

**SECTION I****QUESTIONS 1-21; MULTIPLE CHOICE**

1 point for each right answer, for a total of 21 points. No penalty for wrong answers.

**Instructions:**

A separate bubble form accompanies this question paper. Enter all information and answers on this form in number 2B pencil (not ink). Enter the module code in Section A. Enter and bubble-shade your matriculation number in Section B very carefully. Follow specific instructions in the instruction box on the bubble form. When filling in Section C, take care to bubble-shade answers only for questions 1-21, even though the form has space for answers to 100 questions.

Passage 1, from Plato's "Euthyphro" (PDF, p. 11):

Socrates: Pull yourself together, my good man, because the thing I'm saying is not that hard to grasp. I am saying the opposite of what that poet said, who wrote: 'you do not wish to name Zeus, who has done it, and who made all things grow, for where there is fear there is also shame.' I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you why?

Euthyphro: Please do.

S: I don't think that 'where there is fear there is also shame,' for I think many people who fear disease and poverty and many other things feel fear but are not ashamed of what they fear. Don't you agree?

E: I do indeed.

S: But where there is shame there is also fear. For is there anyone who, when ashamed and embarrassed about anything, does not at the same time fear and dread a reputation for wickedness?






E: He is certainly afraid.

S: Then it isn't right to say, 'where there is fear there is also shame,' rather that where there is shame there is also fear, because fear covers a larger area than shame. Shame is part of fear's domain just as odd is part of the domain of number – from which it follows that it isn't true that where there is number there is also oddness, rather that where there is the oddness there is also number. Do you follow me now?

E: Absolutely.





**QUESTION 1**

Which one of the following schemes correctly represents the necessary relationship between the domains of shame and fear, according to Socrates in passage 1?



**QUESTION 2**

Which one of the following schemes correctly represents the necessary relationship between the domains of shame and fear, according to the poet Socrates quotes in passage 1?



**QUESTION 3**

Which of the following, if it were the case, would be a counter-example to Socrates' claim concerning the necessary relationship between fear and shame in passage 1.

- A) Lee is afraid of spiders and ashamed to tell anyone he is afraid of spiders.
- B) Lee is afraid of spiders but not ashamed to tell anyone he is afraid of spiders.
- C) Lee is ashamed of his fear of spiders, and afraid others will find out about his fear.
- D) Lee is ashamed of his fear of spiders, but not afraid others will find out about his fear.
- E) Lee is not ashamed of spiders, but is fearful others will fear he is ashamed of spiders.

Passage 2, from Plato's "Meno" (PDF, p. 2)

Socrates: Meno, by the gods, what do you yourself say virtue is? ...

Meno: It's really not that hard to say, Socrates. First, if you want the virtue of a man, it is easy to say that a man's virtue consists in being able to manage public affairs and thereby help his friends and harm his enemies – all the while being careful to come to no harm himself. If you want the virtue of a woman, it's not difficult to describe: she must manage the home well, keep the household together, and be submissive to her husband; the virtue of a child, whether boy or girl, is another thing altogether, and so is that of an elderly man – if you want that – or if you want that of a free man or a slave. There are lots of different virtues, as a result of which it is not at all hard to say what virtue is. There is virtue for every action and every stage in life, for every person and every capacity,

Socrates. And the same goes for wickedness.

S: It must be my lucky day, Meno! Here I was, looking for just one virtue, and you happen by with a whole swarm! But, Meno, following up on this figurative swarm of mine, if I were to ask you what sort of being a bee is, and you said, 'there are all sorts of different sorts of bees,' what would you say if I went on to ask: 'Do you mean that there are all sorts of different sorts of bees insofar as they are bees? Or are they no different, insofar as they are bees, but they differ in other respects – in how beautiful they are, for example, or how big, and so on and so forth?' Tell me, what would you answer if I asked you this?

M: I would say that they do not differ from one another insofar as they are all bees.

S: What if I went on to say: 'Tell me Meno, what is this thing that they all share, with respect to which they are all the same?' Would you be able to tell me?

M: I would.

**QUESTION 4**

On the basis of passage 2, which of the following is it reasonable to suppose Socrates accepts as true?

- A) There cannot be different sorts of bees, since they are all the same sort of thing, namely, bees.
- B) Even if there are different sorts of bees, any definition of what bees are should focus on what they all have in common.
- C) There cannot be many different sorts of virtue, since there must be something that all virtuous things have in common.
- D) Even if there are different sorts of virtue, any definition of what virtue is should focus on what they all have in common.
- E) Both B and D.

Passage 3, from a scholarly discussion of the end of passage 4; Meno's assertion that he could, if asked, define 'bee'.

He could perhaps. But some doubt is permitted on this point. To tell what is common to all bees and, by the same token, what differentiates all bees from everything else, that is, to "define" what "bee" is, is not an easy task. Quite apart from the difficulty that "queens" and "drones" pose in this case, such "defining" presupposes the agreed acceptance of a much larger frame within which the defining takes place - as all known classifications of living beings show - and ultimately perhaps agreement on the structure of the entire universe. Does Socrates want us to understand the immensity of the problem by picking bees as an example? The difficulty of defining is hardly lessened in the case of "human excellence." Meno, apparently misled by Socrates' taunting question about so "trivial" an example, is probably guilty of too great a rashness in letting Socrates have his way. We should be on our guard.

**QUESTION 5**

The author of passage 3 advances all of the following claims except one. Which is the one he does not make?

- A) The existence of queens and drones does not make defining "bee" harder.
- B) It is only possible to define "bee" against the backdrop of a larger framework for classifying living beings.
- C) It may not be possible to define "bee" without having a settled view of the structure of the entire universe.
- D) Meno might be able to define "bee".
- E) Meno might not be able to define "bee".

Passage 4, from Plato's "Meno" (PDF, p. 27). Anytus has just declared Athens is full of virtuous men. Therefore a young man who wishes to learn virtue has lots of potential teachers to choose from.

Socrates: And have these good men – and true – become virtuous automatically, without taking instruction from anyone, and are they able to instruct others in this thing they themselves never studied?

Anytus: I believe these men have learned at the feet of other good men before them; or don't you think that there are many good men to be found in our city?

S: I believe, Anytus, that there are many men here who are good and handling public affairs, and that there have been many more just like them in the past. But have they been good teachers of this virtue of theirs? That is the point under consideration, not whether or not there are good men here, nor whether there have been in the past. Instead, we have been investigating for some time whether virtue can be taught. Pursuing that investigation we now inquire whether the good men of today, and of the past, knew how to pass on their virtue to others, or, on the other hand, whether a man cannot impart virtue or get it from someone else. This is what Meno and I have been investigating for some time. Look at it this way, from what you yourself have said. Would you not say that Themistocles was a good man?

A: Yes. One of the very best.

S: He would have been a good teacher of his virtue, if anyone was?

A: I think so, if he wanted to be.

S: But do you think he did not want other citizens to be good men and true, especially his own son? Can you seriously think he begrudged this to his son, deliberately not passing on his own virtue? Haven't you heard that Themistocles taught his son, Cleophantus, to be a good horseman? He could stand upright on horseback and shoot javelins from there and do many other remarkable things – all skills his father had taught to him, all requiring good teachers. Haven't you heard about this from your elders?

A: I have.

S: So you couldn't say the son lacked virtue because he lacked natural aptitude altogether?

A: Perhaps not.

S: But have you ever heard anyone, young or old, say that Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, was accomplished and good at the same pursuits as his father?

A: Never.

S: Are we supposed to believe he wanted to educate his son well, except when it came to that wisdom he himself possessed, in which his son was to be no better than his neighbors – still assuming that virtue can be taught?

A: Perhaps not, by Zeus.

**QUESTION 6**

All of the following, except one, are true statements about passage 4. Which one of the following statements about Socrates' argument in passage 4 is false?

- A) Socrates' argument aims to cast doubt on the proposition that virtue is teachable.
- B) Socrates argument aims to show that, if virtue is teachable, it will be teachable by the virtuous.
- C) Socrates assumes that, if virtue is teachable, it will be teachable by the virtuous.
- D) Socrates does not consider the possibility that virtue might be teachable, yet a particular student might lack natural aptitude for it, even if that student has natural aptitude for riding horseback, throwing javelins, etc.
- E) Socrates claims that Themistocles' son was no more virtuous than his neighbors.

Passage 5, from Plato's "Republic", (PDF, p. 4)

Cephalus: Wealth goes a long way towards preserving a man from having to lie or defraud anyone. When such a man departs to the world below his money has bought him peace of mind from cares about sacrifices owed to the gods or debts owed to men. And so on balance – weighing all the many benefits wealth may bring – I would say this is the greatest, to anyone with the intelligence to see it is so.

Socrates: Well put, Cephalus, I replied; but concerning this thing you have been talking about – namely, justice – what is it? Just: speak truth and pay one's debts? Isn't there more to it? And isn't doing those things sometimes just, and at other times unjust? Suppose, for example, I have a friend who leaves weapons in my care, when he is of sound mind, and then asks for them back after he has gone insane. Should I give this madman his weapons? No one would say that was the right thing to do, or that someone who did give them back was a just man, any than they would say you should always speak the truth to someone in such a seriously disturbed frame of mind.

You're absolutely right, he replied.

But then, I said, 'speaking truth and paying one's debts' is not a correct definition of justice.

#### QUESTION 7

Suppose we read Socrates as attempting to refute Cephalus' account of the value of wealth, in passage 5. All of the following, except one, would be responses Cephalus could plausibly make. Which one response is clearly NOT appropriate, for purposes of defending Cephalus' account of the value of wealth?

- A) Until Socrates comes up with an example of a better use for wealth, Cephalus can coherently maintain the best use for it, on balance, is to "preserve a man from having to lie or defraud anyone".
- B) From the fact that 'speak truth and pay one's debts' is not a correct definition of justice, it does not follow that speaking truth and paying one's debts is not generally the best thing that money allows you to do.
- C) If 'speaking truth and paying one's debts' is not a good definition of justice, then it must be unjust to speak truth and pay one's debts.
- D) Justice is not just a matter of how you spend your money. So there is no reason to suppose an account of how to use your wealth justly will amount to a definition of 'justice'.
- E) Cases like the one Socrates imagines are unusual. Most of the time, the just thing to do is tell the truth and pay your debts. Therefore, on balance, this is the best use for your wealth: to allow you to do these things.

Passage 6, from a scholarly discussion of passage 5:

It is sometimes objected that Cephalus did not intend to define justice or say what it is: Socrates has picked on his stray remarks and unfairly elevated them into a definition. No doubt Cephalus did not intend to 'define' justice, but it is clear that on his conception, justice can be no more than the performance of a list of duties, and Socrates is forcing him to recognize this, and to see that this cannot be right. In fact I do not think that it is useful to discuss the argument in terms of 'definitions'. There is no harm in using the word as long as it is taken to mean something like an account of what justice is, not to be a precise piece of philosophical terminology. Plato does sometimes take an interest in definitions (in the *Meno*, for example) but it is wrong to think of him as being obsessed with what we would call a search for definitions. Questions about definitions are for us questions about the meaning of words. But Plato's general enterprise of asking what justice, or courage, or whatever, is, does not fit well with the mould of asking about words. He is not interested in examining how most people use the word - no doubt most people would agree with Cephalus, and the question is whether they are right. Nor is he interested in stipulating his own meaning for 'justice' - that would lack point in a discussion which is to keep contact with the original moral dilemma. But if he is not concerned with words in these ways, then it seems as though he must, somehow, be concerned with 'things'; and it is often said that he is trying to produce a 'real definition', which is a definition but somehow defines a thing. Not surprisingly, this has been found mysterious.

#### QUESTION 8

Which of the following best states the author's attitude towards the objection described in the first [underlined] sentence of passage 6?

- A) The objection may be valid.
- B) The objection is valid.
- C) The objection may be invalid.
- D) The objection is invalid.
- E) It is impossible to determine whether the objection is valid or invalid.

**QUESTION 9**

What evidence or argument does the author of passage 6 offer, suggesting it may not be appropriate to treat Plato's investigation of justice as a search for a definition of the word 'justice'.

- A) The author offers no argument for this claim.
- B) A definition may be stipulated, but Socrates is not interested in merely stipulating how the word 'justice' is used.
- C) A definition may simply express how most people use a word like 'justice'. But Socrates would want to know, further, whether most people are right.
- D) If Socrates is interested in defining 'justice', then Socrates' attack on Cephalus would be unfair. But it is absurd to think Cephalus is a better philosopher than Socrates.
- E) Both B and C.

Passage 7, from Plato's *Republic*, Book I, (PDF, p. 5):

Socrates: What it is that Simonides had to say about justice that you feel is correct?

Polemarchus: He said that to give back what is owed to each person is just. I think he's right about that.

S: I wouldn't want to doubt the word of a wise and godlike man like Simonides, but his meaning – though maybe it's clear to you – is far from clear to me. To go back to what we were just saying, of course he doesn't mean that I should return weapons to a man who is out of his mind; and yet a thing held in trust is a sort of debt owed.

P: True.

S: But when the madman wants his weapons, I am not going to give them to him?

P: Certainly not.

S: When Simonides said justice was the repayment of what is owed, he meant something different from this sort of case?

P: Something very different, by Zeus; for he thinks that a friend ought to do good to a friend, never evil.

**QUESTION 10**

In passage 7, Socrates brings up the hypothetical case of the madman who wants his weapons back in order to:

- A) Prove that Simonides is committed to the view that justice requires giving the madman back his weapons.
- B) Determine whether Polemarchus agrees with Simonides about justice.
- C) Convince Polemarchus to agree with Simonides about justice.
- D) Clarify the meaning of Simonides' statement concerning justice.
- E) Both C and D.

Passage 8, from Descartes' "First Meditation" (PDF, p. 1):

Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true and assured I have gotten either from the senses or through the senses.

Passage 9, from Descartes' "Second Meditation" (PDF, p. 5)

Let us consider those things people commonly think they understand most distinctly of all: namely, those bodies that we touch and see. I do not mean bodies in general - for general perceptions are apt to be somewhat more confused - but one particular body. Let us take, for example, this piece of wax, just come from the comb. It has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey it contained; it retains some of the scent of the flowers from which it was gathered; its color, shape and size are apparent; it is hard, cool and can be readily handled; if you tap it with your knuckle it makes a sound. In short, it has everything which seems necessary to enable a body to be known as distinctly as possible. But see how, even as I speak, I place the wax by the fire: what remained of its taste evaporates, its scent dissipates, its color changes, its shape is lost, its size increases; it becomes liquid and hot; you can hardly touch it, and if you do it no longer makes a sound, But does the same wax remain? It must be granted that it does; no one denies it, no one thinks otherwise. So what was it about the wax that I understood with such distinctness? Evidently none of the features that I gleaned by means of the senses; for whatever had to do with taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has now changed – yet the wax remains.

#### **QUESTION 11**

If the claim made in passage 8 is true, what follows about the argument in passage 9?

- A) Nothing.
- B) The conclusion must be false.
- C) The conclusion must be true.
- D) Both A) and B).
- E) Both B) and C).

Passage 10, from Descartes' "First Meditation" (PDF, p. 1):

It has been some years since I was for the first time struck by how many falsehoods I had taken for truths when I was very young, and by how doubtful and uncertain everything subsequently based on such questionable material had to be. In this way I came to see the need, once in my life, to demolish all that I had accepted up to that point, and to make a fresh start from the very foundations, if I wanted to achieve anything solid and lasting in the sciences. But the project looked truly enormous, so I waited until I was old and mature enough to be sure there could never be a better time for taking up the task. This led me to put the project off for so long that now I would at fault if, instead of taking it up, I spent what time remains to me in deliberations. So now that my mind is free of all cares, and I have arranged to be left in peaceful solitude, I will apply myself seriously and freely to the general demolition of my beliefs.

To achieve this end it will not be necessary for me to prove that all my beliefs are false, since it might not come to that. Rather, because reason now teaches me that I should be just as careful about withholding assent from uncertain, doubtful things as from patent falsehoods, the least bit of doubt on any point will suffice for complete rejection.

#### QUESTION 12

1. All of the following statements about passage 10 are false except one. Which one is true?

A) Descartes suspects that all his beliefs are in fact false, but admits he may not be able to prove it.

B) Descartes suspects that all his beliefs are in fact false. He may not be able to prove it, but he thinks the demolition of all his beliefs does not require proof.

C) Descartes suspects that all his beliefs are in fact false, and will at least attempt to prove it.

D) Descartes' method cannot lead to the 'demolition' of any true beliefs.

E) Descartes method may lead to the 'demolition' of true beliefs.

Passage 11, from a scholarly commentary on passage 10:

The method of doubting everything, until one reaches, if one can, something that cannot be doubted, is presented as a strategy, as a systematic way of achieving something which is Descartes' basic aim: this is to discover the truth. It is clear from both these passages, and from their brevity, that he regards this strategy as straightforwardly and obviously the rational course to adopt if truth, and nothing but the truth, is to be his aim. But it is surely far from obvious: we constantly want the truth about various matters, but hardly ever demand the indubitable. The first question, then, is what reason Descartes has for regarding this unobvious strategy as straightforwardly the rational course.

### **QUESTION 13**

The author of passage 11 makes all the following claims except one. Which one claim is not made in passage 11?

- A) Descartes' strategy of doubt aims at discovering truth.
- B) The fact that Descartes sketches his strategy so briefly suggests he finds it obviously reasonable.
- C) Descartes presents as obviously reasonable a strategy that is not obviously reasonable.
- D) It is not obvious why discovering indubitable truths should be an aim that rationally overrides all others.
- E) It is not obvious that Descartes' strategy can be carried out in practice.

Passage 12, from J. S. Mill, *On Liberty*, chapter 1 (PDF, p. 4):

Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant – society collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it – its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.

#### QUESTION 14

Which of the following claims does Mill advance in passage 12:

- A) The political ‘tyranny of the magistrate’ is more oppressive than social ‘tyranny of prevailing opinion and feeling’.
- B) The social ‘tyranny of prevailing opinion and feeling’ is more oppressive than the political ‘tyranny of the magistrate’.
- C) The political ‘tyranny of the magistrate’ is more readily acknowledged to be a danger than is social ‘tyranny of prevailing opinion and feeling’.
- D) The social ‘tyranny of prevailing opinion and feeling’ is readily acknowledged to be a danger than is the political ‘tyranny of the magistrate’.
- E) Both C & D.

Passage 13, from Mill's *On Liberty*, chapter 1, (PDF, p. 5):

Some rules of conduct ... must be imposed, by law in the first place, and by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law. What these rules should be, is the principal question in human affairs; but if we except a few of the most obvious cases, it is one of those which least progress has been made in resolving. No two ages, and scarcely any two countries, have decided it alike; and the decision of one age or country is a wonder to another. Yet the people of any given age and country no more suspect any difficulty in it, than if it were a subject on which mankind had always been agreed. The rules which obtain among themselves appear to them self-evident and self-justifying. This all but universal illusion is one of the examples of the magical influence of custom, which is not only, as the proverb says a second nature, but is continually mistaken for the first. The effect of custom, in preventing any misgiving respecting the rules of conduct which mankind impose on one another, is all the more complete because the subject is one on which it is not generally considered necessary that reasons should be given, either by one person to others, or by each to himself. People are accustomed to believe and have been encouraged in the belief by some who aspire to the character of philosophers, that their feelings, on subjects of this nature, are better than reasons, and render reasons unnecessary. The practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of human conduct, is the feeling in each person's mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would like them to act. No one, indeed, acknowledges to himself that his standard of judgment is his own liking; but an opinion on a point of conduct, not supported by reasons, can only count as one person's preference; and if the reasons, when given, are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many people's liking instead of one.

### QUESTION 15

In passage 13, what "all but universal illusion" [see first underlined bit] does Mill term 'magical'?

- A) The false appearance that custom exists, even though it is unnatural.
- B) The false appearance that custom acts "on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law."
- C) The false appearance that custom properly acts on "on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law."
- D) The false appearance that all other people, in other times and places, have upheld the same rules of conduct as ourselves
- E) The false appearance that our own rules of conduct are self-evident, even though it should be obvious there are reasons to doubt this.

**QUESTION 16**

In passage 13, what reason does Mill give for denying that “feelings, on subjects of this nature, are better than reasons” [see second underlined bit]?

- A) We do not necessarily have feelings on subjects of this nature.
- B) Feelings are of no value, regarding subjects of this nature.
- C) Everyone feels the same, so feelings cannot explain disagreements on subjects of this nature.
- D) In effect, those who assert this want to set their personal preferences over others’, which is unwarranted.
- E) Both B and C.

Passage 14, from Mill’s *On Liberty*, chapter 1 (PDF, p. 9):

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

**QUESTION 17**

Which of the following is the best short statement of Mill’s principle, as articulated in passage 14?

- A) I may only harm anyone to prevent infringements of my liberty.
- B) I may only harm anyone to prevent harm to others.
- C) I may only infringe anyone’s liberty to prevent harm to myself or others.
- D) I may only infringe anyone’s liberty to prevent harm to that person.
- E) I may only infringe anyone’s liberty to prevent loss of liberty to others.

Passage 15, from a critical commentary on passage 14, from Mill's *On Liberty*:

There is hardly anything in the whole essay which can properly be called proof as distinguished from enunciation or assertion of the general principle [in passage 14]. I think, however, that it will not be difficult to show that the principle stands in much need of proof. In order to make this clear it will be desirable in the first place to point out the meaning of the word liberty according to principles which I think are common to Mr. Mill and to myself. I do not think Mr. Mill would dispute the following statement of the theory of human actions. All voluntary acts are caused by motives. All motives may be placed in one of two categories – hope and fear, pleasure and pain. Voluntary acts of which hope is the motive are said to be free. Voluntary acts of which fear is the motive are said to be done under compulsion, or omitted under restraint. A woman marries. This in every case is a voluntary action. If she regards the marriage with the ordinary feelings and acts from the ordinary motives, she is said to act freely. If she regards it as a necessity, to which she submits in order to avoid greater evil, she is said to act under compulsion and not freely.

If this is the true theory of liberty – and, though many persons would deny this, I do not think Mr. Mill would – the propositions already stated will in a condensed form amount to this: "No one is ever justified in trying to affect any one's conduct by exciting his fears, except for the sake of self-protection;" or, making another substitution which he would also approve – "It can never promote the general happiness of mankind that the conduct of any persons should be affected by an appeal to their fears, except in the cases excepted."

Surely these are not assertions which can be regarded as self-evident, or even as otherwise than paradoxical.

**QUESTION 18**

All of the following are true statements about passage 15, except one. Which one is not true?

- A) The author claims Mill offers no proof of his principle, but proof is needed because the principle is not self-evident.
- B) The author implies that Mill's principle commits him to the view that it is illegitimate to play on people's fears, even in cases where doing so seems perfectly appropriate.
- C) The author claims that all voluntary acts are caused by motives.
- D) The author argues that Mill's principle has apparently paradoxical consequences.
- E) The author claims that Mill's principle is false.

Passage 16, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty":

I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or it may be, enslaved. Coercion is not, however, a term that covers every form of inability. If I say that I am unable to jump more than ten feet in the air, or cannot read because I am blind ... it would be eccentric to say that I am to that degree enslaved or coerced. Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act. You lack political liberty or freedom only if you are prevented from attaining a goal by human beings. Mere incapacity to attain a goal is not lack of political freedom. This is brought out by the use of such modern expressions as 'economic freedom' and its counterpart, 'economic slavery'. It is argued, very plausibly, that if a man is too poor to afford something on which there is no legal ban – a loaf of bread, a journey round the world, recourse to the law courts – he is as little free to have it as he would be if it were forbidden him by law. If my poverty were a kind of disease which prevented me from buying bread, or paying for the journey round the world or getting my case heard, as lameness prevents me from running, this inability would not naturally be described as a lack of freedom, least of all political freedom. It is only because I believe that my inability to get a given thing is due to the fact that other human beings have made arrangements whereby I am, whereas others are not, prevented from having enough money with which to pay for it, that I think myself a victim of coercion or slavery. In other words, this use of the term depends on a particular social and economic theory about the causes of my poverty or weakness. If my lack of material means is due to my lack of mental or physical capacity, then I begin to speak of being deprived of freedom (and not simply about poverty) only if I accept the theory.

**QUESTION 19**

What is the difference between the account of 'political liberty' Isaiah Berlin lays out in passage 16 and the 'theory of liberty' assumed in passage 15:

- A) There is no difference.
- B) 16 applies only to politics, 15 applies generally.
- B) 16 says lack of freedom is a function of deliberate interference; 15 says lack of freedom is a function of motive.
- D) 16 says lack of freedom is a function of physical incapacity; 15 says lack of freedom as a function of motive.
- E) 16 says lack of freedom is a function of deliberate interference; 15 says lack of freedom is a function of physical incapacity.

Passage 17, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty":

Mill confuses two distinct notions. One is that all coercion is, in so far as it frustrates human desires, bad as such, although it may have to be applied to prevent other, greater evils; while non-interference, which is the opposite of coercion, is good as such, although it is not the only good. The other is that men should seek to discover the truth, or to develop a certain type of character of which Mill approved – critical, original, imaginative, independent, non-conforming to the point of eccentricity, and so on – and that truth can be found, and such character can be bred, only in conditions of freedom. Both these are liberal views, but they are not identical, and the connection between them is, at best, empirical. No one would argue that truth or freedom of self-expression could flourish where dogma crushes all thought. But the evidence of history tends to show ... that integrity, love of truth and fiery individualism grow at least as often in severely disciplined communities, among, for example, the puritan Calvinists of Scotland or New England, or under military discipline, as in more tolerant or indifferent societies; and if this is so, Mill's argument for liberty as a necessary condition for the growth of human genius falls to the ground.

**QUESTION 20**

Which of the following is the best statement of Berlin's criticism of Mill in passage 17:

- A) Mill conflates the harm of frustrated human desire with the harm of "other, greater evils".
- B) Mill conflates the value of truth discovery and the value of character development
- C) Mill conflates the value of freedom and the value of non-conformity.
- D) Mill conflates illegitimate coercion and principled infringements of liberty to prevent harm.
- E) Mill conflates a defense of liberty as inherently good with a defense of liberty as a means to a good end.

Passage 18, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty":

'Freedom for the pike is death for the minnows'. Freedom for an Oxford don, others have been known to add, is a very different thing from freedom for an Egyptian peasant. This proposition derives its force from something that is both true and important, but the phrase itself remains a piece of political claptrap. It is true that to offer political rights, or safeguard against intervention by the State, to men who are half-naked, illiterate, underfed and diseased is to mock their condition; they need medical help or education before they can understand, or make use of, an increase in their freedom. What is freedom to those who cannot make use of it? Without adequate conditions for the use of freedom what is the value of freedom? First things come first: there are situations in which – to use a saying satirically attributed to the nihilists by Dostoyevsky – boots are superior to Pushkin; individual freedom is not everyone's primary need. For freedom is not the mere absence of frustration of whatever kind; this would inflate the meaning of the word until it meant too much or too little. The Egyptian peasant needs clothes or medicine before, and more than, personal liberty, but the minimum freedom that he needs today, and the greater degree of freedom that he may need tomorrow, is not some species of freedom peculiar to him, but identical with that of professors, artists and millionaires. What troubles the consciences of Western liberals is, I think, the belief, not that the freedom that men seek differs according to the social or economic conditions, but that the minority who possess it have gained it by exploiting, or, at least, averting their gaze from the vast majority who do not.

**QUESTION 21**

All of the following are true statements about passage 17 except one. Which one statement is not true?

- A) Berlin argues that, just because you need x in order to make use of freedom, it does not follow that x is itself freedom, or a kind of freedom.
- B) Berlin suggests, in effect, that when people say "Freedom for an Oxford don ... is a very different thing from freedom for an Egyptian peasant" what is really bothering them is the guilt feeling that "Freedom for the pike is death for the minnows". That is, the Oxford don enjoys his freedom only because the peasant does not.
- C) Berlin denies that individual freedom is everyone's primary need.
- D) Berlin denies that freedom for an Oxford don really is very different thing from freedom for an Egyptian peasant.
- E) Berlin denies that freedom is of no value if ones material conditions do not allow one to make good use of it.

**END OF PAPER**