

SECTION I

QUESTIONS 1-22; MULTIPLE CHOICE

1 point for each right answer, for a total of 22 points. (No penalty for wrong answers.)

Instructions:

A separate 1-page answer sheet accompanies this question paper. Record your answers in the blank spaces on the answer sheet. Answer by writing one letter (a-e) per question. Illegible or ambiguous answers will receive no credit.

Remember to write your matriculation number on the answer sheet; do not write your name on the answer sheet.

Passage 1, from Plato's *Euthyphro* (pdf, p. 7):

S: Well now, Euthyphro, have you ever heard any man arguing that one who has murdered or otherwise acted unjustly should not pay the penalty?

E: There are endless disputes about this sort of thing, both in and out of the courts, because wrongdoers will say and do anything to avoid getting punished.

S: Do they admit they have done wrong, Euthyphro, but maintain that, even so, they should not be punished?

E: No, they don't admit it.

S: So then they don't say or do just anything. For they don't go so far as to admit this, nor do they go so far as to deny they should pay the penalty if they did wrong. But I think they do deny wrong-doing, don't they?

E: That's how it is.

S: Then they don't dispute that wrongdoers must be punished, only who did wrong, what they did, and when.

E: You are right.

QUESTION 1

Which of the following is the best statement of Socrates' main point, in passage 1?

- a) Wrongdoers must be punished.
- b) Wrongdoers must be punished whether they admit their crimes or not.
- c) Whether someone does wrong depends on whether he/she admits wrongdoing.
- d) Even wrongdoers admit wrongdoers must be punished, but not all wrongdoers admit they do wrong.
- e) Everyone admits wrongdoers often refuse to admit that the things they do are wrong.

Passage 2, from Plato's *Euthyphro*, (pdf, p. 8):

S: Come now, my dear Euthyphro; tell me, that I may be the wiser for it, what proof you can offer that all gods deem this man unjustly killed – this servant-turned-murderer, bound by the master of his victim, who died in bondage before his captor learned from the seers what was to be done – and that all gods consider it right for a son to denounce and prosecute a father on behalf of such a one? Come, show me, if you can, a clear sign that all the gods definitely believe this action to be right. If you can produce an adequate proof of this I will sing praises of your wisdom forevermore.

E: This is maybe not so easily done, Socrates – though I could show you very clearly.

S: I quite understand that you think I'm dull-witted compared to the jury, since obviously you are going to show them that these actions were unjust and hated by all the gods.

E; I will show them clearly, Socrates – if only they will listen to me.

S: They will listen so long as you seem to speak well. But something occurred to me while you were talking – a thought I am even now turning over in my mind: 'Suppose Euthyphro does show me conclusively that all the gods consider such a death unjust. To what extent will he thereby have taught me the nature of holiness and unholiness? That such a deed is hated by all the gods – so much would seem to follow; but a definition of holiness and unholiness does not. For what is hated by the gods has also been shown to be loved by them.' So I won't keep pressing the point.

QUESTION 2

The underlined portion of passage 2 is ironic because:

- a) Socrates doesn't really think Euthyphro thinks he is duller than the average member of the jury.
- b) It is far from obvious that Euthyphro will be able to show clearly what he says he will show clearly.
- c) Socrates does not actually pretend to understand the complexities of the case, so he does not really mean 'I quite understand. . . '
- d) Socrates does not think there are clear answers to questions about the nature of 'justice', so it is quite impossible that the gods will all be in agreement about them.
- e) Both a and b.

QUESTION 3

In passage 2, Socrates raises which of the following objections to what Euthyphro has claimed?

- a) It seems to follow from what Euthyphro says that 'all the gods consider such a death unjust.' But that cannot be demonstrated.
- b) It seems to follow from the fact that 'all the gods consider such a death unjust' that all the gods will love Euthyphro's prosecution of his father. But that cannot be demonstrated.
- c) Euthyphro has not managed to show that 'all the gods consider such a death unjust.'
- d) Even if Euthyphro shows 'that such a deed is hated by all the gods,' he still will not have defined 'holiness'.
- e) Even if Euthyphro shows that 'that such a deed is hated by all the gods,' he will not have shown that all the gods hate injustice.

Passage 3, from Plato's *Meno*, (pdf, p.8):

S: Do you take it for granted that there are people who desire bad things, and others who desire good things? Don't you think, my good man, that all men desire good things?

M: I certainly don't.

S: You think some want bad things, then?

M: Yes.

S: Do you mean that they believe the bad things to be good, or that they know they are bad and want them anyway?

M: I think there are both kinds.

S: Do you think, Meno, that anyone, knowing that bad things are bad, still wants them?

M: I certainly do.

S: Wants in what way? To have for himself?

M: What else?

S: Does he think the bad things benefit he who has them, or does he perfectly well know they will harm him?

M: There are some who believe bad things benefit them, others who know that they harm them.

S: And do you think that those who believe that bad things benefit them know they are bad?

M: No, that's something I can't quite believe.

S: It's clear, then, that those who do not know things to be bad do not want what is bad. What they want are things they think are good, that are in fact bad. It follows that those who have no knowledge about these things and believe them to be good clearly want good things. Isn't that right?

M: It is likely.

QUESTION 4

Which of the following conclusions does Socrates take himself to have established by the end of passage 3?

- a) Everyone wants good things.
- b) No one desires bad things.
- c) Those who believe bad things benefit them cannot really want those things.
- d) Those who know bad things harm them cannot really want those things.
- e) All of a)-d)

QUESTION 5

Which of the following quotations from Isaiah Berlin's "Two Concepts of Liberty" is in effect an objection to the argument Socrates makes in passage 3?

- a) "It is one thing to say that I know what is good for X, while he himself does not; and even to ignore his wishes for its – and his - sake; and a very different one to say that he has...chosen it." (p. 180)
- b) "Where ends are agreed, the only question left are those of means." (p. 166)
- c) "It is easy for me to conceive of myself as coercing others for their own sake, in their, not my, interest. I am then claiming that I know what they truly need better than they know it themselves." (p. 179)
- d) "If I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may be, enslaved." (p. 169)
- e) "Self-denial may be a source of integrity or serenity and spiritual strength, but it is difficult to see how it can be called an enlargement of liberty." (p. 186)

Passage 4, from Plato's *Meno*, (pdf, p. 6)

S: Now then, let me try to tell you what shape is. See whether you will accept the following account: shape, let's say, is the one thing that invariably accompanies color. Does this satisfy you, or do you want to go about defining the term in some other way? For myself, I would be satisfied if you defined virtue in some such way as this.

M: But this is a silly sort of definition, Socrates.

S: How so?

M: It's silly that you say shape always accompanies color. Because what if someone says he doesn't know what color is. He's just as confused about color as he is about shape. Now what do you say about your definition?

S: That it is certainly a true one; and if my questioner is going to turn out to be one of those clever debaters who turns everything into a competition I will say to him: 'I have given my answer; if it is wrong, it's up to you to refute it.' On the other hand, if we are among friends – as you and I are – and if we want to pursue the question, we must answer in a manner more conducive to agreeable, productive discussion. By this I mean that answers given must not only be true; they must also be made in terms the questioner admits to understanding.

QUESTION 6

Meno objects that Socrates' definition of 'shape' is silly because:

- a) It is silly to define terms that everyone already understands.
- b) It is silly to define terms by means of further terms no one understands.
- c) It is silly to define 'shape' in terms of something that is not a shape.
- d) It is silly to claim that shapes are always colored.
- e) It is silly to define 'shape' using terms someone might not understand.

QUESTION 7

In response to Meno's objection, Socrates in effect makes which of the following points?

- a) Productive discussion requires competition between clever debaters.
- b) Answers must be true if they are to be understood by the questioner.
- c) It is possible for someone not to understand a true definition.
- d) Answers to questions ought to be made using terms the questioner understands.
- e) Both c) and d).

Passage 5, from Plato's *Republic*, Book I, (pdf, p. 2):

Cephalus: Men my age flock together; we are birds of a feather, as the proverb says; and at our meetings most of my friends weep and moan – they long for the pleasures of youth, and reminisce about sex and drinking and feasting and everything else like that. They feel annoyed, as if they have been robbed of something great, and say, 'life used to be good; now it's not worth living.' Some complain about old people being disrespected in their own households; they sing a sad song blaming age for being the cause of all their woes. But to me, Socrates, these whiners put the blame in the wrong place. If old age really caused all these evils, I – and every single other old man, for that matter – would feel the way they do. But I don't, and neither do others I have known.

QUESTION 8

In passage 5, Cephalus' proof that old age does not cause misery relies on which of the following general principles?

- a) If A does not cause B, it is impossible to have B without A.
- b) If A does not cause B, it is impossible to have A without B.
- c) If A causes B, it is impossible to have A without B.
- d) If A causes B, it is impossible to have B without A.
- e) If A causes B, then B causes A.

Passage 6, from Plato's *Republic*, Book I (continues from where passage 5 leaves off):

Yes, Cephalus, I said; but I think most people wouldn't buy it, coming from you; they would say you bear your old age well not because of your disposition but because of your money. For, so they say, 'being rich has many consolations.'

You're right, he replied; that's just what they would say: and there is something to it; but not as much as you might think. I could answer back the same way Themistocles answered that Seriphian who insulted him, saying he was only famous because he was Athenian, not because he deserved it. To that he said: 'It's true; I wouldn't have made it to the top from Seriphos; but you wouldn't have gotten anywhere even if you started in Athens.' The same applies to those who are poor and miserable in old age. A man of good character won't find it easy to be both old and poor; but a man of bad character isn't going to be made happy by any amount of money.

QUESTION 9

In passage 6, Cephalus modifies his position somewhat in response to Socrates' objection. Which of the following is the best statement of Cephalus' modified position?

- a) Good character is necessary but not sufficient for happiness in old age.
- b) Good character is sufficient but not necessary for happiness in old age.
- c) Good character neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness in old age.
- d) Good character is necessary and sufficient for happiness in old age.
- e) Happiness in old age is necessary and sufficient for wealth.

Passage 7, from Descartes, "First Meditation", (pdf, p. 1):

Yet although the senses sometimes deceive us with respect to barely perceivable and distant objects, one finds that concerning many other matters no reasonable doubt is possible, even though these things are known through the senses: for example, that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in my hand, and other things of a similar nature.

QUESTION 10

In passage 7, Descartes' claims about the senses are most analogous to which of the following?

- a) Although a microscope may be useless for studying the properties of quarks, it is reliable for studying larger things like cells and molecules.
- b) Microscopes deceive us, for example when we see our own eye reflected back. But, so long as we take care not to be deceived, no reasonable doubt is possible about what we are seeing.
- c) Microscopes are unreliable instruments for investigating stars and planets. To study such large and distant objects there can be no doubt one needs a telescope.
- d) Using a microscope to study large and distant objects is like using a telescope to study small objects close-up.
- e) No scientific instrument can be universally useful. Telescopes will work best for studying some things, microscopes for studying others. Nothing can be both telescope and microscope.

Passage 8, from Descartes' "First Meditation" (pdf, p. 1):

Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true and assured I have gotten either from the senses or through the senses.

Passage 9, from Descartes' "Second Meditation" (pdf, p. 5)

Let us consider those things people commonly think they understand most distinctly of all: namely, those bodies that we touch and see. I do not mean bodies in general - for general perceptions are apt to be somewhat more confused - but one particular body. Let us take, for example, this piece of wax, just come from the comb. It has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey it contained; it retains some of the scent of the flowers from which it was gathered; its color, shape and size are apparent; it is hard, cool and can be readily handled; if you tap it with your knuckle it makes a sound. In short, it has everything which seems necessary to enable a body to be known as distinctly as possible. But see how, even as I speak, I place the wax by the fire: what remained of its taste evaporates, its scent dissipates, its color changes, its shape is lost, its size increases; it becomes liquid and hot; you can hardly touch it, and if you do it no longer makes a sound, But does the same wax remain? It must be granted that it does; no one denies it, no one thinks otherwise. So what was it about the wax that I understood with such distinctness? Evidently none of the features that I gleaned by means of the senses; for whatever had to do with taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has now changed – yet the wax remains.

QUESTION 11

Which of the following is the best statement of the logical relationship between passage 8 and passage 9.

- a) Passage 9 is summarized by the claim in passage 8.
- b) Passage 9 argues for the claim in passage 8.
- c) Passage 9 argues against the claim in passage 8.
- d) Passage 9 illustrates the claim in passage 8 with a concrete example.
- e) Passage 9 explores the concrete consequences of the claim in passage 8.

Passage 10, from Descartes' "Second Meditation", (pdf, p. 6):

We say we see the wax itself, if it is there before us, not that we judge it to be there from its color or shape. And this might lead me to conclude without further ado that knowledge of the wax comes from what the eye sees, and not from the scrutiny of the mind alone. But if I then look out the window and see men crossing the square, as I just happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax. Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which could conceal ghosts or mechanical men? But I judge that they are men. And so something which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of judgement which is in my mind.

QUESTION 10

Which of the following statements about passage 10 is false?

- a) Descartes compares the wax to men on the street.
- b) Descartes compares the color and shape of wax to the hats and coats of men on the street.
- c) Descartes compares human eyes to windows on the external world of things.
- d) Descartes argues that we sometimes use the word 'see' when, strictly, we mean 'judge'.
- e) Descartes argues that, although we say we see the wax itself, this is somewhat misleading.

Passage 11, from David Chalmers, "The Puzzle of Conscious Experience":

It is widely believed that physics provides a complete catalogue of the universe's fundamental features and laws. As physicist Steven Weinberg puts it in his 1992 book *Dreams of a Final Theory*, the goal of physics is a "theory of everything" from which all there is to know about the universe can be derived. But Weinberg concedes that there is a problem with consciousness. Despite the power of physical theory, the existence of consciousness does not seem to be derivable from physical laws. He defends physics by arguing that it might eventually explain what he calls the objective correlates of consciousness (that is, the neural correlates), but of course to do this is not to explain consciousness itself. If the existence of consciousness cannot be derived from physical laws, a theory of physics is not a true theory of everything. So a final theory must contain an additional fundamental component.

Toward this end, I propose that conscious experience be considered a fundamental feature, irreducible to anything more basic. The idea may seem strange at first, but consistency seems to demand it. In the 19th century it turned out that electromagnetic phenomena could not be explained in terms of previously known principles. As a consequence, scientists introduced electromagnetic charge as a new fundamental entity and studied the associated fundamental laws. Similar reasoning should apply to consciousness. If existing fundamental theories cannot encompass it, then something new is required.

Where there is a fundamental property, there are fundamental laws. In this case, the laws must relate experience to elements of physical theory. These laws will almost certainly not interfere with those of the physical world; it seems that the latter form a closed system in their own right. Rather the laws will serve as a bridge, specifying how experience depends on underlying physical processes.

QUESTION 13

In passage 11, Chalmers criticizes Steven Weinberg on the following grounds:

- a) Weinberg believes physics may succeed as a 'theory of everything' if it discovers the objective (neural) correlates of consciousness, but correlation does not equal explanation.
- b) Weinberg believes physics may succeed as a 'theory of everything', but he fails to acknowledge the problem of consciousness.
- c) Weinberg believes physics may eventually discover the objective (neural) correlates of consciousness, but this is implausible.
- d) Weinberg concedes that there is a problem with consciousness, but does not distinguish between the explanation of consciousness and the existence of consciousness.
- e) Both c) and d).

QUESTION 14

Which of the following, if true, would constitute grounds for doubting the feasibility of Chalmers' proposal, as outlined in passage 11?

- a) All fundamental physical properties may be governed by fundamental laws, but there is no reason to think fundamental non-physical properties must be law-governed as well.
- b) There is no reason to suppose that consciousness will turn out to be an electromagnetic phenomenon.
- c) It might be possible to discover the neural correlates to consciousness, as Weinberg suggests.
- d) Even if consciousness can be compared to electromagnetism, it does not follow that consciousness is a physical phenomenon.
- e) Both a) and c).

Passage 12, from John Barrow, *Pi in the Sky*, p. 268:

There is one curious example of the effectiveness of mathematics that weighs heavily upon the side of those who would convince us that mathematics is discovered and existed before there were any such creatures as mathematicians.

When modern astronomers observe the structure of the distant Universe of stars and galaxies they are not determining the nature of the Universe's structure 'now'. They are seeing distant objects as they were far in our past. In fact, in many cases we are seeing them long before any form of life existed on Earth...The fact that the mathematical structure of the object being observed coincides with that given by our mathematical analysis on Earth *here and now* witnesses to the fact that there is an intrinsic mathematical aspect to these objects that is observer independent . . . This gives us confidence in the existence of some universal substructure that is mathematical in nature.

QUESTION 15

In making his argument in passage 12, Barrow clearly assumes which of the following?

- a) Mathematical truths are discovered, not created.
- b) Mathematical truths are created, not discovered.
- c) Something that happens now cannot alter the character of past events.
- d) Something that happens now can alter the character of past events.
- e) Observers cannot alter the events they observe.

Passage 13, from John Barrow, *Pi in the Sky*, p. 267:

Another intriguing aspect of mathematics that seems to distinguish it from the arts and humanities is the extent to which mathematicians, like scientists, collaborate in their work. A very large fraction of the articles published in the research journals of mathematics have multiple authorship. Such collaboration is rare in the arts unless it arises through a rather strict demarcation of contributions, as was the case with Gilbert and Sullivan's operettas, where one of the duo composed the music, the other the lyrics. There are also some instances of painters who specialize in producing background landscapes on which others paint human figures or animals. As one moves farther away from realist to abstract painting, this division of labour becomes less and less feasible. But in science and mathematics the collaborative process often goes much deeper to entwine the authors in a process of dialogue and mutual criticism in which they are able to produce a result that could not have been even half-reached by one of them. Perhaps we should regard this distinction between the arts and the sciences in the same way as we do the fact that the same scientific or mathematical discoveries are often made 'independently' by different individuals but artistic creations are unique. Is it evidence that the sciences and mathematics are dominated by a strong objective element that is independent of the investigator(s), whose role is primarily that of discovery? The artist or creative writer, by contrast, is offering an almost entirely subjective creation that emanates from the creative mind of the individual. Indeed, it is this non-objective element in the creative process that is so attractive. It is inherently unpredictable and unsystematic.

QUESTION 16

Only one of the following claims is clearly consistent with what Barrow claims in passage 13. Which one is it? (To put the question another way: four of the following would constitute potential objections to what Barrow claims. Which one would not?)

- a) Since almost all artists belong to schools or movements, almost all artistic creations are effectively collaborative, although it is hard to demarcate individual contributions.
- b) Some scientific endeavors are collaborative but involve a strict demarcation of individual contributions.
- b) It is always feasible for artists to collaborate on abstract paintings but for economic and cultural reasons it is not usually done.
- d) Artists engaged in collaborative art works are often deeply entwined in dialogue and mutual criticism of each other's contributions to the overall product.
- e) Art that is too predictable is dull, but any creation that was inherently unpredictable and unsystematic would be extremely dull, since it would be incomprehensible.

Passage 14, from Lakoff and Nuñez, *Where Mathematics Comes From*, p. 343:

There is another popular view close to transcendental mathematics but not identical – the idea that mathematics is part of the physical world. This view is based on the enormous success that mathematics has had in physics, where mathematics is used to describe phenomena and make correct predictions with great accuracy. In many cases, physical regularities can be stated briefly and succinctly in terms of “laws” formulated in mathematical terms. This fact has often been misstated as “The universe runs according to mathematical laws,” as if the laws came first and the physical universe “obeyed” the laws. Accordingly, the “truth” of physical laws formulated in mathematical terms is taken as indicating that the mathematics used in stating the physical laws is actually there in the physical universe. Since the regularities of the physical universe exist external to human beings, so mathematics itself must exist external to human beings as part of the physical universe.

There is a great deal that is wrong with this argument. First, no one observes laws of the universe as such; what are observed empirically are *regularities* of the universe. Regularities in the universe exist independent of us. *Laws* are mathematical statements made up by human beings to attempt to characterise those *regularities* experienced in the physical universe.

QUESTION 17

In passage 14, Lakoff and Nuñez object to talk about ‘laws’, preferring talk about ‘regularities’. But ‘regularity’ is related to the word ‘regulation’, which is just another word for ‘law’. So it might be objected that there can be no basis for preferring ‘regularity’ to ‘law’. On the basis of passage 14, Lakoff and Nuñez would clearly want to make all of the following responses to this objection except one. (Which one response is plainly inconsistent with what is maintained by the authors of passage 14?)

- a) Regularities are observable; laws are not. Therefore, ‘law’ does not mean the same as ‘regularity’.
- b) ‘Law’ suggests something that pre-exists the physical universe. Regularities, by contrast, are features of the physical universe.
- c) Natural laws are human inventions. Physical regularities, which exist independently of human beings, are not.
- d) Laws are statements about regularities; laws are not the regularities themselves.
- e) ‘Law’ wrongly implies the existence of transcendent mathematics beyond or behind the physical world; ‘regularity’ rightly locates mathematics in the physical world itself.

Passage 15, from C. S. Lewis, "Bluspels and Flalansferes", p. 142:

I may attempt to explain the Kantian philosophy to a pupil by the following metaphor. 'Kant answered the question "How do I know that whatever comes round the corner will be blue?" by the supposition "I am wearing blue spectacles." In time I may come to use "the blue spectacles" as a kind of shorthand for the whole Kantian machinery of the categories and forms of perception. And let us suppose, for the sake of analogy with the real history of language, that I continue to use this expression long after I have forgotten the metaphor which originally gave rise to it. And perhaps by this time the form of the word will have changed. Instead of the 'blue spectacles' I may now talk of the *bloospel* or even the *bluspel*. If I live long enough to reach my dotage I may even enter on a philological period in which I attempt to find the derivation of this mysterious word. I may suppose that the second element is derived from the word *spell* and look back with interest on the supposed period when Kant appeared to me to be magical; or else, arguing that the world word is clearly formed on the analogy of *gospel*, may indulge in unhistorical reminiscences of the days when the *Critique* [a book by Kant] seemed to me irrefragably true. But how far, if at all, will my thinking about Kant be affected by all this linguistic process? . . . The mere forgetting of the metaphor does not seem to alter my thinking about Kant, just as the original metaphor did not limit my thinking about Kant.

QUESTION 18

In passage 15, C. S. Lewis constructs a proof by example of which of the following?

- a) When we use words that are metaphorical in origin, our meaning is always determined by the meaning of the original metaphor.
- b) When we use words that are metaphorical in origin, our meaning is always independent of the original metaphor.
- c) When we use words that are metaphorical in origin, our meaning is sometimes determined by the original metaphor.
- d) When we use words that are metaphorical in origin, our meaning is sometimes independent of the original metaphor.
- e) When we use words that are metaphorical in origin, we ought to investigate the original meaning of the metaphor.

Passage 16, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", p. 174:

What made the protection of individual liberty so sacred to Mill? In his famous essay he declares that, unless the individual is left to live as he wishes in 'the part of [his conduct] which merely concerns himself,' civilization cannot advance; the truth will not, for lack of a free market in ideas, come to light; there will be no scope for spontaneity, originality, genius, for mental energy, for moral courage. Society will be crushed by the weight of 'collective mediocrity'. Whatever is rich and diversified will be crushed by the weight of custom, by men's constant tendency to conformity, which breeds only 'withered' capacities, 'pinched and hidebound', 'cramped and dwarfed' human beings...

Mill confuses two distinct notions. One is that all coercion is, in so far as it frustrates human desires, bad as such, although it may have to be applied to prevent other, greater evils; while non-interference, which is the opposite of coercion, is good as such, although it is not the only good. The other is that men should seek to discover the truth, or to develop a certain type of character of which Mill approved – critical, original, imaginative, independent, non-conforming to the point of eccentricity, and so on – and that truth can be found, and such character can be bred, only in conditions of freedom. Both these are liberal views, but they are not identical, and the connection between them is, at best, empirical. No one would argue that truth or freedom of self-expression could flourish where dogma crushes all thought. But the evidence of history tends to show...that integrity, love of truth and fiery individualism grow at least as often in severely disciplined communities, among, for example, the puritan Calvinists of Scotland or New England, or under military discipline, as in more tolerant or indifferent societies; and if this is so, Mill's argument for liberty as a necessary condition for the growth of human genius falls to the ground.

QUESTION 19

In passage 16, Berlin states then criticizes Mill's view of the value of individual liberty. What is Mill's view, as stated by Berlin?

- a) Intolerance and dogmatism can crush individual liberty. But it may be the case that individuality flourishes in intolerant circumstances just as much as in tolerant circumstances.
- b) If it is true that truth and freedom flourish just as well under intolerance as under tolerance, then individual liberty may not be as valuable as some have maintained.
- c) Unless there is individual liberty, there will be no advancement of civilization or individual genius; therefore, civilization and genius should be sacred to protectors of individual liberty.
- d) Unless there is individual liberty, there will be no advancement of civilization or individual genius; therefore, the protection of individual liberty must be held sacred.
- e) Civilization and individual genius are necessary if individual liberty is to be protected and held sacred.

QUESTION 20

In passage 16, Berlin accuses Mill of 'confusing two distinct notions'. Which of the following pairs correspond to the two distinct notions Berlin thinks are being confused.

- a) Coercion is bad.
The absence of coercion is good.
- b) Coercion is bad.
Coercion can never be a legitimate way of preventing worse things.
- c) There are bad things besides coercion.
There are good things besides the absence of coercion.
- d) Men should seek the truth.
Men should seek to develop the sort of character of which Mill approved.
- e) Coercion is bad and its absence good.
Truth-seeking and good character require individual liberty.

QUESTION 21

In passage 16, Berlin claims that Mill's conceptual confusion causes him to make which of the following mistakes?

- a) Mill distinguishes between the value of individual liberty and the value of civilization and individual genius, but these values are not really distinct.
- b) Mill implies that all free individuals must be civilized geniuses, but this is not obviously so.
- c) Mill defends individual liberty on the grounds that it is necessary for civilization and individual genius, but this is not obviously so.
- d) Mill defends civilization and individual genius on the grounds that they are necessary for individual liberty, but this is not obviously so.
- e) Mill defends individual liberty on the grounds that it is indistinguishable from civilization and individual genius, but this is not obviously so.

Passage 17, from Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", p. 180:

We recognise that it is possible, and at times justifiable, to coerce men in the name of some goal (let us say, justice or public health) which they would, if they were more enlightened, themselves pursue, but do not, because they are blind or ignorant or corrupt. This renders it easy for me to conceive of myself as coercing others for their own sake, in their, not my, interest. I am claiming that I know what they truly need better than they know it themselves...But I may go on to claim a good deal more than this. I may declare that they are actually aiming at what in their benighted state they consciously resist, because there exists within them an occult entity – their latent rational will, or their 'true' purpose – and that this entity, although it is belied by all they overtly feel and do and say, is their 'real' self...and that this inner spirit is the only self that deserves to have its wishes taken into account. Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their 'real' selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man (happiness, performance of duty, wisdom, a just society, self-fulfilment) must be identical with his freedom – the free choice of his 'true', albeit often submerged and inarticulate, self.

QUESTION 22

Which of the following does Berlin claim in passage 17?

- a) Coercion is always wrong.
- b) It is more dangerous to coerce people for the sake of what they 'really need', but don't realize they need, than it is to coerce people for the sake of what they 'really' want, but don't realize they want.
- c) From the fact that you can sometimes know what people 'really need', even though they don't know it, it does not follow that you should infer that you can know what people 'really want', even though they don't know it.
- d) Coercion is always a matter of saying either what someone 'really' needs or 'really' wants, and forcing them 'for their own sakes'.
- e) If you coerce people for the sake of what they really 'need', even though they are too 'blind, ignorant or corrupt' to want it, you will inevitably deceive yourself about people's true desires.

END OF PAPER