

**NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE**

**EXAMINATION FOR ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 1**

(Semester 2: 2005-2006)

**PHILOSOPHY**

**PH1101E/GEM1004 REASON AND PERSUASION**

**April / May 2006 - Time Allowed: 2 Hours**

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**INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES**

1. This examination paper contains **TWENTY** questions and comprises **TWENTY-ONE** printed pages.
2. There is only one section to the examination. It is multiple-choice, 20 questions, worth 1 point apiece, for a total of 20 points.
3. This is an **OPEN BOOK** Examination.

**SECTION I****QUESTIONS 1-20; MULTIPLE CHOICE**

1 point for each right answer, for a total of 20 points. No penalty for wrong answers.

**Instructions:**

A separate bubble form accompanies this question paper. Enter all information and answers on this form in number 2B pencil (not ink). Enter the module code in Section A. Enter and bubble-shade your matriculation number in Section B very carefully. Follow specific instructions in the instruction box on the bubble form. When filling in Section C, take care to bubble-shade answers only for questions 1-20, even though the form has space for answers to 100 questions.

Passage 1, from Plato's "Euthyphro" (pdf, p. 1):

S: What charge, you ask? No mean charge, I should say, for it is no small thing for one so young to attain such insight. He says he knows how, and by whom, the young are corrupted. More likely than not the man is wise; so when he sees my dull ignorance corrupting his whole generation, he is provoked to denounce me to the city like a child running to its mother. I think he is the only one of our public men to make a proper start in politics. One should first of all look to the proper upbringing of the young – just as a good farmer tends young sprouts first, looking after the rest later. In just this way Meletus will start off by uprooting weeds – such as myself – that damage tender shoots, so he says; later he will obviously tend to older growth, thereby making himself a source of bounty and fruitful blessings for the city; a likely fate for anyone who sets about things in such a way ...

E: I only wish it were true, Socrates. I'm afraid the opposite may be the case. By trying to hurt you, it seems to me he makes a very crude start, cutting at the very heart of the city. But tell me, what does he say you do to corrupt the young?

**QUESTION 1**

In passage 1, Socrates says, or implies, all of the following but one. Which one of the following does he not say, or imply?

- a) Meletus is probably wise.
- b) Socrates is dull and ignorant.
- c) Meletus is like a child running to its mother.
- d) Euthyphro is probably wise.
- e) Meletus is concerned with the education of the young.

**QUESTION 2**

In passage 1, all of the following but one plausibly describe Euthyphro's apparent attitude towards Socrates. Which one of the following does not?

- a) Irritated by his demand for definitions.
- b) Sympathetic on account of his legal difficulties.
- c) Respectful of his wisdom.
- d) Concerned on behalf of the city.
- e) Curious as to why Socrates has a bad reputation.

Passage 2, from Plato's "Euthyphro", (pdf, p. 1-2).

S: It's an outlandish business I'm mixed up in, to hear him tell the tale. He says I fabricate gods. He indicts me, so he says, on behalf of the old gods, whom I don't believe in while I'm making the new ones.

E: I know just how it is, Socrates. This is due to the divine sign you say comes to you. This man has written out his indictment against you as against one who innovates in divine matters. He comes to court to slander you, knowing such matters can easily be made to appear in a bad light before the crowd. That's how it is with me, too. Whenever I speak up concerning divine matters in the assembly, and foretell the future, they laugh me down as if I were crazy; yet all I have foretold has come to pass. They envy those of us with such gifts. But you musn't pay attention to all that; you just have to take the bull by the horns.

S: My dear Euthyphro, maybe being laughed at isn't such a big deal. The Athenians don't mind clever-types, so long as no one tries to teach his peculiar brand of wisdom. But if someone starts bringing others round to his way of thinking, then the Athenians get angry – either because they are jealous, as you say, or for some other reason.

E: I certainly don't have any desire to put their feelings towards me to the test.

S: Perhaps they take you for a stingy sort of fellow, not unduly eager to spread your wisdom around. But my fondness for people makes them think I am ready to spill all the beans to everyone – not just for free but maybe with a little extra thrown in, out of gratitude for the loan of a spare ear. So if it were all just a big plot to laugh at me, as you say they laugh at you, there would be nothing unpleasant about the prospect of a day in court, spent laughing and having fun. But if they are serious about it – well, in that case the outcome is less clear, unless you prophets know better.

**QUESTION 3**

In passage 2 Euthyphro suggests all of the following but one. Which one suggestion does he not make?

- a) That Socrates' enemies are jealous of his religious gifts.
- b) That Socrates' enemies are irritated by his philosophical arguments.
- c) That Socrates' enemies will tell lies about him.
- d) That one should not back down in the face of such critics as Socrates has.
- e) That it might be unwise to provoke such critics as Socrates has.

**QUESTION 4**

In passage 2 Euthyphro suggests one explanation of why Socrates is making enemies. Socrates hints that other explanations are possible. Which of the following quotes from Mill, *On Liberty*, has the form of an alternative explanation of the sorts of reactions Socrates has gotten?

- a) "The practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of human conduct, is the feeling in each person's mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would like them to act."
- b) "The struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly in that of Greece, Rome, and England. But in old times this contest was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government."
- c) "The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection."
- d) "Men's opinions, accordingly, on what is laudable or blamable, are affected by all the multifarious causes which influence their wishes in regard to the conduct of others, and which are as numerous as those which determine their wishes on any other subject. Sometimes their reason—at other times their prejudices or superstitions: often their social affections, not seldom their antisocial ones, their envy or jealousy, their arrogance or contemptuousness: but most commonly, their desires or fears for themselves—their legitimate or illegitimate self-interest."
- e) Both a) and d)

**QUESTION 5**

The following are quotes from Mill, *On Liberty*. All of them, except one, provide grounds for thinking the sorts of activities Socrates is being prosecuted for (per passage 2) should be permitted. Which one does not?

- a) There is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself, or, if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation.
- b) The ancient commonwealths thought themselves entitled to practise, and the ancient philosophers countenanced, the regulation of every part of private conduct by public authority, on the ground that the State had a deep interest in the whole bodily and mental discipline of every one of its citizens, a mode of thinking which may have been admissible in small republics surrounded by powerful enemies, in constant peril of being subverted by foreign attack or internal commotion, and to which even a short interval of relaxed energy and self-command might so easily be fatal, that they could not afford to wait for the salutary permanent effects of freedom.
- c) I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.
- d) The great writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty it possesses, have mostly asserted freedom of conscience as an indefeasible right, and denied absolutely that a human being is accountable to others for his religious belief.
- e) The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental or spiritual.

**QUESTION 6**

Which of the following quotes from Mill's *On Liberty* indicates a possible line of justification for the legal action taken against Socrates (per passage 2)?

- a) No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act.
- b) Apart from the peculiar tenets of individual thinkers, there is also in the world at large an increasing inclination to stretch unduly the powers of society over the individual, both by the force of opinion and even by that of legislation: and as the tendency of all the changes taking place in the world is to strengthen society, and diminish the power of the individual, this encroachment is not one of the evils which tend spontaneously to disappear, but, on the contrary, to grow more and more formidable.
- c) Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury.
- d) It will be said, that we do not now put to death the introducers of new opinions: we are not like our fathers who slew the prophets, we even build sepulchres to them. It is true we no longer put heretics to death; and the amount of penal infliction which modern feeling would probably tolerate, even against the most obnoxious opinions, is not sufficient to extirpate them. But let us not flatter ourselves that we are yet free from the stain even of legal persecution.
- e) Both a) and c).

Passage 3, from Plato's "Meno" (pdf, p. 1)

S: It must be my lucky day, Meno! Here I was, looking for just one virtue, and you happen by with a whole swarm! But, Meno, following up on this figurative swarm of mine, if I were to ask you what sort of being a bee is, and you said, 'there are all sorts of different sorts of bees,' what would you say if I went on to ask: 'Do you mean that there are all sorts of different sorts of bees insofar as they are bees? Or are they no different, insofar as they are bees, but they differ in other respects – in how beautiful they are, for example, or how big, and so on and so forth?' Tell me, what would you answer if I asked you this?

M: I would say that they do not differ from one another insofar as they are all bees.

S: What if I went on to say: 'Tell me Meno, what is this thing that they all share, with respect to which they are all the same?' Would you be able to tell me?

M: I would.

S: The same goes for all the virtues. Even if they come in all sorts of different varieties, all of them have one and the same form which makes them virtues, and the thing to do is look to this form when someone asks you to make clear what virtue is. Do you follow me?

M: I think I understand, but – then again – not as clearly as I would like.

S: I am asking whether you think it is only in the case of virtue that there is one for a man, another for a woman and so on. Does the same go for health and size and strength? Do you think that there is one health for a man and another for a woman? Or, if it is health, does it have the same form everywhere, whether in man or in anything else whatever?

M: The health of a man seems to me the same as that of a woman.

S: And the same goes for size and strength? If a woman is strong, her strength will be the same and have the same form; for by 'the same' I mean to indicate that strength is strength, whoever has it – man or woman. But maybe you think it makes a difference.

M: I don't think it does.

S: So will there be any difference in the case of virtue, then, insofar as something's being virtue is what is in question – whether in a child or an old person, a woman or a man?

**QUESTION 7**

Which of the following is the best statement of the point Socrates is making, in passage 3, by means of his bee example.

- a) Bees come in all sorts of different varieties.
- b) Bees come in all sorts of different varieties, insofar as they are all bees.
- c) Bees don't come in all sorts of different varieties, insofar as they are all bees.
- d) If bees all have something in common, they do not come in all sorts of different varieties.
- e) Even if bees come in all sorts of different varieties, they all have something in common.

Passage 4, from Plato's "Meno" [continuing on from passage 3]:

M: I think, Socrates, that somehow this case is a bit different than the others.

S: How so? Didn't you say the virtue of a man consists in being able to manage the city well, whereas that of a woman consists in managing the household well?

M: I did.

S: Is it possible to manage a city well, or a household, or anything for that matter, while not managing it moderately and justly?

M: Certainly not.

S: Then if they manage justly and moderately, they must do so with justice and moderation?

M: Necessarily.

S: So both the man and the woman, if they are to be good, need the same things: justice and moderation.

M: So it seems.

S: What about your child and your old man? Can they possibly be good if they are ill-tempered and unjust?

M: Certainly not.

S: But if they are moderate and just?

M: Yes.

S: So all people are good in the same way, since what makes them good is the fact that they exhibit the same qualities.

M: It seems so.

S: And they would not be good in the same way if they did not have the same virtue.

M: They certainly wouldn't.

S: Therefore, since everyone's virtue is the same, try to tell me – and try to remember what you and Gorgias said – that same thing is.

### QUESTION 8

Which of the following is the best statement of the argument Socrates makes in passage 4?

- a) Even if there are different virtues, 'virtue' can be defined as 'justice and moderation'. Thus, the case of virtue must be like those of strength and health.
- b) It is not possible to be good if one is not just and moderate. Thus, the case of virtue must be like those of strength and health.
- c) The case of virtue does not seem different from those of strength or health because different people need similar qualities to be virtuous. This suggests all cases of virtue have something in common.
- d) The case of virtue seems different from those of strength or health because different people need different qualities to be virtuous. This suggests all cases of virtue need not have something in common.
- e) The virtue of a man consists in being able to manage the city well, whereas that of a woman consists in managing the household well.

Passage 5, from Plato's "Meno" [continuing on from passage 4]

M: What else but to be able to rule over men, if you are seeking one formula to fit them all.

S: You are right. That's what I'm looking for. But Meno, is virtue the same for a child or a slave – namely, to be able to rule over a master? Do you think he who rules is still a slave?

M: I do not think so at all, Socrates.

S: It doesn't seem likely, my good man. Consider this further point: you say virtue is the capacity to rule. Don't you think we should add: justly and not unjustly?

### QUESTION 9

Which of the following is the best summary of the criticism Socrates makes, in passage 5, of Meno's proposed definition of virtue as 'the ability to rule over men'?

- a) It is not a sufficient condition for being virtuous.
- b) It is not a necessary condition for being virtuous.
- c) It is neither necessary nor sufficient for being virtuous.
- d) It is a sufficient but not necessary condition for being virtuous.
- e) It is necessary but not sufficient condition for being virtuous.

Passage 6, from Plato's "Republic", Book I (pdf, p. 15-6):

Then justice, by your argument, is not only obedience to the advantage of the stronger, but also the reverse, what is not to his advantage?

What are you talking about? he asked.

I am only repeating what you said, I think. Here, let's consider: haven't we admitted that the rulers can mistakenly betray their own advantage by making the commands they do, and also that for those who are ruled to obey these commands is justice? Didn't you say as much?

Yes.

Anyway, the laws which are made must be obeyed by the subjects – and that is what you call justice?

No doubt about it.

Then justice, by your argument, is not only obedience to the advantage of the stronger, but also the reverse, what is not to his advantage?

What are you talking about? he asked.

I am only repeating what you said, I think. Here, let's consider: haven't we admitted that the rulers can mistakenly betray their own advantage by making the commands they do, and also that for those who are ruled to obey these commands is justice? Didn't you say as much?

Yes.

Then you have agreed that it is just to do what is to the disadvantage of those who rule and are stronger, whenever the rulers unintentionally command things which are bad for them. For if, as you say, it is just to perform those very things which the rulers command, in that case – O, wisest of men – is there any escape from the conclusion that it is just to do the opposite of what you say? For the weaker are commanded to do what is to the disadvantage of the stronger?

**QUESTION 10**

In passage 6, Socrates is reviewing his argument against Thrasymachus' definition of justice as 'the advantage of the stronger'. All of the following, but one, are true statements about passage 6. Which one is not true?

- a) Thrasymachus admits that it is justice for subjects to do as their rulers command.
- b) Thrasymachus admits that rulers may command things not to their advantage.
- c) Socrates argues that, if a) and b) are true, Thrasymachus' definition commits him to a contradiction.
- d) Socrates assumes that justice is sometimes obedience to rulers, sometimes the reverse, then attempts to refute Thrasymachus' definition on that basis.
- e) Socrates assumes Thrasymachus' definition of justice for purposes of deducing what behavior by subjects is just, if the definition is true.

Passage 7, from Plato's "Republic", book 1 [continuing on from passage 6]:

By Zeus, this is clear as day, Socrates, said Polemarchus.

Yes, said Cleitophon, breaking in, if anyone asked you to be a witness.

Who needs witnesses? said Polemarchus. Thrasymachus plainly admitted rulers may sometimes make commands not to their advantage, and that for subjects to obey these commands is justice.

But, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was commanded of them by their rulers is just.

Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said justice is the interest of the stronger; and, while holding both these positions, he admitted as well that the stronger may command the weaker, who are his subjects, to do things that are not to his advantage; it follows that justice is just as much the injury as the interest of the stronger

But, said Cleitophon, when he said 'the advantage of the stronger', he meant what the stronger thought to be his advantage – this was what the weaker had to do; this is what he said justice is.

That isn't what he said, retorted Polemarchus.

Never mind that, Polemarchus, I replied. If he now says this is how it is, let us accept his statement.

Tell me, Thrasymachus, is this what you meant to say justice was: what the stronger thought to be his advantage, whether it really is or not? Shall we say this is what you mean?

Absolutely not, he said. Do you think I would call someone who makes a mistake 'the stronger' at just the moment when he makes some mistake?

**QUESTION 11**

All of the following, except one, are plausibly true statements about passage 7. Which one is clearly not true?

- a) Cleitophon suggests eliminating the contradiction by amending the definition of justice as the advantage of the stronger.
- b) Cleitophon suggests eliminating the contradiction by amending the premise that it is justice for subjects to obey their ruler's commands.
- c) Thrasymachus refuses to accept Cleitophon's suggestion about how to eliminate the contradiction.
- d) Thrasymachus retracts his earlier admission that the stronger may command the weaker to do things that are not to his advantage.
- e) Thrasymachus assumes that a ruler who commands his subjects to do what is not to the ruler's advantage is making a mistake.

Passage 8, from Descartes' "First Meditation" (pdf, p. 1):

It has been some years since I was for the first time struck by how many falsehoods I had taken for truths when I was very young, and by how doubtful and uncertain everything subsequently based on such questionable material had to be. In this way I came to see the need, once in my life, to demolish all that I had accepted up to that point, and to make a fresh start from the very foundations, if I wanted to achieve anything solid and lasting in the sciences. But the project looked truly enormous, so I waited until I was old and mature enough to be sure there could never be a better time for taking up the task. This led me to put the project off for so long that now I would at fault if, instead of taking it up, I spent what time remains to me in deliberations. So now that my mind is free of all cares, and I have arranged to be left in peaceful solitude, I will apply myself seriously and freely to the general demolition of my beliefs.

### QUESTION 12

In passage 8, Descartes cites all of the following, but one, as grounds for attempting the general demolition of his beliefs? Which one does he not cite?

- a) Many of his beliefs are false.
- b) Beliefs based on beliefs that may be false are doubtful.
- c) Achieving anything solid and lasting in the sciences is inconsistent with doubt and uncertainty.
- d) Since he has delayed undertaking the demolition of his beliefs, he should not put the task off any longer.
- e) Everyone should attempt, once in their life, to achieve something solid and lasting in the sciences.

Passage 9, from Descartes' "First Meditation" [immediately following passage 8]

To achieve this end it will not be necessary for me to prove that all my beliefs are false, since it might not come to that. Rather, because reason now teaches me that I should be just as careful about withholding assent from uncertain, doubtful things as from patent falsehoods, the least bit of doubt on any point will suffice for complete rejection. And for this it will not be necessary to examine each article individually, which would be an endless task. Once the foundation of a building is undermined, everything above goes with it. So I will go straight for the basic principles underlying all my former beliefs.

Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true and assured I have gotten either from the senses or through the senses. But from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once.

### QUESTION 13

Which of the following is/are true statements about the underlined bit of passage 9?

- a) Descartes assumes it without argument.
- b) Descartes doubts it is true.
- c) Descartes argues that this must be the principle underlying all his former beliefs.
- d) Descartes argues that he must assume this principle underlies his beliefs, otherwise he will not be able to undermine their foundations.
- e) Both a) and d).

### QUESTION 14

Which of the following is the best statement of the conclusion of the argument in the second paragraph of passage 9?

- a) Descartes' beliefs have been acquired either from the senses or through the senses.
- b) The senses are like a friend who had deceived us once.
- c) A friend who has deceived us once can never be trusted completely.
- d) Once the foundation of Descartes' beliefs is undermined, the rest go with it.
- e) All Descartes' beliefs appear to be doubtful.

Passage 10, from Descartes' "First Meditation" (pdf, p. 2-3):

Perhaps there may be those who would prefer to deny the existence of so powerful a God, if the alternative were to believe everything else is uncertain. Let us not argue with them, but grant instead that everything said about God is a fiction. According to their hypothesis, then, I have arrived at my present state by fate or chance or an unbroken chain of events, or by some other means. Yet since deception and error seem to be imperfections, the less powerful they make my original cause, the more likely it is that I am so imperfect as to be deceived all the time. I have no answer to these arguments, but am finally compelled to admit that there is not one of my former beliefs concerning which a doubt may not legitimately be raised; and this is not an idle or ill-considered conclusion, but one based on powerful and well thought-out reasons.

### QUESTION 15

Which of the following is the most accurate paraphrase of the underlined portion of passage 10?

- a) Perhaps some people believe there is no all-powerful God, and therefore everything else is uncertain.
- b) Perhaps some people believe there is no all-powerful God, and therefore everything else is certain.
- c) Perhaps some people believe there is an all-powerful God, and therefore everything else is uncertain.
- d) Perhaps some people believe that unless there is no all-powerful God, everything else is uncertain.
- e) Perhaps some people believe that unless there is an all-powerful God, everything else is uncertain.

Passage 11, from Descartes' "Second Meditation" (pdf, p. 1-2):

But I do not yet sufficiently understand what this 'I' is that now necessarily exists. So I must be careful not to mistake something else for this 'I', and so make a mistake concerning that very item of knowledge I maintain is most certain and evident of all. Which is why I will now meditate anew on what I originally believed myself to be before I embarked on this present train of thought. I will then subtract anything capable of being weakened in the least by the arguments I have brought forth, so that what is left at the end may be no more nor less than that which is certain and unshakeable.

### QUESTION 16

In passage 11, Descartes resolves to 'meditate anew'. What is the best statement of what he means to attempt?

- a) He will attempt to demolish all his beliefs as uncertain.
- b) He will attempt to reestablish some of his former beliefs about the self, if they can be shown to be certain.
- c) He will attempt to reestablish some of his former beliefs about the self, even though they have been shown to be uncertain.
- d) He will attempt to demolish as uncertain all his beliefs about the self.
- e) He will attempt to demolish as uncertain all his beliefs not having to do with the self.

Passage 12, from Mill's *On Liberty*, Chapter 1 (p. 9)

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

#### **QUESTION 17**

Accepting Mill's principle, as stated in passage 12, is consistent with accepting which of the following?

- a) It may be permissible to coerce someone to prevent harm to yourself.
- b) It may be permissible to coerce someone to prevent harm to others.
- c) It may be permissible to coerce someone to prevent coercion of others.
- d) Both a and b.
- e) All of a, b and c.

Passage 13, from Mill's *On Liberty* [directly following passage 12]:

It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion (a period long since reached in all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), compulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others.

### QUESTION 18

All of the following, except one, are true statements about passage 13? Which one is not true?

- a) Mill implies that Akbar and Charlemagne were despots.
- b) Mill implies that Akbar and Charlemagne intended to improve their subjects' lives.
- c) Mill implies that Akbar and Charlemagnes' subjects were not capable of being improved by free and equal discussion.
- d) Mill implies that the measures Akbar and Charlemagne took to improve their subjects' lives were somewhat successful.
- e) Mill implies that Akbar and Charlemagne raised up their subjects to the point where Mill's principle applied to them.

Passage 14, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty":

Mill confuses two distinct notions. One is that all coercion is, in so far as it frustrates human desires, bad as such, although it may have to be applied to prevent other, greater evils; while non-interference, which is the opposite of coercion, is good as such, although it is not the only good. The other is that men should seek to discover the truth, or to develop a certain type of character of which Mill approved – critical, original, imaginative, independent, non-conforming to the point of eccentricity, and so on – and that truth can be found, and such character can be bred, only in conditions of freedom. Both these are liberal views, but they are not identical, and the connection between them is, at best, empirical. No one would argue that truth or freedom of self-expression could flourish where dogma crushes all thought. But the evidence of history tends to show ... that integrity, love of truth and fiery individualism grow at least as often in severely disciplined communities, among, for example, the puritan Calvinists of Scotland or New England, or under military discipline, as in more tolerant or indifferent societies; and if this is so, Mill's argument for liberty as a necessary condition for the growth of human genius falls to the ground.

#### QUESTION 19

Which of the following is the best statement of the alleged 'confusion of two notions' Berlin discusses in passage 14?

- a) Mill fails to see that liberty can flourish in intolerant circumstances.
- b) Mill conflates genius with non-conformity.
- c) Mill conflates liberty as means to an end with liberty as an end in itself.
- d) Mill conflates coercion with the absence of non-interference.
- e) Mill conflates the value of truth with the value of a type of character.

Passage 15, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty":

This paradox has been often exposed. It is one thing to say that I know what is good for X, while he himself does not; and even to ignore his wishes for its – and his – sake; and a very different one to say that he has *eo ipso* chosen it, not indeed consciously, not as he seems in everyday life, but in his role as a rational self which his empirical self may not know – the 'real' self which discerns the good, and cannot help choosing it once it is revealed. This monstrous impersonation, which consists in equating what X would choose if he were something he is not, or at least not yet, with what X actually seeks and chooses, is at the heart of all political theories of self-realization. It is one thing to say that I may be coerced for my own good, which I am too blind to see: this may, on occasion, be for my benefit; indeed it may enlarge the scope of my liberty. It is another to say that if it is my good, then I am not being coerced, for I have willed it, whether I know this or not, and am free (or 'truly' free) even while my poor earthly body and foolish mind bitterly reject it, and struggle with the greatest desperation against those who seek, however benevolently, to impose it.

#### QUESTION 20

Suppose Mr. Lim is mentally ill and we are considering what to do. Which course of action is Berlin committed to opposing, since it cannot avoid the 'monstrous impersonation' he criticizes in passage 15?

- a) We will force Lim to take medicine for his condition, if it would be good for him.
- b) We will not force Lim to take medicine for his condition, even if it would be good for him.
- c) If we have reason to think Lim would want to take medicine for his condition, if only the condition itself did not prevent him from understanding it would be good for him, we will infer that Lim wants to take the medicine.
- d) If we have reason to think Lim would not want to take medicine for his condition, even if his condition itself did not prevent him from understanding it would be good for him, we will infer that Lim does not want to take the medicine.
- e) Even if Lim should take medicine for his condition, because it would be good for him, we will not infer that he wants to take the medicine.

**END OF PAPER**