From *The Global City* to Globalising Cities:

Views from a Developmental City-State in Pacific Asia

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Abstract

The main aim of this paper is to offer a constructive critique of the dominant (indeed hegemonic) global city/world city discourse. This is a discourse that is too dependent upon a theoretically *globalist* perspective that is derived out of empirical studies of a small sample of major cities within large (mainly Western) countries. Moreover, this is a discourse that focuses too much upon (a) the characteristics of global/world cities and (b) the processes creating global/world cities *versus* (b) and (c) governance issues and implications. Consequently there remain many unanswered questions about how global cities have 'come into being', and what is the role of the state in globalising cities. In such a conceptual context, we tease out the main contours of three forms of global/globalising cities: hyper global cities; emerging global cities; and global city-states. Drawing upon the case of Singapore, we then analyse the unique nature of the global city-state, especially in a Pacific Asian context associated with strategic 'plan rational' developmental states. The conjunction of a Pacific Asian city-state with developmentalist policies and capacities both requires and enables this form of global city to be rapidly and constantly reworked in the aim of embedding the city into an extraterritorial terrain of network relations.

1.   Introduction

The $2 postal stamp in Figure 1 can be read in many different ways; as a marker of

the transition towards a knowledge based economy; as an indicator of the increasingly

significant role of information technology in underlying global development processes; as a

terrifying symbol of social control and surveillance in high-tech authoritarian times; and as a

celebratory icon of the new Millennium.

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Figure 1 about here
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In this paper the stamp in Figure 1 is read as a symbol of the developmental city-state in a

globalising era. It signifies (to us at least) the *nation-state* - hence the simple presence of a

postal stamp to be read. Of all the world/global cities listed in league tables produced by

analysts like Friedmann (1986), Beaverstock, Taylor and Smith (1999), Godfrey and Zhou

(1999) or Short and Kim (1999), only two of these 'cities' issue postal stamps – Singapore

and Hong Kong. In other words, the city-state has a broader range of powers and responsibilities than the other places analysts commonly deem global/world cities.

This stamp also signifies the spatially limited scale of the *city*…the absence of any large (identifiable) land mass on the stamp could be the result of neglect or the practicalities of image choice and selection. In our reading though, we view the swirling cloud cover and amorphous (unidentifiable) land at the edges of the globe as a sign of uncertainty/change/process/evolution that no city can ever hope to control. In other words Singapore is just a city – a tiny (647 sq. km) 'dot' of about 4 million (mainly Chinese) people situated within a swirling and turbulent sea of geopolitical and geoeconomic forces. Yet, while control is deemed an irrelevant objective, the developmental city-state of Singapore never misses an opportunity to convey how the small city must cope with and exploit (ride) global and regional systemic change in an aggressive and strategic fashion (Ho and So, 1997; Yeung and Olds, 1998; Yeung, 1999a; 2000a; 2001a). How can a city no larger than Surabaya in Indonesia, Ankara in Turkey, Cologne in Germany, Monterrey in Mexico, Montreal in Canada, or Boston in the United States ensure that economic and social development proceeds when there are *no* natural resources within the boundaries of the city, and *no* sources of intergovernmental transfer payments (or multilateral aid)? It does so by using the powers and capacities of the nation-state (in both material and discursive senses) to transform society and space within the city; all in the aim of embedding Singapore within the evolving lattice of network relations that propel the world economy. Existing space and social formations are purged, razed, flattened, cleansed, restructured, re-engineered: in their place 'world class' infrastructure/education/legal/financial/healthcare systems are developed, maintained and constantly refashioned. As the infamous architect Rem Koolahaus (Koolhaus and Mau (1995: 1011) put it in a reflective chapter of *S/M/L/XL*:

I turned eight in the harbour of Singapore. We did not go ashore, but I remember the smell – sweetness and rot, both overwhelming.

Last year I went again. The smell was gone. In fact Singapore was gone, scraped, rebuilt. There was a completely new town there.

Almost all of Singapore is less than 30 years old; the city represents the ideological production of the past three decades in its pure form, uncontaminated by surviving contextual remnants. It is managed by a regime that has excluded accident and randomness: even its nature is entirely remade. It is pure intention: if there is chaos, it is authored chaos; if it is ugly, it is designed ugliness; if it is absurd, it is willed absurdity. Singapore represents a unique ecology of the contemporary.

'Creative destruction' is the catchphrase in Singapore; it is a process that can be initiated with *relative* ease in a spatially limited area that is governed by a unified and well resourced government. Once global flows are grounded in the city, mechanisms are developed (via the powers of the nation-state) to reshape the nature of the networks Singapore is embedded within; to shift from being a simple repository for layers of foreign investment (as guided by networks of TNCs), to simultaneously becoming an active *exporter* of capital to potentially profitable sites around the region and the globe (hence the image of the globe in the stamp). The policy goal is to establish interactive economic relations with a broader range of economies so that Singapore can extract streams of profit from an *extraterritorial* terrain. As noted above, this terrain is the globe pictured in the stamp; a terrain that evolves and changes over time. The hands represent social intention to establish this terrain, and the dominant role of the state in guiding the relational transformational process. Finally, the cables, satellites and wires represent the technologies that Singaporeans will have to increasingly rely upon to establish, maintain and reshape this terrain.

The fact that city-states are globalising (both inwards and outwards) is not new, as will be detailed further in this paper. What is surprising, however, is that much of the literature on global cities has paid little attention to the complex interrelationships between

global city formation and the developmental state, nor recognised the unique characteristics of the *developmental city-state*.

This lacunae in the global/world city literature is, to a large extent, explained by the dependency of the literature on empirical studies of two to three major global cities within large countries – London (in England), New York (in the United States) and, occasionally, Tokyo (in Japan) and Seoul (in South Korea). It is also explained by the Western base of most proponents and critics of the global cities/world cities paradigm. In such a context there is an urgent need to extend our existing global city research agenda to incorporate other varieties of global city formation, and to investigate, in historically and geographically specific ways, the processes through which these 'other' global cities are formed, transformed, and extended beyond their immediate urban territoriality (Olds et al., 1999; Olds, 2001).

This paper is conceptual for the most part. The main aim of the paper is to offer an alternative perspective to the dominant (indeed hegemonic) global city discourse produced by people like Saskia Sassen or John Friedmann. We do this by moving out of the empirical terrain of North America and Europe to Pacific Asia, to develop an exploration of the interrelationships between global city formation processes, the developmental state, and the unique characteristics of the contemporary city-state. That said, while this paper is conceptual in orientation, it is explicitly devised in a manner that reflects empirically derived knowledge about how Singapore 'works' - in terms of regionalisation programmes, industrial development, urban planning, public housing programmes, and transport policy.

We begin with a brief critical evaluation of two decades of global city research. Our main argument here is that much existing research has taken global cities to be *passive recipients* of global flows (i.e. the materialisation argument) and overlooked their important role as *active facilitators and generators* of some of these global flows (and therefore global networks). We then develop a theoretical perspective on the 'global reach' of developmental

city-states. 'Global reach', in this paper, is defined as the complex processes through which a city articulates itself into, and benefits from, participation in the evolving global space of flows. For cities to engender global reach (in the formation of extraterritorial terrain of network relations) they must have institutional will (political and non-political) and political legitimacy to initiate and sustain it through both material and discursive practices. These themes are elaborated by drawing upon (in a more implicit than explicit way) empirical research on regionalisation and urban planning *vis a vis* Singapore.

2   From *The Global City* to Globalising Cities

Forms of Literature

Discourses on the 'global city' and the 'world city' continue to be developed and circulated by academics in a variety of disciplines. Amidst the avalanche of writing on the topic, we now have access to a small number of detailed research monographs (e.g., King, 1990; Sassen, 1991; Abu-Lughod, 1999), several succinct chapters and articles that summarize associated concept(s) (e.g., Hamnett, 1994, 1995; Knox, 1995; Yeoh, 1999; Hill and Kim, 2000), and edited collections that interrogate the global/world city[1] concept and its application in particular parts of the world (e.g., Knox and Taylor, 1995; Douglass and Friedmann, 1998; Lo and Yeung, 1998). We also have access to a plethora of individual articles and chapters that utilise the concept when examining issues such as: regional development and change (e.g., Castells, 1996; Soja, 2000), the impact of globalisation on the urbanisation process (e.g., Lo and Marcotullio, 2000); the reshaping of the nation-state in a globalising era (e.g., Brenner, 1998; Kusno, 2000; Taylor, 2000); the emergence of social

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[1] From this point on we will use the 'global city' term. While there are some people who attempt to differentiate between 'global city' and 'world city' we do not.

cleavages at a variety of scales (Sassen, 1991; Hamnett, 1994, 1995; Castells, 1996); the impact of information technology on spatial development processes (e.g., Castells, 1996; Graham and Marvin, 1996); the spatialisation of network forms of capitalism (Castells, 1996; Sassen, 1998); the nature and impact of transnationalism in metropolitan/cosmopolitan contexts (e.g., Hannerz, 1992; Smith, 1997. 2001); and so on. Of course, the majority of these texts are derived (to a degree) *vis a vis* the ideas associated with influential authors such as Patrick Geddes, Peter Hall (1966), Stephen Hymer (1972) R.B. Cohen (1981), John Friedmann and Goetz Wolff (1982), and John Friedmann (1986). Tracing the lineage of such thinking also leads, in many cases, to the influential interdisciplinary writing of people like Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein.

All of the literature noted above can be categorised into three main (overlapping) fields of knowledge:

(1)   characteristics of global/world cities;
(2)   processes creating global/world cities; and
(3)   governance issues and implications.

The first field of knowledge that is by far the largest in a relative sense, reflecting (amongst other things) positivist influences within disciplines such as geography and sociology. In terms of broad content the first and second fields of knowledge typically analyse the role of global cities in acting as 'key basing points' for transnational corporate headquarters. In doing so global cities (so it is asserted) become embedded within global circuits of capital (Friedmann, 1986), both facilitating and reflecting the material and symbolic power of global capital. To quote John Friedmann and Goetz Wolff (1982: 310), world cities have become tightly 'interconnected with each other through decision-making and finance', and they now 'constitute a world-wide system of control over production and market expansion'.

Similarly, Saskia Sassen (1991: 3) suggests that:

> A combination of spatial dispersal and global integration has created a new strategic role for major cities. Beyond their long history as centres for international trade and banking, these cities now function as centres in four new ways: first, as highly concentrated command points in the organization of the world economy; second, as key locations for finance and specialized service firms, which have replaced manufacturing as the leading economic sectors; third, as sites of production of innovations, in these leading industries; and fourth, as markets for the products and innovations produced.

In short, global cities are posited to act as:

· command points in the organisation of the world economy;

· key locations and marketplaces for the leading industries of the current period, which are finance and specialised services for firms;

> · major sites of production for these industries, including the production of innovations.

> (Sassen, 1994: 4)

Given these externally driven dynamics (as posited by global city analysts) such cities have become associated with volatile economies, dense nodes of information and reflexive social networks, social polarisation, globalised property markets, social diversity (through migration in particular), cosmopolitanism, creativity, and considerable human suffering. Global cities are represented as the visible manifestation of the global economy; they are the products of a transitory world system that is articulated in a 'cross-border network of some 30-40 cities' (Sassen, 1998: 131; also see Godfrey and Zhou, 1999). Such transnational networks of capital, so it is argued, play a fundamental role in *inscribing* the identity of each and every global city in fundamental ways.

While these first two fields of knowledge generate some valuable insights, it is clear that world/global city discourses have emerged in particular disciplinary, epistemological, institutional geographical contexts, and historical contexts (Soja, 2000: 189-232). For example, Anthony D. King (2000: 266) notes:

> with the invention of concepts of both the world and the global city, stemming largely from a dominant American academy based either in Los Angeles or New York (with

regional offices elsewhere) new paradigms have been launched the result of which, in prioritizing so-called "economic criteria," has focused (if not fixed) for a decade the attention of many urban scholars on perhaps 30 or 40 cities, all but three or four of them either in Europe or the United States (Knox and Taylor, 1995; Knox, 1995).

Global cities are written about as if they are the product of the steamroller known as 'globalisation'; a monolithic and primarily economic force that drops from the ether to script unilinear urban histories of an increasingly homogeneous nature. As Michael Peter Smith (2001: 58) also notes in his book *Transnational Urbanism*:

> The global cities thesis centrally depends on the assumption that global economic restructuring precedes and determines urban spatial and sociocultural restructuring, inexorably transforming localities by disconnecting them from their ties to nation-states, national legal systems, local political cultures, and everyday place-making practices.

In short economic characteristics (such as those outlined above) are common in dominant 'global city' and 'world city' discourses. And again, while such discourses do provide some valuable insights into the forces shaping urbanisation at a variety of scales, they also overwhelm more open ended and perhaps less economistic analyses. That said, some alternative discourses are now emerging: witness Janet Abu-Lughod's insightful book *New York, Chicago, Los Angeles: America's Global Cities* (1999). Abu-Lughod, while observant of the impact of macro-economic economic forces, and the utility of abstraction and modernist modes of analysis, also incorporates (in insightful ways) more fluid, grounded and situated modes of analysis. In doing so she highlights the 'multiplexity' (Amin, 1997; Amin and Graham, 1997) of contemporary global cities in a manner that cannot be conveyed in accounts derived out of data sources such as leagues of producer services firms or MNC/TNC headquarters.

Another key criticism, one that applies with respect to both (1) and (2) above, is the Anglo-American (and especially London/New York) bias of much of the global cities research and literature. As Godfrey and Zhou (1999: 269) note, '[T]he analytical bias inherent in

world-city studies reflects and in turn perpetuates well-established Eurocentric views of the global economy under the guise of objective data'. From a related angle, Hamnett (1994), amongst others, criticises Sassen for generalising from the American (or NY/London/Tokyo) experience. In doing so Sassen (and others of course) effectively develops a social construct (*The* Global City) that enters and circulates within various discursive fields. Her global city becomes *the* global city, shaping numerous academic research projects, and some public policy formulation processes (for good and for bad we might add). While generating insights, debate and fame, the circulation of such a coherent global city discourse generates resource allocation bias towards highlighting commonalities between global cities, or possible global city status in terms of function, role, linkages, structure, problems, form and process (Markusen and Gwiasda, 1994; Amin and Graham, 1997; McNeill, 1999). But, as Amin and Graham (1997: 417) note:

> The problem with paradigmatic examples is that analysis inevitably tends to generalise from very specific cities, both in identifying the changing nature of urban assets and highlighting normative suggestions for policy innovation elsewhere. What should be a debate on *variety and specificity* quickly reduces to the assumption that some degree of interurban homogeneity can be assumed, either in the nature of the sectors leading urban transformation or in the processes of urban change. The exception, by a process of reduction or totalizing, becomes the norm… (our emphasis)

Thrift (1997: 142-143) also highlights the implications of adopting a 'one city tells all' approach to urban studies; an approach that reflects the dominance of 'representational' theories of urban change (on representational theory see Thrift, 1996), the subtle effects of Eurocentrism in urban studies (McGee, 1995), and structurally influenced 'globalist' perspectives in urban studies (Hill and Kim, 2000: 2168, 2187). Furthermore, even arguments that reinforce the specificity of local politics in world city formation are structured in a way that assumes all world cities are embedded within a much larger national context, and that they are governed by overlapping 'political units' (e.g., Keil, 1998: 632; Hill and Kim, 2000). However, the resonance of this literature for Singaporeans cannot help but be limited – it is,

after all, a Southeast Asian *city-state*, there is *one* level of government (i.e. the mayor is the prime minister!), and the urban population of 3.7 million is also the national population.

The totalizing discourses that dominate the analysis of the global city are particularly problematic when one moves from a concern with characteristics and processes to *processes* and *governance*. The second and especially the third fields of global cities knowledge are relatively weak in terms of both volume and content. Academics have devoted the majority of their resources to abstraction and theorisation about what a global city is, how it relates to the modern world economy, what life is like within the global city, and what kind of relational networks might exist between global cities. Yet, as Douglass (2000) and Hill and Kim (2000) point out, there are many unanswered questions about issues such as how global cities have 'come into being', and what is the 'role of the state and national economy' in globalising cities. More specifically, since the 1986 proclamation of the 'World City Hypothesis' by John Friedmann:

> A question that loomed large but went almost wholly unanswered in the following body of world city research was straightforward yet complex: *how does a city become a world city?* Research on global cities seems to accept without question that a few cities, notably London, New York and Tokyo, are automatically first-rank global cities (Sassen 1991), while a host of others, such as Paris or Los Angeles, are included but possibly at a lower level, and still others are assigned to a vague secondary or tertiary status (Hamnett 1994; Friedmann 1986). (Douglass, 1998: 110; our emphasis)

Indeed it is this type of question that has greater purchase in public policy circles, with considerable potential for enhancing quality of life within globalising cities. That said, such issues cannot be understood unless one grounds the analysis in a geographically and historically specific manner (Keil, 1998; Smith 2001). In other words the focus needs to be reoriented towards *process* (i.e. how are particular cities globalising at particular times). This point is particularly important when pursuing process and governance issues in Asia, a region associated with network forms of capitalism (often with ethnic dimensions) (Hamilton, 1991; Yeung, 1998a; 1999b; 1999c; 2000b; Olds and Yeung, 1999), resistance to the adoption of

liberal economic and public policy prescriptions (that are so evident in global cities such as New York and London), and the presence of active and relatively powerful 'developmental states' (Appelbaum and Henderson, 1992; Evans, 1995; Woo-Cumings, 1999; Hill and Kim, 2000).[2]

From Governance and The Global City to Globalising Cities Through Governance

As noted above, the global city/world city concept has considerable policy relevance. Policy, program and project planning in numerous *cities* around the world is now being framed by goals to acquire, or reinforce, some form of global city status. In academic circles, associated concepts such as the post-Fordist city (Mayer, 1994) and the entrepreneurial city have also emerged (Harvey, 1989; Hall and Hubbard, 1998). The shift from *government* to *governance* is noted in multiple locales, as are the policy challenges of dealing with problems such as social polarisation, gentrification, transport congestion, and tensions over immigration (Harvey, 1989; Douglass and Friedmann, 1998; Sassen, 1994).

Global city discourses have also become associated with development thinking at supra-urban scales. For example, at the *global scale* the incorporation of global city thinking is evident in key policy documents such as the World Bank's (1991) report *Urban Policy and Economic Development: An Agenda for the 1990s*; a seminal text that highlights the World Bank's growing awareness of the significance of urbanisation and urban policy to national and international economic development activity. More recently the World Bank (1999, 2000),

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[2] On a related note, Godfrey and Zhou (1999) highlight the problems with relying upon MNC headquarter data to delineate ranked hierarchies of global cities. Some national economies (esp those in the UK, the USA, Japan and Korea) are dominated by large vertically integrated MNCs (hence the relatively high rank of their cities as world/global cities. However, while economically dynamic, economies in some regions are associated with smaller firms and diverse interfirm networks. This implicity underweights the economic importance of cities such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Milan for they are strongly shaped by the operation of such interfirm networks (see Perry et al., 1998; Yeung et al., 2001).

the Asian Development Bank (Stubbs and Clark, 1996), and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS, 1996) have all released documents that provide evidence of the growing awareness of how cities, and especially global cities, facilitate economic development processes at both national, regional and global scales. As the World Bank (1999: 26; also see World Bank 2000b) notes:

> With improvements in transport and communications, cities are now linked directly to international markets. This trend, coupled with increased intensity in the use of information, financial, and other services by all types of firms, means that cities face more exacting requirements as sites for high-quality services to producers and greater competition for foreign and domestic investment (Harris 1997; Sassen 1998). Urban areas sharing large regional markets (border zones and port cities, such as those surrounding the South China Sea) are becoming closely networked, sometimes developing interdependencies across national boundaries that are as close as, or even closer than, those with their own hinterland.[3] By reducing the traditional market position of some cities and fostering the growth of others with different locational and production advantages, the liberalization of trade and financial flows is contributing to large spatial shifts of population and output. These changes imply that now more than ever, cities need to provide solid public services and a business-friendly environment to retain their traditional firms or to attract new ones, domestic or foreign.

At the *national scale*, countries as diverse as China, Thailand, the Philippines, Korea, Canada, and England are concentrating relatively more attention and resources on particular city-regions. Some, like China or Malaysia, are using cities to connect the nation to the global space of flows, while concurrently using such cities to propel social change (including the development of more reflexive citizens) in particular directions. Tim Bunnell (2002: 9-11; also see Bunnell, 1999), for example, highlights the role of the nation state in Malaysia as it spurs on the restructuring of Kuala Lumpur (through the development of projects like Kuala Lumpur Central City and the Petronas Towers) so that Malaysia is (a) 'put on the world map' while also (b) connecting 'the nation to global technological and cultural-economic sectors' and (c) constructing a 'national *conception* of information society' (emphasis in

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[3] The footnote in the original states: "Gipouloux (1997), argues that: (cities') "strategic importance now lies less in location than in capacity to master factors such as finance,

original). Further up the Pacific coast, Chinese and Shanghainese officials are restructuring Shanghai (via sectoral and territorially defined development projects to propel regional (Yangzi River Delta) and national economic development processes (Olds, 1998; 2001).

At the *urban and regional* scale within large nations, governments around the world are on a drive to achieve world or global city status. From Africa to Europe (e.g., Berlin) to Asia (e.g., Kuala Lumpur), local governments are refashioning policies, programmes and projects in a manner that integrates metropolitan areas into the global space of flows in both material and discursive realms. The perception of a global space of flows has engendered a strategic and 'entrepreneurial' development strategy on the part of the local state, driven by the perception that cities and regions are engaged in rigorous inter-urban competition (Castells, 1989; Harvey, 1989; Lee and Schmidt-Marwede, 1993; Fainstein, 1994; Hall and Hubbard, 1998). In short, a 'global city discourse' has emerged in public policy circles, and this discourse is being used by political and business groups to ensure urban policy is formulated in a market-friendly environment (Machimura, 1998).

And finally, at the unique level of the *city-state*, we see the rapid reshaping of policies, programmes and projects in the context of an awareness of what global/world city status brings with it, and what might be required to become such a city…in other words, such city states are intentionally adopting some form of global/world city discourse as they reshape policies in the light of perceived insights generated by this discourse. For example, in late February 2000, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), arguably still a city-state, released a strategic planning document noting that Hong Kong 'must clearly establish itself as one of the world's truly great international cities and a leading city in Asia - Asia's World City - as it has been termed' (Commission on Strategic Development, 2000). The Chief

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production, and innovation....city functions, not city size, are important to economic position in the global economy" (p. 16).

Executive (Tung Chee-hwa) elaborated on his thinking on Hong Kong's long-term vision in his 1999 Policy Address in association with this plan:

> Hong Kong already possesses many of the key features common to New York and London. For example, we are already an international centre of finance and a popular tourist destination and hold leading positions in trade and transportation. These are all pillars of our economy. If we can consolidate our existing economic pillars and continue to build on our strengths, we should be able to become world-class. Then like New York and London, we will play a pivotal role in the global economy, be home to a host of multi-national companies, and provide services to the entire region....We have the thriving Mainland next to us. We are a melting pot for Chinese and Western cultures. We are a highly liberal and open society. Our institutions are well established. With such a strong foundation, we should be able to build on our strengths and develop modern and knowledge-intensive industries, erect new pillars in our economy and open up new and better prospects. (Commission on Strategic Development, 2000: 5)

It is clear from the full document that the Hong Kong government has been cribbing notes from Saskia Sassen's books, as well as from publications by John Friedmann, Yue-Man Yeung, and a few others. Hong Kong is being framed by an urban and economic development discourse that posits the main role of the city to be that of nodal point in a globalising world economy; a socio-spatial formation that functions as a control centre 'for the interdependent skein of material, financial, and cultural flows which, together, support and sustain globalisation' (Knox, 1995: 236). Such development discourses have tangible material implications for they are being instituted in the city-state; a relatively small spatial unit that is managed by unified level of government.

In summary then, cities around the world, and especially in the Asia-Pacific region, are being proactively globalised by a myriad of policies, programmes and projects that are shaped by global/world city discourses. As Douglass (1998: 111) notes, the:

> appearance of "world city" as the new shibboleth of global achievement has not been missed by governments in Pacific Asia…. In realising that the status of their national economies will be increasingly determined by the positioning of their principal urban regions, governments in Pacific Asia are actively intervening in the physical restructuring of cities in the new competition for world city prominence.

How the state actively intervenes to create a global city is the focus of the remainder of this paper. However, the discussion needs to be embedded in an awareness of the diversities of global/globalising cities that exist, not in terms of level on a hierarchy (à la Friedmann) and more in terms of state capacity and relational flows. In such a conceptual context, we draw out the main contours of three forms of global/globalising cities: hyper global cities; emerging global cities; and global city-states. In this analysis we devote particular attention to the of the global city-state, especially in a regional context associated with strategic 'plan rational' developmental states (Henderson, 1993; Woo-Cumings, 1999). The conjunction of the city-state with developmentalist policies and capacities both requires and enables this form of global city to be constantly reworked, and to generate an extraterritorial terrain of network relations.

3   Varieties of Globalising Cities

It is clear from this critical review of the global city literature that while much has been said about the attributes and characteristics of a global city, little attention has been devoted to the processes and governance of global city formation. The main proponents of global city research have ascribed the formation of global cities to their functional roles in global restructuring and international divisions of labour. To them, certain territorial entities emerge as global cities because of their capability in grounding the managers, coordinators, and servicers of the global economy in a nodal sense. Yet few studies in global city research have explained the sources and governance of the grounding process, or of the role of global cities in facilitating the formation of extraterritorial linkages via networks.

One key agent in all global city formation processes is the *territorial state*. Though recent studies of the formation of global city networks note that in an era of trans-state relations the nation state is becoming less relevant in understanding global city formation (e.g., Keil, 1998; Yeung, 1998b; 2001b; Taylor, 2000), the state, in its various institutional and

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spatial forms, continues to exert a critical influence on the processes and governance of global city formation. In his study of global city formation in Europe, for example, Brenner (1998: 27) argues that '[g]lobal city formation cannot be adequately understood without an examination of the matrices of state territorial organization within and through which it occurs'. Similarly, Douglass (2000: 45; our emphasis) recently expanded this argument by pointing out that '[t]he obscure nature of state-world city interaction is related to a larger mystery, namely, *how* centers currently identified as world cities actually became world cities'. We therefore need to pay more attention to the processes through which some cities emerge as global cities. In short, the role of state territorial organisation is particularly important in this research pursuit.

In the remaining part of this paper, we develop a typology of global cities. In developing this typology, we pay particular attention to the third type of global city – the *global city-state* - and examine some key features of its governance process. In doing so we hope to lay the ground for richer and more nuanced studies of global/world city formation; i.e. the process *of becoming*, versus the characteristics *of being.*

A typology of global cities

To begin, we reinforce our support for Keil (1998), Douglass (2000), and Hill and Kim (2000) that there are divergent pathways to global city formation, such that the global mosaic of cities comprises different varieties of global cities. The differences amongst established and emerging global cities are attributed to different historical and geographical contexts of emergence and path dependency, and different configurations of internal institutional capacities and discursive practices (by strategic actors).

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Figure 2 presents three types of global cities: (1) hyper global cities; (2) emerging global cities; and (3) global city-states. For clarity purposes, there is no attempt to map out all three types of global cities onto one world map.

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Figure 2 about here
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(1) Hyper Global Cities

The characteristics of *hyper global cities* as New York and London are very well known today thanks to several decades of global city research. These global cities are comprehensively integrated (via networks) into a nested hierarchy of regional, national, and global economies. As portrayed in Figure 2, hyper global cities have strong embedded relationships with their immediate hinterland, the so-called 'global city-region'. As argued by geographers from UCLA (e.g. Scott et al., 1999, Scott, 2001), these global city-regions have emerged as the fundamental spatial units of the contemporary global economy (the so-called 'regional motors of the global economy') though they have no formal and particularly coherent political presence on the national or international level.

Their rapid emergence is explained by the fact that globalisation has accentuated the importance of spatial proximity and agglomerations in enhancing economic productivity and performance advantages. Large global city-regions function as territorial platforms for firms to compete in global markets. These firms are embedded in the relational assets of these global city-regions (Storper, 1997; Scott, 1998). In particular, these global city-regions 'come to function increasingly as the regional motors of the global economy, that is, as dynamic local networks of economic relationships caught up in more extended world-wide networks of inter-regional competition and exchange' (Scott et al., 1999: 4). In Figure 2, these intense networks of flows are illustrated in the inner circle in which the global city is located.

Hyper global cities are not only embedded in their immediate global city-regions, but they also engaged in competitive and/or cooperative relationships with other (global) city-regions in their same home country. This dimension of inter-regional interaction is very important to our understanding of why few dominant global city-regions can co-exist within one country. Indeed Figure 2 shows only one dominant global city-region, although it has significant interaction with other regions in the same country (represented by various two-way arrows).

To a certain extent, the competitiveness of a particular global city-region is determined by its role and functions within global city networks that transcend specific regions and/or countries (Sassen, 1998). For example, the London is the only viable global city-region in the UK because it has developed such a strong momentum in serving as a strategic node in the global economy that it is virtually impossible for another city-region in the UK to compete. The same logic may be applied to understand the dominance of New York as a global city-region in the financial world of the US, San Francisco as a global city-region in the high-tech world, and Los Angeles and a global city-region in terms of cultural industries. All three global city-regions operate at different levels, and are embedded in disparate (albeit overlapping) geoeconomic networks that reach our across space. All three global city-regions owe their successes in becoming dominant global city-regions less to their interaction and flows *within* their home countries, than to their articulation into the global economy, particularly with other global city-regions. That said all hyper-global cities/global city-regions are critically dependent upon much larger national markets for their survival (Hill and Kim, 2000).

To sum up, hyper global cities and their regions are deeply integrated into the contemporary global economy. They are relational city-regions of the highest order, attracting and distributing unprecedented volumes of material and non-material flows. The transformation of these cities is also related to historical context (e.g. imperialism and transnational migration) and geographical context (e.g. national capitals and agglomeration

advantages). Once set in motion, these hyper global cities and their hinterland regions gain certain momentum of further dominance and the logic of path dependency becomes increasingly important.[4]

(2) Emerging Global Cities

While some cities in today's world economy are hyper global cities (and/or global city-regions), there are other cities that *strive* to become global cities. We designate these as *emerging global cities*. In seeking to do so, these cities draw in significant resources and inputs from their home countries, as well as multilateral institutions (in the case of developing country cities). As shown graphically in Figure 2, an emerging global city (A) has only limited relational linkages with the global economy (in a relative sense compared to hyper global cities). It is also much more dependent upon *inward* flows of capital, people, goods and services and information from the global economy. Instead of acting as a strategic node in the coordination ('command and control' in Sassen's terms) of the global economy, emerging global cities act as coordination/channeling centres responsible for guiding or accepting inward transnational flows. Such a global city does not (or cannot) facilitate the export of significant outward flows to service the global economy, as often expected in dominant definitions of global cities (such as London). The flow arrows in Figure 2 are primarily unidirectional, representing inflows from the global cultural economy into particular emerging global city (A) before these inflows are further redirected and/or distributed further down the urban hierarchy in that country. Because these cities are emerging and striving to become global cities, there is more potential for competition from other urban centres in the same host country. City (B) in Figure 2, for example, may pose as a challenger to the aspirations of (A) to become a global

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[4] This path dependency, however, also creates problems for the decline of certain global cities (e.g. Tokyo).

city. This competitive condition, of course, does not apply to those developing countries dominated by one primate city (e.g., Bangkok in Southeast Asia).

The processes of emergence amongst these aspiring cities depends significantly upon preconditions in terms of endowments of institutional resources, economic linkages at different spatial scales, and political fabric. Nation states often deploy resources (and initiate regulatory changes) to develop these types of cities into global cities. The intention is to use these cities to enable the nation to 'plug' into the global economy. Such cities play a critical role for they act as the specific locales within a country where key actors and institutions analyse, represent, and associate with the global space of flows (see Amin and Thrift, 1992; Castells, 1996). This role is not a new one in the history of capitalism (Held et al., 1999). In today's globalising and post-colonial era, however, what is significant is that many nation states in developing countries have engaged in unique discursive practices, and mobilised a disproportionate amount of material resources to 'construct' the global city. Malaysia's Multimedia Super Corridor project and Shanghai's Pudong mega urban development are two obvious examples from the Asia Pacific region (see Olds, 1995; 2001; Bunnell, 1999, 2002; Wu, 2000). In both cases, massive public resources have been poured into developing 'show-case' projects that theoretically qualify both Kuala Lumpur and Shanghai as global cities. Both cities compete for hosting the tallest buildings in the world (Kuala Lumpur's twin Petronas Towers will soon be replaced by another building in Shanghai). Of course, the specific national contexts in the emergence of both Kuala Lumpur and Shanghai are quite different. But one common process in both emerging global cities is that there is a very strong political and institutional will to construct them as 'national projects'. Whereas Kuala Lumpur has the personal favour of Prime Minister Mahathir, Shanghai's interests are well represented by the sheer number of China's top leadership who came from Shanghai (from President Jiang Zemin to Premier Zhu Rongji). Whether these emerging global cities will

eventually converge in their characteristics and developmental pathways towards those hyper global cities may be a moot point. The critical condition is the sustainability of *national efforts* in developing particular cities to become global cities. The politics of governance in this case represents a reterritorialisation of state power from the national scale towards the urban scale. As suggested by Brenner (1998), the European experience shows that global cities are increasingly coordinates of reterritorialised state institutions and power in an era of globalisation. They are part of the attempt by re-scaled "glocal" territorial states to promote the global competitive advantage of their major urban/city regions.

(3) Global City-States

Third, the above national-urban convergence in the rescaling process is even more apparent in the third type of globalising city – the *global city-state*. To a large extent, city-states (e.g. Hong Kong and Singapore) are unique historical and geographical realities because the state is contained within a fully urbanised and spatially limited territorial unit. The national and the urban/local scales are effectively juxtaposed under what we call (somewhat awkwardly) the *UrbaNational* scale. Global city-states are clearly different from hyper global cities and emerging global cities because they do not have an immediate hinterland within the same national territorial boundaries.[5] To a significant degree, broader regions (e.g., Southeast Asia) and more distant parts of the globe become their hinterland. The development of a terrain of extraterritorial influence emerges when global city-state functions like hyper global cities, both attracting in material and non-material flows, and in functioning as a command and control centre for the flows and networks that reach out to the regional (for the most part) and sometimes global scales.

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[5] Even in the case of post-1997 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), it remains a city-state with substantial autonomy. There are no free flows of capital, people, goods and services from other cities and/or regions of mainland China to HKSAR.

Referring to Figure 2, it is clear that in global city-states, the (national) state has a virtually direct access to the global economy. State policies can be channelled to develop a city-state into a global city-state. This process implies that the city-state must be not only an attractive location for material *inflows* from the global economy, but also an *origin* of these flows to participate in the global economy. As defined in the introduction to this paper, the term 'global reach' best captures global city-state formation. It illustrates how a specific territorial organisation (e.g. the city-state) is able to extend its influence and relations in the global economy through encouraging both inward and outward flows of people, capital, goods and services, and information.

These global city-states are different from hyper global cities in at least two very important ways: they have the political power, legitimacy and will to mobilise strategic resources to achieve (national) objectives that are otherwise unimaginable in non-city-state global cities. This is the case because they are city-*states*; they are represented and governed by the state in all of its roles. Table 1 (adapted from O'Neill, 1997: 295, with permission) outlines the roles of the 'qualitative state' in a modern economy. When one recognises that the state in city-states plays all of these roles, that the territoriality of governance is miniscule in comparison to most nations, and that both hyper global cities and emerging global cities are governed in more complex, less coherent, and less strategic fashion, the unique nature and capacities of the global city-state becomes all the more evident.

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Table 1 about here
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Second, and on a related note, global city-states are not constrained by the tensions inherent in national-versus-urban politics (or regional development politics) confronting so many developing, and for that matter, developed countries that aspire to 'construct' their

global cities. In other words there are no intra-national regions or cities competing for material and non-material resources. The politics of city-building tends to be focused on the strengths and weaknesses of policy options rather than which territorial unit is deserving of attention.

How do global city-states acquire the capacity to spur on global reach? While there are a variety of factors to consider in such a discussion, it is clear that we must turn our attention to the building of institutional capacities in the global city-state. In particular, we consider two interrelated aspects of this process of building institutional capacities: *developmentalism* and *political control*.

To some ultra-globalists, globalisation leads to the end of the nation state (Ohmae, 1990; 1995; Hill and Kim, 2000). This view fundamentally distorts the transformational nature of the nation state in today's global economy. Held et al. (1999: 55, 81) argue that the emergence of international regimes of governance has transformed the nature of global political economy such that national governments are increasingly 'locked into an array of global, regional and multilateral systems of governance', resulting in a world of 'overlapping communities of fate'. The reconstituted role of the nation state in today's global economy, however, does not necessarily diminish its role in governing its national space; the role of the state is simply being reshaped (O'Neill, 1997; Weiss, 1997). In the case of global city-states, the dialectical contest between the nation state and global forces is becoming even more apparent. Whereas a global city-state may serve the global economy well through its role as a command and control node, the nation state may have certain developmental objectives that run against the call for putting the global logic of capital above the local/national interests of citizens. To accomplish the sometimes contradictory objectives of caring for citizens and serving the global economy, the nation state in global city-states often takes on a developmental role. Developmentalism and the developmental state may sometimes be a historical legacy (e.g. in Japan and South Korea). They may also be a consequence of intense

political struggles that ended with the dominance of one political power/coalition. Their emergence is therefore highly specific within particular historical and geographical contexts (see the case of Singapore in the next section).

To Leftwich (1994: 378-380), developmentalism entails at least six important components:

1 a determined developmental state;

2 relative state autonomy;

3 a powerful, competent, and insulated state bureaucracy;

4 a weak and subordinated civil society;

5 the effective management of non-state economic interests; and

6 repression, legitimacy, and performance

Or in Johnson's (1982) original study of post-war development in Japan, the developmental state is characterised by several attributes (see also Wade, 1990):

1. the top priority of state action, consistently maintained, is economic development, defined for policy purposes in terms of growth, productivity, and competitiveness rather than in terms of welfare. The substance of growth and competitiveness goals is derived from comparisons with external reference economies which provide the state managers with models for emulation;

2. the state is committed to private property and the market, and it limits its interventions to conform with this commitment;

3. the state guides the market with instruments formulated by an élite economic bureaucracy, led by a pilot agency or 'economic general staff';

4. the state is engaged in numerous institutions for consultation and coordination with the private sector, and these consultations are an essential part of the process of policy formulation and implementation and

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5. while state bureaucrats 'rule', politicians 'reign'. Their function is not to make policy but

   to create economic and political space for the bureaucracy to maneuver in while also acting

   as a 'safety valve' by forcing the bureaucrats to respond to the needs of groups upon

   which the stability of the system rests, (i.e. to maintain the relative autonomy of the state

   while preserving political stability). This separation of 'ruling' and 'reigning' goes with a

   'soft authoritarianism' when it comes to maintaining the needs of economic development

   vis-a-vis other claims and with a virtual monopoly of political power in a single political

   party or institution over a long period of time.[6]

At a national scale, a developmental state that satisfies these conditions has much

greater capacity to effect global reach in the building of an extraterritorial terrain that is

exploited in the aim of benefiting the city-state. For example, in Singapore a plethora of state-

directed institutions, policies, programmes, and projects have emerged to spur on the outward

investment process. This is in part because the historical underdevelopment of indigenous

entrepreneurship in the private sector has convinced the state that regionalisation drives

cannot be effectively taken up by private sector initiatives only.

The state has to take up the role and the risks of spearheading regionalisation in two

specific ways: (1) the regionalisation of government-linked companies (GLCs) and companies

set up by statutory boards and (2) 'political entrepreneurship' through which the state opens

up overseas business opportunities for private capitalists and negotiates the institutional

framework for such opportunities to be tapped by these Singaporean firms (Ho and So, 1997;

Yeung, 1998c; 1999a; 2000a; 2000c). Today, the public sector and GLCs account for about

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[6] See also Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990; Evans, 1995; Weiss, 1998; Woo-Cumings, 1999.

60% of Singapore's GDP (Ministry of Finance, 1993: 39; see also Singh and Ang, 1998). As at 31 May 1999, the market capitalisation of first-tier public listed GLCs controlled by Temasek Holdings alone was S$88.2 billion or 25% of total market capitalisation of the Stock Exchange of Singapore. The share of Temasek Holdings in these GLCs amounted to S$46.5 billion or 13.2% of total market capitalisation (*The Straits Times*, 25 June 1999: 74). In the context of Singapore's regionalisation policy, flows of outward foreign investment have been significant, especially in the Southeast and East Asian regions.

Focusing inwards, the political power and control of a developmental city-state distinguishes it from municipal governments in most global cities because it is able to bypass national-state/provincial-city politics typical in many global cities. In Singapore, for example, the statutory board responsible for urban planning (the Urban Redevelopment Authority)[7] answers directly to the Ministry of *National* Development. The consequence of the intertwining of the national and the urban is that *all* urban planning policies, programmes and projects are suffused with the politics of nation-building in the post-colonial era (see, for example, Chua, 1996; Perry, Kong and Yeoh, 1997). More pragmatically, 100% of the country/city is planned by one authority, with every square centimetre of the city/island being managed in a strategic fashion.

Given the role of the state (as outlined in Table 1) *vis a vis* the limited size of the territory being governed, the global/world city formation process has been both rapid and unique. The juxtaposition of both national and city governance in the hands of the developmental city-state necessarily implies that it is also able to extend its control over most aspects of social and political life of its citizens. The net outcome of this control is that the state is able to mobilise social actors and tremendous resources to meet its national objectives

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[7] Details on the URA are available at < http://www.ura.gov.sg/>.

(e.g. global reach). It is also able to eliminate major opposition to its developmental policies through social control and discursive practices. Under these circumstances, the (nation) state becomes the city and the city becomes the (nation) state. The global reach of the city-state becomes an institutional extension of the influence and relations of the nation state on a global scale.

It should be noted that not all actors in a city-state or not all city-states are willing and/or able to initiate and complete such processes of global city formation. Much depends upon existing political-economic and social-organisational processes and the capability of key actors (firms, state, and institutions) in exercising power to implement certain strategies that situate the city-state in a beneficial manner to the global spaces of flows.

4. Conclusion

To conclude, we would like to reiterate that there are varieties of global cities and differential pathways to global (or world) city formation. Their processes of transformation and development must be situated within historically and geographically specific contexts. Having said that, the existing literature on global cities seems to have focused too narrowly on a few 'champion examples', in particular London and New York. Furthermore the global city literature fails to shed enough light on the complex interrelationships between global city formation and the state. As Hill and Kim (2000: 2187-2188) note:

> The globalist world city paradigm is seriously flawed because it fails to address the role of the state and national interest in the formation of all world cities. By equating Anglo-American market liberalism with international norms tout court, the world city paradigm bestows universality on a particular cluster of national interests and hazards turning into a world city ideology. The role of the state and national interest in the formation of Western market-centred world cities, like New York and London, must also be conceptualised….

> Understanding Tokyo and Seoul necessitates a different conception of the world system from that of the underlying globalist world city argument. Tokyo and Seoul differ from New York in so many salient respects because these cities are lodged within a non-hegemonic and interdependent world political economy divided among differently organised national systems and regional alliances.

As Hill and Kim (2000) imply more generally, global cities should not be viewed as an idealised end-state phenomenon, but instead as the outcome of a wide range of processes, all of which are shaped by the state. Given the diversity of state roles and capacities around the world, we should therefore expect equally diverse urban formation and transformation processes.

The complexity in the global city formation process is particularly apparent in the context of the evolution and development of the global city-state. While hyper global cities as London and New York continue to be reinvented by a rich assortment of agents and forces, city-states such as Singapore and Hong Kong vigorously pursue relatively singular and focused UrbaNational developmental strategies. The implication of recognising the diversity of global cities is clear: there is no 'cook book' approach to global city formation just as there is no 'model city'. Rather, global city formation processes are ultimately shaped by the state, and factors such as institutional capacity and political will, history and geography. Given this, the replicability of global city models is in serious doubt: calls for the attainment of global city status in many countries may be unfounded or unrealistic, thereby shutting down alternative development scenarios that have the potential to be more appropriate and achievable given the continued diversity of conditions across space and time.

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Table 1 Roles of the qualitative state in a modern economy

A. Maintenance of a regime of property rights	**F. Creation and governance of financial markets**
• maintenance of private property rights • recognition of institutional property rights • basic rules for the ownership and use of productive assets • basic rules for the exploitation of natural resources • rules for the transfer of property rights (between individuals, households, institutions and generations)	• rules for the establishment and operation of financial institutions • designation of the means of economic payment • rules for the use of credit • maintenance of the lender of last resort
A. Maintenance of a regime of property rights	**F. Creation and governance of financial markets**
• maintenance of private property rights • recognition of institutional property rights • basic rules for the ownership and use of productive assets • basic rules for the exploitation of natural resources • rules for the transfer of property rights (between individuals, households, institutions and generations)	• rules for the establishment and operation of financial institutions • designation of the means of economic payment • rules for the use of credit • maintenance of the lender of last resort
B. Management of territorial boundaries	**G. Creation and governance of product markets**
• provision of military force • economic protection through manipulation of: • money flows • goods flows • services flows • labour flows • flows of intangibles • quarantine protection	• regulation of the market power of firms • the selection and regulation of natural monopolies • the promotion and maintenance of strategic industries • the provision of public goods • the provision of goods unlikely to be supplied fairly
C. Legal frameworks to maximise economic cooperation	**H. Production and reproduction of labour**
• establishment of partnerships and corporations • protection of intellectual property rights • the governance of recurring economic relations between: • family members • employers and workers • landlords and tenants • buyers and sellers	• demographic planning and governance • provision of universal education and training • governance of workplace conditions • governance of returns for work • social wage provision • supply and governance of child care • provision or governance of retirement incomes
D. Projects to ensure social cooperation	**I. Control of macro-economic trends**
• maintenance of law and order • undertake national image making processes • other coercive strategies	• fiscal policy • monetary policy • external viability
E. Provision of Basic Infrastructure	**J. Other legitimation activities**
• Provision or organisation of: • transportation and communications • systems • energy and water supply • waste-disposal systems • assembly and conduct of communications media • assembly and dissemination of public information • land use planning and regulation	• elimination of poverty • maintenance of public health • citizenship rights • income and wealth redistribution • urban and regional development • cultural development • socialisation • enhancement of the environment

Source: Derived from O'Neill (1997: 295).

Figure 1. A Stamp of Singapore

Figure 2. A Typology of Global Cities

1. Hyper Global Cities

Very well integrated into the
global economy through both
inward and outward flows

Global city-regions

· Cities

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2. Emerging Global Cities

More reliance on inward flows
from the global economy

Global city-regions

A/B   Emerging global cities

· Cities

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3. Global City-States

Very well integrated into the
global economy and
experience direct influence

Global city-regions

Global city-state

· Cities