

SECTION I

QUESTIONS 1-20; MULTIPLE CHOICE

1 point for each right answer, for a total of 20 points. (No penalty for wrong answers.)

Instructions:

A separate 1-page answer sheet accompanies this question paper. Record your answers in the blank spaces on the answer sheet. Answer by writing one letter (a-e) per question. Illegible or ambiguous answers will receive no credit.

Remember to write your matriculation number on the answer sheet; do not write your name on the answer sheet.

Passage 1, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (pdf, p. 3)

S: Is it a case, then, of your father killing another relative? But I suppose that much is obvious. It wouldn't make sense to prosecute your father for killing a stranger.

E: What makes no sense, Socrates, is for you to think it makes a difference whether the victim is a stranger or a relative. One should only consider whether the killer acted justly or not; if he acted justly, let him go; if not, prosecute even a killer who shares your hearth and home. You are just as polluted, remaining under the same roof with such a one, when you should be helping yourself and him by leading the way to divine cleanliness and justice.

QUESTION 1

In passage 1, Euthyphro thinks Socrates' remark makes no sense in light of *which* of the following alleged truths?

- a) It is worse to kill strangers than family members.
- b) It is worse to kill family members than strangers.
- c) Murder causes moral 'pollution' to descend not only upon murderers but upon those who associate with them.
- d) In considering whether a killing is just or unjust, it is wrong to take account of the killer's relationship to oneself.
- e) Both c) and d).

Passage 2, from Plato's *Euthyphro*, (pdf, p. 8):

S: Come now, my dear Euthyphro; tell me, that I may be the wiser for it, what proof you can offer that all gods deem this man unjustly killed – this servant-turned-murderer, bound by the master of his victim, who died in bondage before his captor learned from the seers what was to be done – and that all gods consider it right for a son to denounce and prosecute a father on behalf of such a one? Come, show me, if you can, a clear sign that all the gods definitely believe this action to be right. If you can produce an adequate proof of this I will sing praises of your wisdom forevermore.

E: This is maybe not so easily done, Socrates – though I could show you very clearly.

S: I quite understand that you think I'm dull-witted compared to the jury, since obviously you are going to show them that these actions were unjust and hated by all the gods.

E: I will show them clearly, Socrates – if only they will listen to me.

S: They will listen so long as you seem to speak well. But something occurred to me while you were talking – a thought I am even now turning over in my mind: 'Suppose Euthyphro does show me conclusively that all the gods consider such a death unjust. To what extent will he thereby have taught me the nature of holiness and unholiness? That such a deed is hated by all the gods – so much would seem to follow; but a definition of holiness and unholiness does not. For what is hated by the gods has also been shown to be loved by them.' So I won't keep pressing the point.

QUESTION 2

The first underlined portion of passage 2 is ironic because:

- a) Socrates obviously finds the whole complicated scenario of the murder to be hilarious.
- b) Socrates obviously has no confidence that Euthyphro can 'obviously' show the jury what he says he can.
- c) Socrates' precise narration of all the facts about the murder shows he is more a master of the details of the case than Euthyphro is.
- d) Socrates thinks there are clear answers to questions about the nature of 'justice', so it is quite impossible that there is no answer in this case.
- e) Both a and b.

QUESTION 3

In the second underlined portion of passage 2, Socrates raises an objection. Which of the following is the best characterization of the form of the objection.

- a) Euthyphro says he can answer a certain question, but what we really want is an answer to a different question.
- b) Euthyphro's arguments all rest on suppositions. But why should we accept those?
- c) Euthyphro has not managed to show that 'all the gods consider such a death unjust.'
- d) Euthyphro is confusing justice and theology. He assumes that if the gods love something it is just. But why shouldn't it be the other way around? If something is just, the gods love it?
- e) Even if Euthyphro shows that 'that such a deed is hated by all the gods,' he will not have shown that all the gods hate injustice.

Passage 3, from Plato's *Meno*, (pdf, p.8):

S: Do you take it for granted that there are people who desire bad things, and others who desire good things? Don't you think, my good man, that all men desire good things?

M: I certainly don't.

S: You think some want bad things, then?

M: Yes.

S: Do you mean that they believe the bad things to be good, or that they know they are bad and want them anyway?

M: I think there are both kinds.

S: Do you think, Meno, that anyone, knowing that bad things are bad, still wants them?

M: I certainly do.

S: Wants in what way? To have for himself?

M: What else?

S: Does he think the bad things benefit he who has them, or does he perfectly well know they will harm him?

M: There are some who believe bad things benefit them, others who know that they harm them.

S: And do you think that those who believe that bad things benefit them know they are bad?

M: No, that's something I can't quite believe.

S: It's clear, then, that those who do not know things to be bad do not want what is bad. What they want are things they think are good, that are in fact bad. It follows that those who have no knowledge about these things and believe them to be good clearly want good things. Isn't that right?

M: It is likely.

QUESTION 4

Which of the following would be the best (most convincing, for his purposes) illustration of Socrates' thesis, in the underlined section of passage 3?

- a) Kelvin, who is walking off a cliff in the dark, thinking there is solid ground there, obviously doesn't really want to fall off the cliff.
- b) Kelvin, who is walking off a cliff in the dark, thinking there is solid ground there, obviously really wants to fall, because otherwise why would he be wandering in the dark?
- c) Lin wants to sign a contract with Lee, but Lee is planning to cheat Lin, since he knows she does not really understand what she is signing.
- d) Lin wants to sign a contract with Lee, but Lee is planning to cheat Lin, since he knows she does not really understand what she is signing. Lin is not careful enough about guarding her own interests.
- e) b) and d) are equally good illustrations.

QUESTION 5

Which of the following quotations from Isaiah Berlin's "Two Concepts of Liberty" is in effect an objection to the argument Socrates makes in passage 3?

- a) "I am the possessor of reason and will; I conceive ends and I desire to pursue them; but if I am prevented from attaining them I no longer feel master of the situation." (p. 181)
- b) "It is easy for me to conceive of myself as coercing others for their own sake, in their, not my, interest. I am then claiming that I know what they truly need better than they know it themselves." (p. 179)
- c) "This monstrous impersonation, which consists in equating what X would choose if he were something he is not, or at least not yet, with what X actually seeks and chooses, is at the heart of all political theories of self-realization. It is one thing to say that I may be coerced for my own good . . . It is another to say that if it is my good, then I am not being coerced. (p. 180)
- d) "I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others." (p. 169)
- e) "What troubles the consciences of Western liberals is, I think, the belief, not that the freedom that men seek differs according to their social or economic conditions, but that the minority who possess it have gained it by exploiting, or, at least, averting their gaze from the vast majority who do not." (p. 172)

Passage 4, from Plato's *Meno*, (pdf, p. 25)

M: What is the trouble? Something is making you doubt virtue is knowledge?

S; I will tell you, Meno. I am not saying it is wrong to say virtue is teachable if it is knowledge, but see whether it isn't reasonable of me to doubt whether it is knowledge. Tell me this: if you take virtue, or any sort of teachable thing, won't there necessarily be those who teach it and others who learn it?

M: I think so.

S: On the other hand, if there are no teachers or learners of a given something, won't we be right to assume the subject cannot be taught?

M: Quite so, but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue?

S: I have often tried to find out whether there are any teachers of it, but in spite of my best efforts I cannot find any.

QUESTION 6

Which of the following would be a situation analogous to the one in which Socrates finds himself, in passage 4?

- a) A biologist believes Darwin's theory of evolution but is puzzled by the absence of intermediate forms from the fossil record. If Darwin is right, these should exist. But they have not been found, despite much searching. The biologist concludes that Darwinism is wrong.
- b) A biologist believes Darwin's theory of evolution but is puzzled by the absence of intermediate forms from the fossil record. If Darwin is right, these should exist. But they have not been found, despite much searching. The biologist does not conclude that Darwinism is wrong.
- c) A biologist believes that if a newly discovered species are mammals, the females should not lay eggs. But the females lay eggs. Therefore the species are not mammals.
- d) A biologist believes that if a newly discovered species are mammals, the females should not lay eggs. And the females do not lay eggs. Therefore the species are mammals.
- e) a) and c) are equally good analogies.

Passage 5, from Plato's *Republic*, Book I, (pdf, p. 5):

S: What it is that Simonides had to say about justice that you feel is correct?

P: He said that to give back what is owed to each person is just. I think he's right about that.

S: I wouldn't want to doubt the word of a wise and godlike man like Simonides, but his meaning – though maybe it's clear to you – is far from clear to me. To go back to what we were just saying, of course he doesn't mean that I should return weapons to a man who is out of his mind; and yet a thing held in trust is a sort of debt owed.

P: True.

S: But when the madman wants his weapons, I am not going to give them to him?

P: Certainly not.

QUESTION 7

In passage 5, Socrates brings up the hypothetical case of the madman who wants his weapons back as:

- a) An illustration of Simonides' notion of justice.
- b) An argument in support of Simonides' notion of justice.
- c) An apparent counter-example to Simonides' notion of justice.
- d) A means of clarifying Simonides' notion of justice.
- e) Both c) and d).

Passage 6, from Plato's *Republic*, Book I (continues from where passage 5 leaves off):

S: When Simonides said justice was the repayment of what is owed, he meant something different from this sort of case?

P: Something very different, by Zeus; for he thinks that a friend ought to do good to a friend, never evil.

S: You mean, then, that to return a thing held in trust – say, gold – if it would injure the receiver, and if both parties are friends, is not the repayment of what is owed; that is what you would think he would say?

P: Yes.

S: And are enemies also to receive what we owe them?

P: Certainly, he said, they are to receive what we owe them. An enemy, I take it, owes an enemy that which is due or proper to him – namely, something bad.

S: Simonides apparently spoke of the nature of justice in that way poets speak – very obscurely; for he really meant that justice is giving to each man his due; this he termed a debt.

P: That must have been what he meant, he said.

QUESTION 8

Which of the following are true of passage 6?

- a) Polemarchus maintains justice is the repayment of what is owed.
- b) Polemarchus agrees that Simonides spoke about justice in a poetic fashion.
- c) Polemarchus accepts that, in order to make sense of Simonides' words, some things should be considered 'repayments of debts' that wouldn't ordinarily be called that.
- d) Polemarchus accepts that, in order to make sense of Simonides' words, some things should not be considered 'repayments of debts' that ordinarily would be.
- e) All of a)-d)

Passage 7, from Descartes' "First Meditation", (pdf, p. 1):

So now that my mind is free of all cares, and I have arranged to be left in peaceful solitude, I will apply myself seriously and freely to the general demolition of my beliefs.

To achieve this end it will not be necessary for me to prove that all my beliefs are false, since it might not come to that. Rather, because reason now teaches me that I should be just as careful about withholding assent from uncertain, doubtful things as from patent falsehoods, the least bit of doubt on any point will suffice for complete rejection. And for this it will not be necessary to examine each article individually, which would be an endless task. Once the foundation of a building is undermined, everything above goes with it. So I will go straight for the basic principles underlying all my former beliefs.

QUESTION 9

Which of the following reasonable inferences from passage 7 would constitute a misunderstanding of Descartes' overall project in the "First Meditation"?

- a. Descartes believes all his beliefs are false but admits that 'it might not come to that.'
- b. Descartes believes that 'reason now teaches me' that, even in ordinary life, one should disbelieve anything not indubitably certain.
- c. When Descartes says that because 'I should be just as careful about withholding assent from uncertain, doubtful things as from patent falsehoods, the least bit of doubt on any point will suffice for complete rejection,' he means that if even one belief can be doubted, all beliefs should be 'rejected'.
- d. Descartes does not think that he needs to examine his beliefs one by one. He can demolish whole classes of belief at once.
- e. All of a, b and c are misrepresentations of Descartes' project.

Passage 8, from Descartes' "First Meditation" (pdf, p. 1):

Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true and assured I have gotten either from the senses or through the senses.

Passage 9, from Descartes' "Second Meditation" (pdf, p. 5)

Let us consider those things people commonly think they understand most distinctly of all: namely, those bodies that we touch and see. I do not mean bodies in general - for general perceptions are apt to be somewhat more confused - but one particular body. Let us take, for example, this piece of wax, just come from the comb. It has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey it contained; it retains some of the scent of the flowers from which it was gathered; its color, shape and size are apparent; it is hard, cool and can be readily handled; if you tap it with your knuckle it makes a sound. In short, it has everything which seems necessary to enable a body to be known as distinctly as possible. But see how, even as I speak, I place the wax by the fire: what remained of its taste evaporates, its scent dissipates, its color changes, its shape is lost, its size increases; it becomes liquid and hot; you can hardly touch it, and if you do it no longer makes a sound, But does the same wax remain? It must be granted that it does; no one denies it, no one thinks otherwise. So what was it about the wax that I understood with such distinctness? Evidently none of the features that I gleaned by means of the senses; for whatever had to do with taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has now changed – yet the wax remains.

QUESTION 10

If the conclusion of the argument in passage 9 is true, what follows concerning the claim in passage 8?

- a) Nothing.
- b) It is false.
- c) It is true.
- d) Both a) and b).
- e) Both b) and c).

Passage 10, from Descartes' "Second Meditation", (pdf, p. 6):

We say we see the wax itself, if it is there before us, not that we judge it to be there from its color or shape. And this might lead me to conclude without further ado that knowledge of the wax comes from what the eye sees, and not from the scrutiny of the mind alone. But if I then look out the window and see men crossing the square, as I just happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax. Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which could conceal ghosts or mechanical men? But I judge that they are men. And so something which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of judgement which is in my mind.

QUESTION 11

Which of the following statements about passage 10 are true?

- a) Descartes compares the color and shape of wax to the hats and coats of men on the street.
- b) Descartes compares the wax to men on the street.
- c) Descartes argues that we sometimes use the word 'see' when, strictly, we mean 'judge'.
- d) Descartes argues that, although we say we see the wax itself, this is somewhat misleading.
- e) All of a)-d) are true.

Passage 11, from David Chalmers, "The Puzzle of Conscious Experience":

It is widely believed that physics provides a complete catalogue of the universe's fundamental features and laws. As physicist Steven Weinberg puts it in his 1992 book *Dreams of a Final Theory*, the goal of physics is a "theory of everything" from which all there is to know about the universe can be derived. But Weinberg concedes that there is a problem with consciousness. Despite the power of physical theory, the existence of consciousness does not seem to be derivable from physical laws. He defends physics by arguing that it might eventually explain what he calls the objective correlates of consciousness (that is, the neural correlates), but of course to do this is not to explain consciousness itself. If the existence of consciousness cannot be derived from physical laws, a theory of physics is not a true theory of everything. So a final theory must contain an additional fundamental component.

Toward this end, I propose that conscious experience be considered a fundamental feature, irreducible to anything more basic. The idea may seem strange at first, but consistency seems to demand it. In the 19th century it turned out that electromagnetic phenomena could not be explained in terms of previously known principles. As a consequence, scientists introduced electromagnetic charge as a new fundamental entity and studied the associated fundamental laws. Similar reasoning should apply to consciousness. If existing fundamental theories cannot encompass it, then something new is required.

Where there is a fundamental property, there are fundamental laws. In this case, the laws must relate experience to elements of physical theory. These laws will almost certainly not interfere with those of the physical world; it seems that the latter form a closed system in their own right. Rather the laws will serve as a bridge, specifying how experience depends on underlying physical processes.

QUESTION 12

In passage 11, which of the following does Chalmers simply assert without providing (in this passage) argument/evidence? [The possible answers are all quotes, or nearly, and underlined in the passage.]

- a) It is widely believed that physics provides a complete catalogue of the universe's fundamental features and laws.
- b) Conscious experience [should] be considered a fundamental feature, irreducible to anything more basic.
- c) To do this [explain physical/consciousness correlations] is not to explain consciousness itself.
- d) Where there is a fundamental property, there are fundamental laws.
- e) Both a) and b).

QUESTION 13

Which of the following is the best statement of Chalmers' main objection to Weinberg, in the first paragraph of passage 11.

- a) Weinberg does not concede that there is any problem concerning consciousness.
- b) Weinberg concedes that there is a problem concerning consciousness.
- c) Weinberg hopes for a physical 'theory of everything', i.e. a complete explanation of all facts, including those about consciousness, in physical terms. But the theory Weinberg outlines will not, even in the best case, explain everything. So 'theory of everything' is false advertising.
- d) Weinberg hopes for a physical 'theory of everything', i.e. a complete explanation of all facts, including those about consciousness, in physical terms. But the theory Weinberg outlines is incoherent. So we can tell already that it cannot be right.
- e) Chalmers' has two main objections: a) and c).

Passage 12, from John Barrow, *Pi in the Sky*, p. 268:

There is one curious example of the effectiveness of mathematics that weighs heavily upon the side of those who would convince us that mathematics is discovered and existed before there were any such creatures as mathematicians.

When modern astronomers observe the structure of the distant Universe of stars and galaxies they are not determining the nature of the Universe's structure 'now'. They are seeing distant objects as they were far in our past. In fact, in many cases we are seeing them long before any form of life existed on Earth...The fact that the mathematical structure of the object being observed coincides with that given by our mathematical analysis on Earth *here and now* witnesses to the fact that there is an intrinsic mathematical aspect to these objects that is observer independent . . . This gives us confidence in the existence of some universal substructure that is mathematical in nature.

QUESTION 14

Mr. X believes he need not accept the conclusion of Barrow's argument in passage 12, since the argument presupposes something Mr. X does not accept. Which of the following could be X's belief? (To put it another way: which of the following, if X believes it, gives him a reason not to accept Barrows' conclusion?)

- a) Mathematical truths are discovered, not created.
- b) Observers cannot alter the events they observe.
- c) Mathematical truths are created, not discovered.
- d) Something that happens now can alter the character of past events.
- e) Something that happens now cannot alter the character of past events.

Passage 13, from John Barrow, *Pi in the Sky*, p. 267:

Another intriguing aspect of mathematics that seems to distinguish it from the arts and humanities is the extent to which mathematicians, like scientists, collaborate in their work. A very large fraction of the articles published in the research journals of mathematics have multiple authorship. Such collaboration is rare in the arts unless it arises through a rather strict demarcation of contributions, as was the case with Gilbert and Sullivan's operettas, where one of the duo composed the music, the other the lyrics. There are also some instances of painters who specialize in producing background landscapes on which others paint human figures or animals. As one moves farther away from realist to abstract painting, this division of labour becomes less and less feasible. But in science and mathematics the collaborative process often goes much deeper to entwine the authors in a process of dialogue and mutual criticism in which they are able to produce a result that could not have been even half-reached by one of them. Perhaps we should regard this distinction between the arts and the sciences in the same way as we do the fact that the same scientific or mathematical discoveries are often made 'independently' by different individuals but artistic creations are unique. Is it evidence that the sciences and mathematics are dominated by a strong objective element that is independent of the investigator(s), whose role is primarily that of discovery? The artist or creative writer, by contrast, is offering an almost entirely subjective creation that emanates from the creative mind of the individual. Indeed, it is this non-objective element in the creative process that is so attractive. It is inherently unpredictable and unsystematic.

QUESTION 15

What is the significance, according to Barrow, of the fact that collaboration is the norm in the sciences and the exception in the arts and humanities?

- a) Barrow thinks this may show that the sciences are more valuable than the arts and humanities.
- d) Barrow thinks this may explain why the arts and humanities are often more attractive and creative than the sciences.
- c) Barrow thinks this may be evidence of the objectivity of science and the subjectivity of the arts and humanities.
- d) Barrow thinks this proves the objectivity of science and the subjectivity of the arts and humanities.
- e) Barrow thinks this proves that artists who collaborate must make strictly demarcated contributions to the overall product.

Passage 14, from John Barrow, *Pi in the Sky*, p. 274:

The vagueness of the Platonic position boils down to its fudging of the issue of how we gain access to this world of mathematical ideas – what is the source of mathematical intuition? It is one thing to maintain that there exists another eternal Platonic world of mathematical forms but quite another to maintain that we can dip into it through some special mental effort. But without the possibility of such contact, mathematical truths must be regarded as essentially unknowable and our theories of sets and numbers cannot really be about the mathematical entities themselves.

Passage 15, from Lakoff and Nuñez, *Where Mathematics Comes From*, p. 2:

Is there, as Platonists have suggested, a disembodied mathematics transcending all bodies and mind and structuring the universe – this universe and every possible universe? ... Our answer is straightforward. Theorems that human beings prove are within a human mathematical conceptual system. All the mathematical knowledge that we have or can have is knowledge within human mathematics. There is no way to know whether theorems proved by human mathematicians have any objective truth, external to human beings or any other beings.

QUESTION 16

Which of the following pairs accurately characterizes the relationship between passage 14 and passage 15?

- a) 14 states what Platonism *is*. 15 denies that Platonism is true.
- b) 14 states that, if Platonism is true, it may be impossible for our mathematical beliefs to be objectively true, which makes a mockery of Platonic aspirations; 15 states that it is impossible for our mathematical beliefs to be objectively true, which makes a mockery of Platonic aspirations.
- c) 14 raises an objection to Platonism: if there are Platonic objects, it may be impossible for us to have knowledge of them. 15 states the same objection more forcefully, changing 'may be' to 'is'.
- d) 14 raises an objection to Platonism: if it is impossible to have knowledge of Platonic objects, Platonism cannot be right. 15 states the same objection more weakly: Platonism may be true, but we cannot know it.
- e) Both b) and c) are accurate characterizations.

Passage 16, from C. S. Lewis, "Bluspels and Flalansferes" (p. 151):

We talked as if the present-day user of the word *anima* [soul] could prove his right to neglect that word's buried metaphor by turning round and giving us an account of the soul which was not metaphorical at all. That he has power to dispense with the particular metaphor of *breath*, is, of course agreed. But we have not yet inquired what he can substitute for it. If we turn to those who are most anxious to tell us about the soul – I mean the psychologists – we shall find that the word *anima* has simply been replaced by complexes, repressions, censors, engrams, and the like. In other words the *breath* has been exchanged for *tyings-up*, *shovings-back*, *Roman magistrates*, and *scratchings*. If we inquire what has replaced the metaphorical *bright sky* of primitive theology, we shall only get a *perfect substance*, that is, a *completely made lying-under*. . . . The point need not be laboured. It is abundantly clear that the freedom from a given metaphor which we admittedly enjoy in some cases is often only a freedom to choose between that metaphor and others.

QUESTION 17

Which of the following is the best statement of C. S. Lewis' overall point in passage 16?

- a) Psychology is unable to arrive at a non-metaphorical account of the nature of the human mind, or soul.
- b) The present-day user of the word *anima* [soul] can prove his right to neglect the word's buried metaphor by giving an account of the soul that is not metaphorical.
- c) Over time, the word *anima* has been replaced by complexes, repressions, censors, engrams and the like. A similar fate has overtaken the word *breath*.
- d) It is impossible to exchange all our metaphorical usages for literal usages.
- e) Often it is possible to trade a given metaphorical usage for other metaphorical usages, but impossible to trade it for a literal usage.

Passage 17, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", p. 174:

What made the protection of individual liberty so sacred to Mill? In his famous essay he declares that, unless the individual is left to live as he wishes in 'the part of [his conduct] which merely concerns himself,' civilization cannot advance; the truth will not, for lack of a free market in ideas, come to light; there will be no scope for spontaneity, originality, genius, for mental energy, for moral courage. Society will be crushed by the weight of 'collective mediocrity'. Whatever is rich and diversified will be crushed by the weight of custom, by men's constant tendency to conformity, which breeds only 'withered' capacities, 'pinched and hidebound', 'cramped and dwarfed' human beings...

Mill confuses two distinct notions. One is that all coercion is, in so far as it frustrates human desires, bad as such, although it may have to be applied to prevent other, greater evils; while non-interference, which is the opposite of coercion, is good as such, although it is not the only good. The other is that men should seek to discover the truth, or to develop a certain type of character of which Mill approved – critical, original, imaginative, independent, non-conforming to the point of eccentricity, and so on – and that truth can be found, and such character can be bred, only in conditions of freedom. Both these are liberal views, but they are not identical, and the connection between them is, at best, empirical. No one would argue that truth or freedom of self-expression could flourish where dogma crushes all thought. But the evidence of history tends to show...that integrity, love of truth and fiery individualism grow at least as often in severely disciplined communities, among, for example, the puritan Calvinists of Scotland or New England, or under military discipline, as in more tolerant or indifferent societies; and if this is so, Mill's argument for liberty as a necessary condition for the growth of human genius falls to the ground.

QUESTION 18

In passage 17, Berlin states then criticizes Mill's view of the value of individual liberty. What is Mill's view, as stated by Berlin?

- a) The dangers of coercion must be balanced against the dangers of non-interference.
- b) Liberty is inherently valuable, since freedom is an end in itself.
- c) Liberty is necessary for the advancement of civilization, individual genius, so forth.
- d) Liberty is sufficient for the advancement of civilization, individual genius, so forth.
- e) Liberty is necessary and sufficient for the advancement of civilization, individual genius, so forth.

QUESTION 19

In passage 17, Berlin claims that Mill's 'confusion of two notions' causes him to make which of the following mistakes?

- a) Mill distinguishes between the value of individual liberty and the value of civilization and individual genius, but these values are not really distinct.
- b) Mill implies that all free individuals must be civilized geniuses, but this is not obviously so.
- c) Mill defends individual liberty on the grounds that it is necessary for civilization and individual genius, but this is not obviously so.
- d) Mill defends individual liberty on the grounds that it is indistinguishable from civilization and individual genius, but this is not obviously so.
- e) Mill defends civilization and individual genius on the grounds that they are necessary for individual liberty, but this is not obviously so.

Passage 18, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", p. 171-2:

'Freedom for the pike is death for the minnows'. Freedom for an Oxford don, others have been known to add, is a very different thing from freedom for an Egyptian peasant.

This proposition derives its force from something that is both true and important, but the phrase itself remains a piece of political claptrap. It is true that to offer political rights, or safeguard against intervention by the State, to men who are half-naked, illiterate, underfed and diseased is to mock their condition; they need medical help or education before they can understand, or make use of, an increase in their freedom. What is freedom to those who cannot make use of it? Without adequate conditions for the use of freedom what is the value of freedom? First things come first: there are situations in which – to use a saying satirically attributed to the nihilists by Dostoyevsky – boots are superior to Pushkin; individual freedom is not everyone's primary need. For freedom is not the mere absence of frustration of whatever kind; this would inflate the meaning of the word until it meant too much or too little. The Egyptian peasant needs clothes or medicine before, and more than, personal liberty, but the minimum freedom that he needs today, and the greater degree of freedom that he may need tomorrow, is not some species of freedom peculiar to him, but identical with that of professors, artists and millionaires.

What troubles the consciences of Western liberals is, I think, the belief, not that the freedom that men seek differs according to the social or economic conditions, but that the minority who possess it have gained it by exploiting, or, at least, averting their gaze from the vast majority who do not.

QUESTION 20

In passage 18, Berlin accuses those who say that 'freedom for an Oxford don is a different thing than freedom for an Egyptian peasant' of making which of the following mistakes.

- a) Trivializing the very real hardships faced by Oxford dons denied their freedom.
- b) Trivializing the hardships faced by Egyptian peasants, by comparing them to Oxford dons.
- c) Confusing a guilty sense that the don's freedom is made possible by the peasant's unfreedom with the thought that freedom for the one a different sort of thing than freedom for the other.
- d) Arguing from the fact that the peasant has a more immediate need for clothes or medicine than for freedom to the conclusion that freedom for him would be different in kind from that enjoyed by those who already have enough clothes and medicine.
- e) Both c) and d).

END OF PAPER