

SECTION I**QUESTIONS 1-21; MULTIPLE CHOICE**

1 point for each right answer, for a total of 21 points. No penalty for wrong answers.

Instructions:

A separate bubble form accompanies this question paper. Enter all information and answers on this form in number 2B pencil (not ink). Enter the module code in Section A. Enter and bubble-shade your matriculation number in Section B very carefully. Follow specific instructions in the instruction box on the bubble form. When filling in Section C, take care to bubble-shade answers only for questions 1-21, even though the form has space for answers to 100 questions.

Passage 1, from Plato's "Euthyphro" (pdf, p. 2):

S: What about your case, Euthyphro? Are you defendant or prosecutor?

E: Prosecutor.

S: Whom do you prosecute?

E: One whom I am thought insane to indict.

S: You're chasing after someone who is sure to get away?

E: Hardly; he is rather old.

S: Who is it?

E: My father.

S: My dear sir! Your own father?

E: Certainly.

S: What is the charge? What is the case about?

E: Murder, Socrates.

S: By Olympus! Certainly most men would not know how to go about a thing like this and end up in the right, Euthyphro. This isn't a thing for just anyone to do. This is a job for one far advanced in wisdom!

E: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, that is so.

S: Is it a case, then, of your father killing another relative? But I suppose that much is obvious. It wouldn't make sense to prosecute your father for killing a stranger.

E: What makes no sense, Socrates, is for you to think it makes a difference whether the victim is a stranger or a relative. One should only consider whether the killer acted justly or not; if he acted justly, let him go;

if not, prosecute even a killer who shares your hearth and home. You are just as polluted, remaining under the same roof with such a one, when you should be helping yourself and him by leading the way to divine cleanliness and justice.

QUESTION 1

What Socrates says in the underlined portion of passage 1 is consistent with him believing which one of the following?

- a) It is always wrong to prosecute your father.
- b) It is never wrong to prosecute your father.
- c) It is sometimes wrong to prosecute your father.
- d) No killings are unjust.
- e) All killings are unjust.

QUESTION 2

Euthyphro is committed to which of the following by what he says in passage 1?

- a) It is a more serious crime to kill strangers than family members.
- b) It is a more serious crime to kill family members than strangers.
- c) It is not possible to kill a human being justly.
- d) It is possible to kill a human being justly.
- e) Both b and d.

Passage 2, from Plato's "Euthyphro" (pdf, p. 10-11):

E: But Socrates, I can't possibly explain to you what I have in mind, because whatever proposition we advance runs around in circles, refusing to stay put where we plant it.

S: Your propositions, Euthyphro, seem like the property of my ancestor, Daedalus. If it were me stating them and setting them forth, you might make fun of me, saying my conclusions have inherited from him the trait of running around and not staying in one place. Since these are your propositions, however, we will have to come up with a different joke – because it's true, as you say, that these things of yours really won't stay put.

E: I think that joke fits in fine with our discussion, Socrates, because I'm not the one making these things go around and around, instead of sitting still. You're the Daedalus here, because if it were up to me, these things would stay still, just as they are.

S: Then it looks as if I must be even cleverer than Daedalus, my friend, since his skill only extended to animating things he made himself, whereas mine makes other people's creations move about as well. And the pinnacle of my genius is my cleverness, minus any desire to be clever. For I would give up the wealth of Tantalus as well as the cleverness of Daedalus, if only these things you say to me would stand still.

QUESTION 3

In passage 2, Euthyphro and Socrates make a comparison between Daedalus' statues (which were so lifelike they came to life and walked around) and something else. Which of the following is the best statement of what the statues are compared to?

- a) Socrates' cleverness.
- b) Socrates' cleverness, minus his desire to be clever.
- c) Euthyphro's dilemma: whether he should prosecute his father.
- d) Euthyphro's view that prosecuting his father is pious.
- e) Euthyphro's various attempts to define 'piety'.

Passage 3, from Plato's Euthyphro (pdf, p. 7):

S: Well now, Euthyphro, have you ever heard any man arguing that one who has murdered or otherwise acted unjustly should not pay the penalty?

E: There are endless disputes about this sort of thing, both in and out of the courts, because wrongdoers will say and do anything to avoid getting punished.

S: Do they admit they have done wrong, Euthyphro, but maintain that, even so, they should not be punished?

E: No, they don't admit it.

S: So then they don't say or do just anything. For they don't go so far as to admit this, nor do they go so far as to deny they should pay the penalty if they did wrong. But I think they do deny wrong-doing, don't they?

E: That's how it is.

S: Then they don't dispute that wrongdoers must be punished, only who did wrong, what they did, and when.

E: You are right.

QUESTION 4

Complete the following statement of what Socrates makes Euthyphro agree to at the end of passage 3.

'From the fact that not all wrongdoers admit they should be punished ...'

- a) It does not follow that anyone denies that crime should be punished.
- b) It does not follow that wrongdoers shouldn't be punished.
- c) It follows that these wrongdoers should be punished.
- d) It follows that these crimes should be punished.
- e) It follows that these crimes should not be punished.

QUESTION 5

What explanation does Euthyphro offer, in passage 3, as to why there are disputes about justice and injustice in the courts?

- a) He offers none.
- b) It is because there is no agreement about what justice is.
- c) It is because wrongdoers want to avoid punishment.
- d) It is because wrongdoing is hard to prove.
- e) It is because those accused of wrongdoing are sometimes innocent.

Passage 4, from Plato's *Republic*, (pdf p. 24-5):

S: Well, then, Thrasymachus, I said, suppose we begin at the beginning and you answer me. You say perfect injustice is more profitable than perfect justice?

T: Yes, I say it, and I have given you my reasons.

S: And what is your view about these two items in question? Would you call one of them virtue and the other vice?

T: Certainly.

S: I suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice?

T: How agreeable that would be! And ever so likely, seeing that I affirm injustice to be profitable and justice unprofitable.

S: What else then would you say instead?

T: The very opposite, he replied.

S: So you would call justice vice?

T: No, I think I would call it 'lofty naivete'.

S: Then would you call injustice malignity?

T: No; I think it would be better to label it 'prudent counsel'.

S: And do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?

T: Yes, he said; at least those who have the power to be overwhelmingly unjust, and therefore have the power of bringing whole states and countries to their knees; because maybe you think I've been advocating a line-up of common criminals. It is true that robbery – as a profession – has its profitable side, so long as business is conducted discretely; but common thieves are not in the same league with those of whom I have

been speaking.

QUESTION 6

Assume that, in passage 4, Thrasymachus would be willing to agree to the following: the wise and good should not be punished. He would then be committed to a view of injustice Socrates discusses in passage 3?. What does Socrates try to prove about this view, in passage 3?

- a) Everyone takes this view.
- b) No one takes this view.
- c) Some people take this view.
- d) This view is wrong.
- e) This view is right.

Passage 5, from Plato's *Republic* (pdf, p. 14)

Thrasymachus: Listen, then, he said; I declare that justice is nothing but the advantage of the stronger. And now why don't you all praise me? Oh, but wait. Of course you won't.

Socrates: Let me first make sure I understand, I replied, for now I don't at all. Justice, you say, is the advantage of the stronger. But what, Thrasymachus, is this supposed to mean? You cannot mean to say that because Polydamas the wrestler is stronger than we are; and because eating beef makes him stronger still; and because eating beef is therefore to his advantage; that therefore justice for all of us is for him to eat more beef?

T: Your answer is disgusting, Socrates; you take hold of the argument at just the point where you know how to do it most harm.

S: Not at all, my good sir, I said; but try to express yourself more clearly.

T: Well, he said, perhaps you have heard about how forms of government differ from place to place; there are tyrannies, and democracies, and aristocracies?

S: Yes, I know.

T: And the government is the ruling power in each state?

S: Certainly.

T: And each government establishes laws with an eye to its own advantage – the democracy making democratic laws and the tyranny tyrannical ones, and so forth. And these laws, which are made by them for their advantage, are the justice which they hand

down to their subjects. And whoever breaks these laws is punished as an unjust lawbreaker. And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice: namely, the advantage of the established government. And as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that everywhere you go there is but one principle of justice: namely, the advantage of the stronger.

QUESTION 7

All of the following are true of passages 4 and 5 except one. Which one is false?

- a) In passage 5, Thrasymachus is implying things are unjust which, in passage 4, he implied were just.
- b) In passage 5, Thrasymachus is implying things are just which, in passage 4, he implied were unjust.
- c) In passage 5, Thrasymachus is attempting to repair the definition of justice offered in passage 4.
- d) In neither passage 5 nor 4 does Thrasymachus attempt to offer a definition of justice.
- e) In passages 5 and 4 Thrasymachus attempts to restrict the scope of his claims about justice to cases of rulers exercising political power.

Passage 6, from Plato's Republic, Book I, (pdf, p. 2)

Cephalus: Men my age flock together; we are birds of a feather, as the proverb says; and at our meetings most of my friends weep and moan – they long for the pleasures of youth, and reminisce about sex and drinking and feasting and everything else like that. They feel annoyed, as if they have been robbed of something great, and say, 'life used to be good; now it's not worth living.' Some complain about old people being disrespected in their own households; they sing a sad song blaming age for being the cause of all their woes. But to me, Socrates, these whiners put the blame in the wrong place. If old age really caused all these evils, I – and every single other old man, for that matter – would feel the way they do. But I don't, and neither do others I have known.

QUESTION 8

All of the following are true about passage 6 except one. Which one is false?

- a) Cephalus is reasoning that if A causes B, you won't find a case of A without B.
- b) Cephalus is reasoning that if A causes B, you won't find a case of B without A.
- c) Cephalus does not deny that old age can be miserable.
- d) Cephalus is offering himself as a counter-example to a general claim.
- e) Cephalus does not explain why so many old men are miserable.

Passage 7, from Plato's "Meno" (pdf, p. 1)

Meno: Can you tell me, Socrates, is virtue the sort of thing you can teach someone? Or is it the sort of thing no one can teach you, but you pick it up by practicing it? Or maybe it's neither: virtue is something people are born with, or something they get some other way?

Socrates: Thessalians used to have a good reputation among Greeks, Meno – for being such good riders and for being so rich; now, it seems, they are famous for wisdom, particularly your friend and fellow citizen, Aristippus of Larissa. The credit goes to Gorgias, for when he moved to your city the leading Aleuadae – your lover Aristippus among them – fell in love with his wisdom, and so did the other leading Thessalians. Specifically, he got all of you into the habit of giving sweeping and confident answers to any questions put to you – as if you were all experts. In fact, he himself was always ready to answer any question put by any Greek; all questions answered. On the other hand, here in Athens, my dear Meno, the opposite is the case. Here it's as though there were a wisdom drought; it has all drained away to where you come from. So if you want to put this sort of question to one of us, everyone will have a good laugh and say to you: 'Good stranger, you must think I am a lucky man, to know whether virtue can be taught or not, or where it comes from. Me, I'm so far from knowing whether virtue can be taught or not that I don't even know what it is.' I'm just as badly off as all my fellow citizens in this regard, Meno, and I blame no one but myself for my utter ignorance about virtue. For if I don't know what something is, how could I know what it's like? Unless you think someone who has no idea who Meno is could know whether he is handsome or rich or a real gentleman, or just the opposite? Do you think that would be possible?

QUESTION 9

One of the following statements about passage 7 is true. Which one?

- d) Socrates suggests that knowing "what something is" is necessary for knowing "what it's like".
- b) Socrates suggests that knowing "what something is" is sufficient for knowing "what it's like".
- c) Socrates suggests that knowing "what something is" is necessary and sufficient for knowing "what it's like".
- d) Socrates suggests that knowing "what something is" is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowing "what it's like".
- e) None of a-d are true.

Passage 8, from a chapter entitled “Plato’s Question”, in a book on psychology:

In the *Meno*, Plato begins the dialogue as follows: ‘Can you tell me, Socrates, - can virtue be taught, or is it rather to be acquired by practice? Or is it neither to be practiced nor learned, but something that comes to men by nature or in some other way?’ Plato is asking about the causes of human disposition and behaviour, and casting it within the archetypal form of the nature-nurture question. Almost 2,000 years after Plato had written his dialogues, Shakespeare, in *The Tempest*, has Prospero describing Caliban as ‘a devil, a born devil, on whose nature Nurture can never stick’ (Act IV, Scene I). For Shakespeare nature seems to be the cause of greater force, at least in the case of poor Caliban. More to the point, for both Plato and Shakespeare, nature and nurture seem to be separable causes of behaviour. Is this the case or not? And if not, just how to nature and nurture relate to one another? These are some of the defining problems of the human sciences, especially psychology.

QUESTION 10

Each of the following, except one, expresses disagreement with something the author of passage 9 claims. Which one does not?

- a) From the fact that Plato begins by having Meno ask this question, it does not follow that Plato regards nature and nurture as separable causes of behaviour.
- b) Shakespeare is not an English playwright.
- c) Meno asks whether virtue is learned, practiced, innate, or some other thing. This is not really an either/or question. This suggests Plato does not accept a simple nature/nurture dichotomy.
- d) From the mere fact that Shakespeare has a character utter a line in a play, it does not seem reasonable to draw inferences about what Shakespeare himself believes.
- e) Issues about nature vs. nurture, or the interrelation of nature and nurture, are not important to psychology.

Passage 9, from Plato’s *Meno*, (pdf, p.8):

S: Do you take it for granted that there are people who desire bad things, and others who desire good things? Don’t you think, my good man, that all men desire good things?

M: I certainly don’t.

S: You think some want bad things, then?

M: Yes.

S: Do you mean that they believe the bad things to be good, or that they know they are bad and want them anyway?

M: I think there are both kinds.

S: Do you think, Meno, that anyone, knowing that bad things are bad, still wants them?

M: I certainly do.

S: Wants in what way? To have for himself?

M: What else?

S: Does he think the bad things benefit he who has them, or does he perfectly well know they will harm him?

M: There are some who believe bad things benefit them, others who know that they harm them.

S: And do you think that those who believe that bad things benefit them know they are bad?

M: No, that's something I can't quite believe.

S: It's clear, then, that those who do not know things to be bad do not want what is bad. What they want are things they think are good, that are in fact bad. It follows that those who have no knowledge about these things and believe them to be good clearly want good things. Isn't that right?

M: It is likely.

S: Well then, those who you say want bad things, believing bad things harm those who have them, know they will be harmed by them?

M: Necessarily.

S: And don't they think those who are harmed are miserable to the extent that they are harmed?

M: That seems unavoidable.

S: And don't they think those who are miserable are unhappy?

M: I think so.

S: Does anyone want to be miserable and unhappy?

M: I do not think so, Socrates.

S: Then no one wants what is bad, Meno – unless he wants to be in such a state. For what else is misery if not wishing for bad things, and having one's wish come true?

S: Weren't you saying just now that virtue is the desire for good things, and the power to acquire them?

M: Yes, I was.

S: It seems everyone satisfies the 'desire for' part of this definition, and no one is better than anyone else in this respect.

M: So it appears.

QUESTION 11

In passage 9, Socrates takes himself to have established which of the following

- a) Everyone wants bad things.
- b) Everyone wants good things.
- c) No one wants bad things.
- d) No one wants goods things.
- e) Both b and c)

Passage 10, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", (p. 180)

This paradox has been often exposed. It is one thing to say that I know what is good for X, while he himself does not; and even to ignore his wishes for its – and his – sake; and a very different one to say that he has *eo ipso* chosen it, not indeed consciously, nor as he seems in everyday life, but in his role as a rational self which his empirical self may not know – the 'real' self which discerns the good, and cannot help choosing it once it is revealed. This monstrous impersonation, which consists in equating what X would choose if he were something he is not, or at least not yet, with what X actually seeks and chooses, is at the heart of all political theories of self-realization. It is one thing to say that I may be coerced for my own good, which I am too blind to see; this may, for on occasion, be for my benefit; indeed, it may enlarge the scope of my liberty. It is another to say that if it is my good, then I am not being coerced, for I have willed it, whether I know this or not,

QUESTION 12

Passage 10 could have been written as a direct response to passage 9. Reading it as a direct response, which of the following would be true of it?

- a) In passage 10, Berlin is objecting to the argument Socrates makes in passage 9.
- b) In passage 10, Berlin is not objecting to the argument Socrates makes in passage 9.
- c) In passage 10, Berlin is objecting to Socrates' assumption in passage 9 that, because people do not always want what is good for them, it is permissible to coerce them against their will.
- d) In passage 10, Berlin is restating Socrates' assumption in passage 9, because people do not always want what is good for them, it is permissible to coerce them against their will.
- e) In passage 10, Berlin is explaining the paradox Socrates exposes in passage 9.

Passage 11, from Descartes' "First Meditation" (pdf, p. 1):

Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true and assured I have gotten either from the senses or through the senses.

Passage 12, from Descartes' "Second Meditation" (pdf, p. 5)

Let us consider those things people commonly think they understand most distinctly of all: namely, those bodies that we touch and see. I do not mean bodies in general - for general perceptions are apt to be somewhat more confused - but one particular body. Let us take, for example, this piece of wax, just come from the comb. It has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey it contained; it retains some of the scent of the flowers from which it was gathered; its color, shape and size are apparent; it is hard, cool and can be readily handled; if you tap it with your knuckle it makes a sound. In short, it has everything which seems necessary to enable a body to be known as distinctly as possible. But see how, even as I speak, I place the wax by the fire: what remained of its taste evaporates, its scent dissipates, its color changes, its shape is lost, its size increases; it becomes liquid and hot; you can hardly touch it, and if you do it no longer makes a sound, But does the same wax remain? It must be granted that it does; no one denies it, no one thinks otherwise. So what was it about the wax that I understood with such distinctness? Evidently none of the features that I gleaned by means of the senses; for whatever had to do with taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has now changed – yet the wax remains.

QUESTION 13

All of the following are true of passages 11 and 12 except one. Which is the one?

- a) Passage 11 attempts to refute the claim made in passage 12.
- b) Passage 11 does not attempt to refute the claim made in passage 12.
- c) Passage 12 advances an argument, whereas passage 11 does not.
- d) Passage 12 tries to give an example of something Descartes has (per passage 11) 'up till now accepted as most true and assured and gotten either from the senses or through the senses.'
- e) Passage 12 tries to give an example of something Descartes has (per passage 11) 'up till now accepted as most true and assured' but not 'gotten either from the senses or through the senses.'

Passage 13, from Descartes' "Second Meditation"

We say we see the wax itself, if it is there before us, not that we judge it to be there from its color or shape. And this might lead me to conclude without further ado that knowledge of the wax comes from what the eye sees, and not from the scrutiny of the mind alone. But if I then look out the window and see men crossing the square, as I just happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax. Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which could conceal ghosts or mechanical men? But I judge that they are men. And so something which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of judgment which is in my mind.

QUESTION 14

In passage 13, Descartes is making an argument by analogy. (A is to B, as C is to D.) In constructing it, all of the following analogies are implied but one. Which one is NOT implied?

- a) The wax itself is compared to men crossing the square.
- b) The wax itself is compared to something hats and coats could conceal.
- c) Seeing with the eye is compared to looking out a window
- d) Seeing with the eye is compared to grasping by the faculty of judgment.
- e) Color and shape are compared to hats and coats.

Passage 14, from an objection one of Descartes' contemporaries made to his use of the wax example (i.e. passages 12 and 13).

Next you introduce the example of the wax, and you spend some time explaining that the so-called accidents of the wax are one thing, and the wax itself, or substance of the wax, is another. You say that in order to have a distinct perception of the wax itself or its substance we need only the mind or intellect, and not sensation or imagination. But the first point is just what everyone commonly asserts, i.e. that the concept of the wax or its substance can be abstracted from the concepts of its accidents. But does this really imply that the substance or nature of the wax is itself distinctly conceived? Besides the colour, the shape, the fact that it can melt, etc. we conceive that there is something which is the subject of the accidents and changes we observe; but what this subject is, or what its nature is, we do not know. This always eludes us; and it is only a kind of conjecture that leads us to think that there must be something underneath the accidents. So I am amazed at how you can say that once the forms have been stripped away like clothes, you perceive more perfectly and evidently what the wax is. Admittedly, you perceive that the wax or its substance must be something over and above such forms; but what this something is you do not perceive, unless you are misleading us. For this 'something' is not revealed to you in the way in which a man can be revealed when, after first of all seeing just his hats and garments, we then remove the clothes so as to find out who and what he is.

QUESTION 15

The author of passage 14 refers to 'the so-called accidents of the wax' [see underlined bit]. By this phrase he evidently means which of the following?

- a) "What everyone commonly asserts" about the wax.
- b) "The colour, the shape, the fact that it can melt, etc."
- c) "The substance of the wax".
- d) "A distinct perception of the wax itself."
- e) "Only the mind or intellect, and not sensation or imagination."

QUESTION 16

Which of the following is the best statement of the objection to Descartes' argument about the wax, in passage 14?

- a) Descartes conjectures there is an enduring substance underlying the 'changes and accidents' of the wax. But there is no such substance.
- b) Descartes conjectures that there is an enduring substance underlying the 'changes and accidents' of the wax. But Descartes' method forbids him to rely on conjecture.
- c) Descartes suggests we have a clear conception of the substance of the wax, minus its accidents, like that of a person minus their clothes. But in fact we have a clear conception that there is nothing to the wax besides its various 'accidents'.
- d) Descartes suggests we have a clear conception of the substance of the wax, minus its accidents, like that of a person minus their clothes. But in fact we have a clear conception that there is nothing to a person besides their clothes.
- e) Descartes suggests we have a clear conception of the substance of the wax, minus its 'accidents', like that of a person minus their clothes. But in fact we have no conception of what that substance might be, beyond the bare conjecture that there is something besides the accidents.

Passage 15, from Mill's *On Liberty*, Chapter 1

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

QUESTION 17

Which of the following is the best statement of Mill's principle in passage 15?

- a) Forcing someone to do something for his or her own good is unwarranted coercion.
- b) Forcing someone to do something for your own good is warranted self-protection.
- c) You may only interfere with someone's liberty to prevent harm to them.
- d) You may only interfere with someone's liberty to prevent harm to others.
- e) You may harm someone to prevent their interference with the liberty of others.

Passage 16, from Mill's On Liberty, chapter 1 (pdf, p. 11):

There is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself, or, if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation. When I say only himself, I mean directly, and in the first instance: for whatever affects himself, may affect others through himself; and the objection which may be grounded on this contingency will receive consideration in the sequel. This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.

QUESTION 18

In the underlined portion of passage 16, Mill anticipates an objection. What is it? (HINT: You aren't being asked to remember but to deduce what it must be from this passage.)

- a) If whatever affects an individual may affect others, it seems there may be no "sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest."
- b) The 'sphere of action' is defined by "that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself", in which society has, if any, only an indirect interest. But this cannot be right.
- c) If the 'sphere of action' is defined as the area in which the individual has "if any, only an indirect interest," then the individual may lose interest in his or her own life.
- d) If everything everyone does may affect others, "the liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle."
- e) If everything everyone one does may affect others, then "framing the plan of our life to suit our own character" means everyone must have the same character.

Passage 17, from J.S. Mill's *On Liberty*, Chapter 3 (pdf, p. 10):

As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any one thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things which do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. Where, not the person's own character, but the traditions of customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress.

In maintaining this principle, the greatest difficulty to be encountered does not lie in the appreciation of means towards an acknowledged end, but in the indifference of persons in general to the end itself. If it were felt that the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being; that it is not only a coordinate element with all that is designated by the terms civilization, instruction, education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of all those things; there would be no danger that liberty should be undervalued, and the adjustment of the boundaries between it and social control would present no extraordinary difficulty. But the evil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly recognized by the common modes of thinking as having any intrinsic worth, or deserving any regard on its own account.

QUESTION 19

In passage 17, Mill's claims are consistent with all of the following positions except one. Which one of the following is inconsistent with what Mill claims?

- a) If mankind becomes perfect, there should not be different opinions.
- b) A person's own character should provide them with rules of conduct.
- c) The importance of free development of individuality is widely acknowledged.
- d) Free development of individuality is necessary for civilization.
- d) Free development of individuality is an end in itself.
- e) Free development of individuality is a means to good ends.

Passage 18, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", p. 174:

Mill confuses two distinct notions. One is that all coercion is, in so far as it frustrates human desires, bad as such, although it may have to be applied to prevent other, greater evils; while non-interference, which is the opposite of coercion, is good as such, although it is not the only good. The other is that men should seek to discover the truth, or to develop a certain type of character of which Mill approved – critical, original, imaginative, independent, non-conforming to the point of eccentricity, and so on – and that truth can be found, and such character can be bred, only in conditions of freedom. Both these are liberal views, but they are not identical, and the connection between them is, at best, empirical. No one would argue that truth or freedom of self-expression could flourish where dogma crushes all thought. But the evidence of history tends to show ... that integrity, love of truth and fiery individualism grow at least as often in severely disciplined communities, among, for example, the puritan Calvinists of Scotland or New England, or under military discipline, as in more tolerant or in different societies; and if this is so, Mill's argument for liberty as a necessary condition for the growth of human genius falls to the ground.

QUESTION 20

Which of the following sentences from passage 17 makes a claim that Berlin suggests is false, in passage 18.

- a) "It is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions."
- b) "The worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any one thinks fit to try them."
- c) "The greatest difficulty to be encountered does not lie in the appreciation of means towards an acknowledged end, but in the indifference of persons in general to the end itself."
- d) "[Liberty] is not only a coordinate element with all that is designated by the terms civilization, instruction, education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of all those things."
- e) "Individual spontaneity is hardly recognized by the common modes of thinking as having any intrinsic worth."

QUESTION 21

In passage 18, Berlin criticizes Mill for 'conflating' two things. Mill might argue back that he is not conflating them. Rather, he is explicitly advocating both. But passage 18 contains the basis for an argument that this line of defense is not available to Mill. What is the argument?

- a) Mill conflates the harm of frustrated human desire with the harm of "other, greater evils". Since these are two different things, he cannot be advocating both.
- b) Mill advocates frustrating human desire only for the sake of avoiding the harm of "other, greater evils". This inevitably leads to conflating means and ends.
- c) Mill advocates both freedom as an end in itself and non-conformity as a means to an end. Since these are not the same, it is impossible to advocate both.
- d) Mill does not consider that the two things he advocates may not necessarily go together. This suggests he really is conflating them.
- e) Mill advocates liberty as inherently good and as a means to a good end. This proves he is conflating two things.

END OF PAPER