to get even or you would forever be at odds.

With two parties – an even number – the fear was that what you got was what the Greeks called *stasis*, gridlock, a kind of civil war, in which each side overvalues the harms it suffers and undervalues the harms it imposes on others, who think, as many of us do, that getting even means obliterating the other side. You needed an *oddman* to undo *stasis*, not so much to break the tie as to convince each side that they were in fact tied. Or more imaginatively, as any parent with more than one child knows, to convince each child that he actually got the better deal. It was the *oddman*’s job to prevent getting even from getting out of hand by selling both parties on a plausible conception of evenness.

QUESTION 14

In passage 10, Ian Miller makes which of the following claims?

- A) What makes the 'unevenman' a bully—unjust—is that he is violent, a killer.
- B) According to the Norse code of justice, anyone who could afford to pay the price could harm or kill with impunity and yet be an 'evenman'.
- C) The 'oddman' helps to settle the price that will restore evenness.
- D) Since being an 'unevenman' is the same as being an 'oddman', according to the Norse code of justice, only an unjust person—a bully—could enforce justice.
- E) The 'oddman' is like the 'unevenman' only to the extent that he is physically imposing. Violence is needed to combat violence and restore peace.

Passage 11, from a secondary source, discussing Ian Miller's *Eye For An Eye*:

Most ... philosophers who defend retributive theories of punishment ... insist that what they call retribution—giving wrongdoers what they deserve—must be sharply distinguished from such unsavory or even evil practices as revenge or vengeance. They also want to insist, as a point in moral psychology, that the motivation that prompts one toward retribution is a sense of justice, something admirable, whereas the motivation that prompts one toward revenge or vengeance is vindictiveness, something quite vile—some primitive and savage emotion that civilized people have outgrown.

Miller believes that this sharp distinction between retributive justice and revenge cannot be maintained and that those who seek to maintain it have a grossly uninformed view about the nature of revenge—a view they would not have if they actually knew something about revenge cultures instead of starting with a variety of ignorant assumptions about such cultures:

The whole distinction [philosophical literature] mobilizes between retribution and revenge is untenable given any serious account of revenge as actually instituted in revenge cultures. Invariably, revenge is caricatured as a crazy, imbalanced response to injury. No real revenge culture would put up with this kind of revenge for a second. [quote from Miller]

If Miller is correct in expressing doubts about a sharp retribution/revenge distinction (and I think he is) why does the distinction seem so tempting to so many people? I think that the villain here may be the arts (particularly literature and film) and their tendency to portray revenge as dangerous madness. Crazy cases are without doubt the most interesting and gripping, but this hardly makes them paradigms for non-aesthetic purposes.

QUESTION 15

According to the author of passage 11, Ian Miller believes all of the following except one. Which is the one?

- A) Retribution and revenge cannot be sharply distinguished.
- B) Revenge, like retribution, is always a good thing.
- C) Those who seek to distinguish sharply between retribution and revenge are ignorant of the nature of revenge cultures.
- D) Those who say retribution is a good thing, revenge a bad thing, are only considering revenge-gone-bad.
- E) Those who say revenge is a bad thing regard it as primitive and savage.

QUESTION 16

Which of the following is the best statement of the point of the last paragraph of passage 11?

- A) It is doubtful that a sharp distinction between retribution and revenge can be maintained, because the villain here is probably the arts. But it is impossible to take revenge against the arts.
- B) The arts are a form of madness, hence artistic works tend to present us with 'crazy cases'.
- C) 'Crazy cases' are without doubt the most interesting and gripping.
- D) 'Crazy cases' are not paradigms for non-aesthetic purposes.
- E) The arts may have caused people to have unrealistic notions about the nature of revenge.

Passage 12, from Martha Nussbaum's essay, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism":

We recognize moral obligations to the rest of the world that are real, and that otherwise would go unrecognized. What are Americans to make of the fact that the high living standard we enjoy is one that very likely cannot be universalized, at least given the present costs of pollution controls and the present economic situation of developing nations, without ecological disaster? If we take Kantian morality at all seriously, as we should, we need to educate our children to be troubled by this fact. Otherwise we are educating a nation of moral hypocrites, who talk the language of universalizability but whose universe has a self-servingly narrow scope.

This point may appear to presuppose universalism, rather than being an argument in its favor. But here one may note that the values on which Americans may most justly pride themselves are, in a deep sense, Stoic values: respect for human dignity and the opportunity for each person to pursue happiness. If we really do believe that all human beings are created equal and endowed with certain inalienable rights, we are morally required to think about what that conception requires us to do with and for the rest of the world.

QUESTION 17

Which of the following is the best statement of why (per the underlined portion of passage 12, Nussbaum thinks the point she makes does not merely presuppose, but is an argument for, universalism? (The author is an American, addressing an American audience.)

- A) The high living standard we enjoy is one that very likely cannot be universalized. But we want to universalize it. Therefore we should be universalists.
- B) Unless we are universalists, we face ecological disaster. We don't want disaster, so we should be universalists.
- C) We should take Kantian morality seriously. Since Kant is a universalist, we should take universalism seriously.
- D) Recognition of real moral obligations to the rest of the world only presupposes basic commitments to equality and rights. Universalism follows from those commitments.
- E) If we believe in universalism, it would be hypocritical not to accept Stoic values of equality and inalienable rights. But we may not see that their universalism commits them to this Stoicism.

Passage 13, from our textbook, Chapter 2 (15-16):

Socrates' negative questioning method is called *elenchus*, which just means *refutation* ... You ask a question. You get an answer. You ask a follow-up. You get another answer. Eventually you have the makings of a contradiction and you hang your debating partner from that hook. His friends laugh at him, perhaps, and you have taken one more step towards unpopularity. For example, in *Euthyphro* the priest wants to maintain the following:

- 1) What the gods love is holy. What they hate is unholy.
- 2) Different gods love and hate different things.
- 3) Nothing can be both holy and unholy.

Lay them out like that and it's obvious: they don't fit. The truth of 1 plus 2 implies the falsehood of 3. (Zeus loves what you are doing, so it is holy. Kronos hates it, so it is unholy. So it is holy *and* unholy.) Logicians say: 1-3 is an inconsistent set. But how does the discovery that your beliefs are inconsistent help you become wiser?

You wise up by clearing up the contradiction, obviously.

But how do you do *that*?

Euthyphro decides he wants to hold onto 3, so he tries to modify 1 and 2. But he could have gone the other way. In general, how can you know you haven't dropped the *true* and kept the *false*. It is easy to form a consistent set of false propositions. No contradiction is implied. All the pieces fit, but the picture they show isn't *true*. It seems the only way to use *elenchus* as a method for becoming wise—for attaining knowledge of anything—is by having at least some knowledge to begin with. Some touchstone of truth. Some secure point you can build out from, testing other beliefs as you go.

QUESTION 18

Which of the following is the best statement of the point the author is making in passage 13?

- A) The way to become wise is to clear up contradictions. *Elenchus* clears up contradictions. Therefore, *elenchus* should make us wise.
- B) The way to clear up contradictions is to employ *elenchus*. Socrates clears up contradictions. Therefore, Socrates employs *elenchus*.
- C) It is easy to form a consistent set of false propositions. Therefore, it is likely that we believe consistent sets of false propositions.
- D) *Elenchus* only tests for consistency. If we want the truth, we need something more than *elenchus*.
- E) At least one of Euthyphro's beliefs must be false, because they form an inconsistent set.

Passage 14, continuing on from passage 13:

Let's consider the matter practically, in terms of what has come to be known as 'the Socratic method': *teaching by questioning*. Teachers who employ this method do not lecture but ask questions, which the students must answer. Pedagogically, the idea is that students won't understand why right answers *are* right except by seeing what is wrong with what they were first inclined to say. This approach corresponds, roughly, to Socrates' method of roughing up his fellow citizens, when they get puffed up with a sense of wisdom. But there is a difference. A teacher who conducts her class this way had better know better than her students. Teachers who set questions like traps along wrong paths, or trail them like breadcrumbs along more promising ones, had better know which is which. You don't teach by asking questions at random. For their part, the students need to have some notion of what the subject is about, as opposed to having no notion whatsoever. They need to have ideas bad enough that they stand in need of being taught, not so bad that they are unteachable. You can't pull anything out of a truly empty head. The students' beliefs need to touch down on the truth, need to be half-right to start with. The teacher must recognize this point of promising contact, firm it up, expand it.

A Socratic teaching style straddles right and wrong (better and worse) ways of thinking in specific and often delicate ways.

It isn't exactly *easy* to teach this way.

So who does *Socrates*—this man of no special wisdom—think he is, employing such a delicate method?

QUESTION 19

The underlined portion of passage 14 asserts that 'there is a difference' What is the difference, according to the passage?

- A) Socrates lacks any 'special wisdom'.
- B) Socrates' methods are the same as those employed by teachers today.
- C) Modern teachers who employ the Socratic method are 'roughing up' their students, who are too 'puffed up with a sense of wisdom'.
- D) Modern teachers who employ the Socratic method are not 'roughing up' their students, who are too 'puffed up with a sense of wisdom'.
- E) The method that Socrates employed was 'specific and often delicate' in ways that the methods of modern teachers who use the Socratic method are not.

Passage 15, from a textbook on psychology:

A question often asked in beginning philosophy classes is this: If a tree falls in the forest but nobody hears it, is there a sound? The answer is now clear: No. Sound is caused by waves of molecules (a physical event), but the waves themselves are not sound. Sound is a psychological event and hence depends on a nervous system to transduce the physical energy of the waves to nerve impulses. Without a brain to register the transduced physical energy, there can be no sound. The situation is exactly analogous to the relationships of wavelength to hue and of amplitude to lightness. Physical properties lead to psychological events, but they are not the events themselves. The discipline of psychophysics charts the relationship between physical events and our experiences of them.

Passage 16, from a philosophical discussion of these issues:

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.

QUESTION 20

The author of passage 16 might respond to passage 15 in a number of ways. One of the following responses to passage 15 would be inconsistent with the claims of passage 16. Which one?

- A) There is no such thing as ‘the discipline of psychophysics’, because we have no good idea as to why there is any relationship between physical events and experiences at all. You cannot study what you do not understand in the least.
- B) There must be a ‘discipline of psychophysics’, at least potentially, because experience has a physical basis, and we have a disciplined understanding of physics.
- C) If a tree falls in a forest, and no one is there to hear it, we should say there is sound, because ‘sound’ should be a term for certain sorts of physical wave-events, distinct from the *experience* of sound.
- D) If a tree falls in a forest, and no one is there to hear it, we should say there is no sound, because ‘sound’ should be a term for certain sorts of *experiences*, distinct from physical wave-events.
- E) None of A-D would be inconsistent with the claims of passage 15.

END OF PAPER